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REGIMENTAL INSIGNIA
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HE COAT OF ARMS of the 376th Infantry Regiment
contains symbols that have been closely associated
with American history since pre-Revolutionary days.
The black rattlesnake on a field of gold dates back to
0~0
1638, being taken from the Ancient and Honorable
Artillery Company of Boston. The rattlesnake and the accompanying
motto, "Don't Tread on Me" also appear on the flag carried during the
Revolutionary War by the communities from which the original personnel
of the 376th Infantry Regiment were drawn. It appeared again on the flag
designed by Colonel Christopher Gadsden, who gave this reason for
choosing the device: "The rattlesnake has no eye lids and is therefore a
symbol of vigilance. It is said of the rattlesnake that it never began a fight
nor when once engaged, ever surrendered. It is therefore, an emblem of
peace, yet true courage.
The rattlesnake is found only in North
America. Among the ancients, serpents were considered to possess wisdom
and vigilance. 11
The bolt of lightning, or thunderbolt, on a bend of fiery red symbolizes
the power of destruction over the enemy, and is probably the first "blitzkrieg" device to be incorporated in a regimental coat of arms. The upper
field of blue designates Infantry. At this writing the blue field contains
no device because at the time the Coat of Arms was designed, the 376th
Infantry Regiment was entitled to no battle honors. However, the magnificent achievements of the Regiment in the present war will be commemorated by a symbol to be placed in the field at some future date.
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INTRODUCTION
COLONEL HAROLD H. McCLUNE

[!]

he design of this book's compilers is to present a panoramic view of the 376th Infantry from its birth in September 1921 to the capitulation of the Japanese Empire
in August 1945; a panorama of battle experiences that
0~0
have demonstrated our superiority over the enemy that
confronted us, and proved the mettle of our civilian Army.
While this is the story of an infantry regiment, we do not fail to appreciate the contributions modern technical science, designer of our weapons,
our armor and aircraft support, and our means of protecting against weapons, has made for the success of our infantry. The weapons and equipment which have proved so deadly in the hands of this war s foot-soldiers
are the best that any army ever had.
In view of these new developments, the infantryman who, until recently
did most of his fighting with a rifle, has become a specialist, and his training must be more thorough than that of any other branch of the army. It
must begin with knowledge, gleaned first from the books and regulations;
but it must stop short of depending on ready-made ideas': Much had to be
learned from other battles, and from brothers-in-arms who learned the hard
way. These principles are sound. The leaders and the men alike have
proved them in the way they adapted themselves and applied the technique
learned in the shock of battle when flesh and blood were the price exacted.
An attempt has here been made to tell the story of how the Regiment
fought-the story of its battles, and the story of its individual acts of courage in the face of the enemy. Much is said of the weather and the land we
fought in, but words are inadequate here. Frozen feet, hunger, loss of sleep,
constant exposure to enemy fire, and the shock of seeing a buddy killed or
wounded cannot be described. They must be lived.
It is the purpose of this volume to tell that story-as much of it as can
be told in words-simply, wit11out exaggeration. This history needs no
embellishments. It is hoped this work may be of use to future military
historians searching for details not to be found in official War Department
records. But primarily it is intended for the officers and men who have
served, and are serving with the 376th Infantry Regiment. For all of us
who wish to keep alive our rich experience with this noble organization,
this book will serve to renew our memories and discipline our imaginations.

WE WON'T
WE CAN'T FORGET
CHAPLAIN

BUCHANAN

Lord God, creator of all men, apart
From whom no man knows life, or tastes of death,
Author of justice, mercy, and man's hope,
Out of great weariness at the battle's end
We turn to Thee. Stunned by such strange silence,
We search ourselves for gratitude and praise.
They say a victory's ours, that war is ended . .
We yet are men, and from our hearts we pray Accept our tardy thanks.
But, God of care and mercy, where are these
Who bled and suffered here, and now are gone?
They were our friends, our brothers in the fight,
Breathing the air we breathed, the good and bad;
They felt what we felt, shared our loves and shared
Our little peeves, and through our endless days,
Joined us in bickering and high spirits too,
In love of family, sweethearts and daily bread,
We dreamed with them of home, of joyous laughter;
Of daily cares and freedom once again
To go our way through all our nights and days.
These dreams we left behind us when we faced
Our stubborn enemy together here . . .
The beauty of the snow upon the hills
Was marred by black and the redness of their blood.
No refuge here, and each with his own prayer
Sought strength from his own God.
Their duty plain, their honor and their pride
Held high against the Winter's piercing chill

Against the enemy's relentless hate . . .
They struggled forward to this victory
And their own immortal fate.
We saw them hit; we heard their cries, and lay
Beside them in their pain and agony.
And now, our God, we call their names until
Our comrades come to tell us these are dead,
And we are numb .
Lord God, hear now our prayer, lest we forget:
These were the best of men; our cherished friends
In this life of war where man was close to man.
We loved what they loved, felt their love in turn,
And were a part of them, and they of us.
Give us the strength to hold their memory firm,
That in our lives they yet may live, and know
The honor of our children's world of peace
For which they all have ·paid so high a fee.
Oh, God of mercy, each through his own creed
Honored Thy name and spoke to Thee in need
Out of his plain sincerity.
Hear us now, and still preserve their souls
In the bright honor of their shining hour.
In Heaven and on earth let all men know
That of all manhood these have been the flower;
That in those moments of a world gone mad,
Each clung to pride and saw his duty plain.
Because they left us we are poor and robbed
Of all the strength and love we had in them.
Yet, with their cherished memory they willed
Us freedom and their yearning after peace,
And years of greater trust twixt man and man.
God hear our prayer, for they are part of us
And we shall not forget,
Nor can forget . . .

OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE 376TH INFANTRY KILLED IN ACTION OR DIED OF WOUNDS
CAPTAINS
WILLIAM A . BRIGHTMAN
CARL J . SHETLER
FIRST LIEUTENANTS
THOMAS A . DALY
TOM HODGES
JAMES H. McCOY JR.
HARRY N . McLAUGHLIN
THEODOR E. WEISSICH
SECOND LIEUTENANTS
WILLIAM B. BENDURE
ERNEST N . DYRLUND
EVERETT M . MORRIS
TFCHNICAL SERGEANTS
ROY ACKERMAN
FOREST M. BALDWIN
LEON D. CRUTCHFIELD
ROBERT J . KINCAID
WILLIAM H. McGUINNISS
AUGUST E. WELLING
STAFF SERGEANTS
WILLIAM H. ARMSTRONG
JOSEPH W. BRYANT
JAMES B. BUMGARNER
JOSEPH I. BULGER
ASHTON L. COLE
PERRY E. CUNNINGHAM
CHARLES V. DEEMS
RUSSELL F. DOLL JR.
CHARLES FOXGROVER JR.
EARL GLADMAN
WALKER HANEY
FRED HARDING
ELMER A . HEINEMANN
ALBERT F. JOHNSTON
ELMER L. KLAWITTER
HAROLD V. KLEIN
CHARLES F. LUZADER
LEROY McPHERSON
JOSEPH M. NICHOLAS
JOHN R. RIDDELL JR .
RAYMOND R. SCHULTZ
KENNETH G. STAAB
CLAYTON W. TAYLOR
SERGEANTS
BERNARD J. ADAMIETZ
JOHN A. BACCELLO
DONALD S. BALL
CECIL R. BANTA
JESSE R. BERRY
FRANCIS H. CAMPBELL
HUGH J. CARLISLE
CHARLES H . COWAN JR.
HAROLD L. CROSSLEY
ROBERT W. DYE
ADELARD E. GRENIER

HERMAN R. HEPPEL
HELMAR C. JOHNSON
STANLEY M. JOHNSTON
ALFRED M . KING
DALLAS H. LOWDER
LESLIE E. MARSH
MIKE P. MATYUF
RALPH J. MURPHY
CLARENCE C. PERDUE
NORMAN J. PIERCE
GILBERT C. ROBB
JOSEPH L. RODRIGUEZ
GEORGE J. ROOKSBY
JOHN J. RYSNIK
AUGUST R. SCHENZINGER
KENNETH E. SIMONS
ALAN A. SLADE JR .
WALTER J. SMITH
ORVIS J. STRONG
JAMES E. TINCH
CARTER N. TRUDEAU
JAMES M . WILSON
RANDALL A . YOST

CORPORALS
ROY S. ALEXANDER
ELMER L. BENNETT
WILLIAM L. CLEARY
JOHN C. JOHNSON
WILLIE A. LESTER
ALBERT G. McDUFFIE
ROBERT A. MUNROE
PHILIP W. MURRAY JR.
JOHN R. NASH
GEORGE H. PARRISH
WALLACE T. REDD
EDWARD W. RUSSELL
LEONARD T. THOMPSON
ROY TUBBS
EVERETT W. ZELLERS
PRIVATES FIRST CLASS
RALPH ALLEN
ROBERT L. ALLEN
GORAN H. ASP
PASCUAL AYALA
FREDERICK R. BALCH JR.
CHARLES R. BASKAS
EMIL G. BAUMGARTNER
JAMES L. BELLISTON JR.
PAUL A. BLAKELY
JOHN A . BUCKLEY
ANDREW L. BUELL
JULIUS A. BURDZY
JOHN M. BURKE
FOREST E. BUSSELL
JAMES P. BYUS
PAUL R. CAGLE
ROBERT H. CARTER
ORVILLE CHAFFINS
WILLIAM P. CLEARY
CHARLES E. COLLINS
SAMUEL K. CRESSMAN
PAUL CURTIS
BERTIL R. DAHLSTROM
JOHN J. DAVIS
LAWRENCE H. DENT
DARREL E. DOTHAGER
JOHN C. DOYLE
MICHAEL DROBNACK JR.
ROBERT L. ELLIS
JOHN W . FANSET
KENNETH L. FRAGO
CHARLES N. FRANKLIN
EVANGELOS F. FRANJESKOS
FITZHUGH FREEMAN
ROSARIO FRENO JR.
RICHARD L. GARBER
VICTOR J , GIANNETTI
GEORGE R. GIBSON
HERMAN B. GIBSON
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CHAPTER I

In the Beginning
1921-1942

0~0

~[!]~

n August 1945 when the atomic bomb at last brought the tottering
Japanese Empire to its knees, the 316thinfantry, manning a sector of
the Russian-American control line in Czechoslovakia, at last had
0~0
.
time to look back oveF its long career and the part it had played
in history's greatest war. For many in the Regiment this history was short, extending back over no more than a few weeks or a few months. Some knew only
the patterned green farmlands of Czechoslovakia. Others remembered Wuppertal
and the broken streets of Ludwigshafen. For others memories of the 316th began
with Veckring, Ayl, Ockfen, Wiltingen and other towns in the wake of the long
advance from the Siegfried Switch Line to the Rhine.
There were many too who could look back as far as training days in the mud of
Camp McCain, Mississippi, or to the dust storms and treeless wastes of Camp
Phillips, Kansas. A few still remember that day at Fort Custer, Michigan, back
in September 1942, when Colonel Arthur N. Payne presented the Regimental colors
to Major General Harry J. Malony, and the 316th became officially activated as a
part of the 94th Division. Captain George P. Whitman, S-3 of the Second Bat-
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talion, can even tell stories of the old Organized Reserve days before activation.
But many officers and men now serving with the Regiment were not even born on
that September in 1921 when the 376th first saw the light of day.
The 376th was more of a blueprint than an actual organization in those days. It
was a skeleton regiment of the skeleton 94th Division, Organized Reserve, which
was one of the then slightly undernourished brain children of the National Defense
Act of 1920. In those early days the Regiment consisted entirely of officers, most
of them recently returned veterans of France and the occupation of the Rhineland.
Commanded from the first by New Hampshire-bred war veteran, Colonel Arthur
N. Payne, the infant 376th was composed entirely of residents of historic Eastern
Massachusetts, and its headquarters was established in Boston-conveniently close
to home for most of its members.
It was only natural that an organization so surrounded by Bay State tradition
should choose as the device for its coat of arms the rattlesnake and motto "Don't
tread on me." The rattlesnake, aside from being a symbol of eternal vigilance,
had appeared, along with this motto, on the flag of the men who had "fired the
shot heard 'round the world" at Lexington and Concord in Revolutionary days.
Most of the original personnel of the 376th were direct descendants of these
Minutemen, the symbolic statue of which appears on the crest of every reserve
regiment in the army.
During the first decade of its existence, the 376th was a fairly dormant organization from a military point of view for fifty weeks of the year. Its members
went about their civilian occupations and attended drill sessions, and later military classes one or two evenings a week The other two weeks were devoted to
more extensive training sessions held first at Fort Devens with the rest of the 94th
Division and later at separate unit camps.
It was in 1932 that the military horizon of the 316th began to broaden. In that
year the Regiment was first detailed to take charge of a CMTC regiment of
somewhere near 1,000 men. It was at this time that a number of officers of the
Regiment received a year of training with the Regular Army under the provisions
of the Thomason Act.
In addition to the limited training schedule provided by law, the officers of the
Regiment devoted much time to rifle marksmanship, and in this respect the Regiment earned an enviable local reputation. Several handsome trophies w~re the
subject of contest on various occasions, the first being known as the "Battalion
Challenge Trophy." Matches were held each year beginning in 1925, and the
Regiment for purposes of the match was divided into four groups: Regimental
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Headquarters and Headquarters Company, and the three battalions. Each group
could enter as many contestants as desired and its score was determined by
taking the five highest recorded. The trophy was up for seven years when it was
finally won for the third time by Regimental Headquarters and is now proudly
possessed by Colonel Payne.
Several sub-calibre indoor matches and turkey shoots were held at various intervals, and in 1935 the Regiment entered a team in the Metropolitan Rifle and Pistol
League, being the only Reserve component ever to participate. Led by Captain Martin J. Sullivan the team won first prize in its division against nine others which
had offered comp~tition of the stiffest sort.
On July 26th, 1934, Colonel Henry A. Hale assumed command of the 376th.
Colonel Hale was born in Salem, Massachusetts, June 23rd, 1888, graduated from
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1910, attended Plattsburg Training Camp,
August 1916. He was commissioned Captain in June 1917, and served with the
23rd Engineers. It was under the command of Colonel Hale that the 376th Infantry Chapter, Reserve Officers Association, proposed a plan for inactive duty
pay for Reserve Officers which received many favorable comments from high
ranking officers of the Army.
Along with its duties the Regiment managed to engage in a number of unofficial
festivities. Regular dinners and parties were held at the Rowes Wharf Station of
the Boston Yacht Club. Somewhat outside the scope of this History is the story
of the "Mystic Council of the Mahagony Picture Frame." Readers interested in
this delightful tale are referred to any of the original personnel of the Regiment.
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J\.clivalion
First indications of the activation of the 376th Infantry Regiment were received
during June 1942 at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, where the officer cadre was
selected from the 77th Division. On July 12th the cadre began studies at a Division
Officers School at Fort Benning, Georgia. The cadre consisted of the following
officers: Major Gerald D. Waits, Captains John R. Dossenbach, Thomas R. Kelley,
Benjamin S. Roper, Graydon A. Tunstall, Alkie C. Kaufman, Frederick W. Bucky,
Jr., First Lieutenants Carl H. Schofield, Hugh R. Gilmore, Frank Malinsky,
Jr., Cecil J. King, John W. Scott, George P. Whitman, Charles A. Sinclair, Lawrence S. Simcox, John D. Heath, Miles S. Andrews, Marion P. Smith, Max H.
Karelitz, Julian M. Way, Howard P. Landry, Robert Smith, Jr., Edward S. Pilcher,
Albert S. Fisher, and William H. Buehrle, Jr. Only members of the cadre who
had been on the roster of the Regiment during its reserve status were Lieutenants
Whitman and Andrews.
Commanding the cadre, and later Commanding Officer of the 376th Infantry
Regiment, was Colonel Maximilian Clay, who had been the chief of the Communications Section at the Infantry School, Fort Benning. From the 325th Infantry, 82nd
Division came Lieutenant Colonel V. J. Conrad to be Executive Officer of the new
Regiment. Lieutenant Colonels Henry Borntraeger and Ernest F. Walker commanded the First and Third Battalions, respectively. The Second Battalion was under the
command of Major (now Lieutenant Colonel) Olivious C. Martin, Jr. S-3 duties were
handled by Major James B. Bennett, later commander of the Third Battalion. All
the other officers, with one exception, had been previously assigned to the 307th
Infantry and were acquainted with one another.
On August 8th, 1942, at the completion of the Division Officers School at Fort
Benning, the officer cadre began its journey to Fort Custer, Michigan, where the
Regiment was to be officially activated, q.nd begin its training. Arriving at Fort
Custer August 12th, the officers found most of the area assigned to the Regiment
still occupied by other troops. Temporary headquarters were set up, but had to
be moved three times. On August .15th the enlisted cadre arrived at Fort Custer.
This cadre consisted entirely of former members of the 307th Infantry, 77th Division. The balance of officers, three First Lieutenants and 98 Second Lieutenants arrived between August 23rd and 25th. Most of these officers were recent graduates
of the Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning.
At this time the officers and enlisted cadre began full scale preparations for the
reception of the filler replacements, expected on September 15th. Training was held
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to refresh the officers and non-commissioned officers on the subjects they would
soon be teaching the new recruits. On September 12th the Regiment learned
from Division that the new men would not arrive before October 1st. So the training schedule was extended to that date.
On September 15th the 376th Infantry Regiment was formally activated in a ceremony with other units of the Division. Colonel Arthur N. Payne, first Commanding Officer of the Regiment, represented the Division in its reserve status. He
presented the Regimental Colors to Major General Harry J. Malony, Commanding
General of the 94th Division. That evening Colonel Payne messed with the officers of the 376th, and related to them many anecdotes of the Reserve Regiment's
history.
On September 18th a detail of 114 enlisted men and five officers, Captain Roper
in charge, participated with other units of the Division, in the dedication ceremony of the Willow Run airplane factory. President and Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt were present. A commendation was later received from the Commanding
General of the Sixth Service Command as to the exceptional performance of the
officers and men of the 94th Division during the ceremony.
Still no recruits were forthcoming. Then early in November the. Regiment received orders to move to Camp Phillips, Kansas and all training gave way to
boxing and crating operations. The Regiment entrained on the morning of
November 15th and detrained at Camp Phillips to find it a new post, only partially
completed, consisting of "theater of operations" type buildings. Bleak, rolling and
treeless prairies surrounded the cantonment area.
Undaunted by the inhospitable atmosphere, the cadre began once more the job
of preparing camp for the new men. On December 1st the recruits begah to stream
in, and continued to arrive throughout the month.
If Camp Phillips had seemed dismal to the cadre, it was utter desert to these new
and inexperienced soldiers, most of them only a few weeks out of civilian life. The
weather was now that of a typical Kansas Winter, extremely cold, with a constant
wind of almost hurricane proportions.
Despite the weather, training had to begin. But first there was the business of
classifying the new men and placing them where they were best fitted. Their
backgrounds were as varied as the hues of the rainbow, representing every walk of
civilian life. But soon each one was training to perform an Army job that matched
his talents as closely as possible.
Basic and technical training began under the thirteen weeks Mobilization Training Program on December 28th, 1942. Eve:ry soldier remembers his basic training as a
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The 376th Infantry Regiment Rifle Team, winners of the 94th Division
Rille Match held at Camp Phillips, Kansas, Saturday, April 24, 1943.

frantically hurried period, crammed with callisthenics, close order drill, rifle
marksmanship, tactical training, discipline, and more callisthenics, all punctuated
with KP, policing the area, and other offensive details. For the men of the 376th
all of this was augmented by the fierceness of the Kansas Winter and the inadequacy of the tar paper barracks.
When a new man joins the Regiment, the oldtimers usually tell him first about
their experiences in combat, but inevitably they .soon get around to tall tales ·Of
those days back in Kansas.
The Regiment experienced its first loss when Private Donald B. Gipson, Company D, died at the Station Hospital on February 10th from complications arising
from an appendicitis operation. Other casualties included 33 march fractures in
the first eight weeks of training. The Medical Detachment was also kept busy caring for the many serious colds and other respiratory infections caused by severe
weather. The process of elimination had begun. Those who could not stand up
under the rigors of basic training were discharged or reassigned. The men who
remained were slowly becoming hardened soldiers.
Snow and high winds constantly harassed the Regiment during the range season.
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However, 89.50fo of the men qualified with the M-1; ·1 9.5% with the Browning
Automatic Rifle; 89.50fo with the Light Machine Gun and 96.00fo with the 31mm
Anti-Tank Gun. At the end of basic training, the Regiment passed the proficiency tests conducted from March 22nd to 27th by XI Corps. At this time · the
Regiment consisted of 160 officers, 2 warrant officers and 3,424 enlisted men.
With the beginning of April came the unit training period. In many ways this
was more rugged than basic, but it was not so rushed, and the men, now more
adept at the time-consuming "off-duty" tasks that continually plague a soldier,
had more opportunity for recreation. There were passes to the surrounding
towns-Salina, Wichita, McPherson, and even across the state line to the metropolis of Kansas City, Missouri.
In camp, athletic activities were organized to fill the lengthening evenings.
The first of these was basketball. On April 1st the 376th enlisted men's team cap-tured the 94th Division Basketball Championship by winning all ten games they
played. The 376th Medical Detachment won the Division Company Championship
on April 7th. Track season followed, and despite the eternally muddy condition
of the turf, interest was keen. On April 17th, Technician Fourth Grade Horace Yan
cey, Medical Detachment, won the Division cross-country run. What had been a
Winter training chore became a Springtime pleasure with the formation of a rifle
team. On April 24th, the 376th Rifle Team won the Division matches. But the favorite
relaxation was of course furloughs, which were granted throughout the Spring.
Unit training included many of the Army's newly-developed "Battle" courses,
purpose of which was to condition the men to the noise, excitement and confusion
of combat. There was the infiltration course, which required creeping and crawling through mud and barbed wire entanglements while under fire. Other courses
included day and night close combat courses, village fighting, and the attack of
fortified areas. These all paid dividends in calmness and coolness when the Regiment actually entered combat.
Lieutenant Colonel Olivious C. Martin took Companies A and C and the entire
S~cond Battalion to Nebraska on April 20th. There, during the next six days,
they guarded the route of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was then on a
transcontinental tour of war industries.
On May 20th, Captain Edwin S. Pilcher and Lieutenant Louis J. Ademec left for
Personnel Replacement Depot, Shenango, Pennsylvania and overseas service, being
the first of many to leave the Regiment in this way.
Summer found Kansas just as uncomfortable as Winter and Spring had been.
The wind, now from the South, covered the marching, sweating soldiers with a film
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of dust from the Mid-West's dust-bowl. On June 2nd seven more officers were released from duty with the Regiment for overseas duty as replacements.
On June 19th the Regiment, progressing from unit training to the combined phase
of training, participated in eight combat-team problems, followed by two Division
problems. It was at this time that the Regiment learned to work with the attached
units which were to support it so ably in combat. These included the 919th Field
Artillery Battalion; Company C, 319th Medical Battalion; First Platoon, Company C,
319th Engineer Battalion; and a detachment from the 94th Signal Company.
During July XI Corps conducted Battalion Combat Firing Proficiency tests, and
on August 16th the Regiment was reorganized under the new Table of Organization,
which, among other changes, called for the addition of a Cannon Company. Upon its
activation, the Cannon Company was commanded by Captain William H. Buehrle.
Strength of the Regiment at this time was 150 officers, 3 warrant officers and 3,060
enlisted men. During this month sixteen additional officers left for overseas duty.
During this time the 376th continued to excel in all phases of athletic competition.
The Regimental Boxing Team won the Division Championship, and in August Technician Fifth Grade Martin Lipton, Medical Detachment, won the Division Tennis
Championship.
With September came preparations to move to Tennessee to participate in the
Second Army Maneuvers. Major Thomas R. Kelley commanded the advance party
which preceded the Regiment to its initial area near · Gallatin, Tennessee. The
entire Regiment travelled by train, leaving all organic transportation behind. Upon
arrival in the maneuver area, they took over the vehicles left there by Ule 319th
Infantry of the 80th Division.
Maneuvers were like a great game, far more interesting than other phases of
training. At the same time they were the best possible way of learning the many
complicated details of large-scale combat operations. During the course of the
problems, the Regiment was opposed by such worthy foes as the 30th Infantry
Division, 12th Armored Division, and IV Armored Corps. The Tennessee countryside was dotted with pine-covered hills, beautiful to the eye, but backbreaking
to soldiers laden with heavy packs. However the difficult climbs proved highly
b~neficial to the general physical condition of all the men. Through the maneuver
area flowed the turbulent Cumberland River, which at two different times the
Regiment used for practice assault crossings. This training proved useful when
it came time to cross the Saar River in Germany.
Rest periods between the problems were the occasion for many delightful campfire gatherings. Food received in packages from the folks at home was washed
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down with great quantities of 3.2 beer and a few shots of Tennessee mountain
moonshine. With singing and story-telling, these festivities lasted well into the
night. Passes to Nashville were also a means of escape from army routine.
Unlike an actual combat zone, the Tennessee Maneuver Area was a good place
in which to get lost. Opportunities for individuals and small groups to "live alone
and like H" were ideal. Initial attempts at large-scale operations often caused complete disorganization; consequently, squads and half-squads lost all contact with
higher echelons and had to take to the hills.
At such times, the native ingenuity of the American soldier and the warm hospitality of the Tennessee farmers combined to provide adequate insurance against
starvation. With hunger in their eyes GI's would approach a farmhouse, never to
be turned away. The meanest shack was good for a meal. And what meals! The
thought of them kindles fond memories in the mental palate of every ETO-happy
Joe. Real Southern-style fried chicken, candied yams, hot biscuits, steaming black
coffee, and always a large, freshly-baked pie. For additional rations there was
always the cross-roads general store. Of course there was usually an MP stationed
outside to keep soldiers from entering these forbidden premises, but ,it was simplicity itself to engage a local Huck Finn as purchasing agent.
For comfortable quarters there was the farmer's hay loft, far more conducive to
sound sleep than any slit trench or pup tent. At the end of the problem the
stragglers would find their way back to their outfits, no wiser in tactics but well
versed in the problems of supply.
Upon the termination of maneuvers, the Regiment assembled near Murfreesboro,
Tennessee, and moved by truck to Camp Forrest. Pyramidal tents served for quarters during the entire stay at Forrest. During the first week there, fifty percent of
the Regiment went on furlough. Over 500 men left for overseas during maneuvers.
On November 16th, 50 enlisted men transferred to the 8th Division. On the same
day Captain William H. Mclaine, with two other officers and one hundred enlisted
men, left to guard German Prisoners of War working at Indianola, Mississippi. This
left the Regiment at less than half strength. The remaining men went through refresher courses on basic subjects. Off-duty hours were spent in the small but bustling town of Tullahoma, Tennessee.
With the recall of Colonel Clay to the position of Chief of the Communications
Section, Infantry School, Fort Benning, command of the 376th Infantry Regiment
was 'assumed by Colonel Harold H. McClune on November 24th. A Colonel in the
Regular Army, Colonel McClune came to the 376th from the 144th Infantry Regiment, whose Commanding Officer he had been for a short time. Previously he had
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been Chief of Staff of the Puerto Rican Mobile Force for almost two years. His
earlier service includes the Mexican Campaign, World War I and Army of Occupation in Germany after 1918. His decorations include the Silver Star and the
Purple Heart, to both of which he has received oak leaf clusters while commanding
the 316th.
Throughout November rumors circulated concerning the next station. After the
over-ventilated shacks of Camp Phillips and the rocky hills of Tennessee, everyone was looking forward to the comparative comfort of "double-decker" barracks,
perhaps in some permanent post in the East, close to a large city. Not until the
Regiment boarded trucks and headed South on November 26th was it made known
to all that the new home was to be Camp McCain in Mississippi.
The first view of the new post caused many hearts to sink. Here were the same
tar-paper barracks so familiar to the veterans of the Phillips campaign, and the mud
was just as thick. But happily, there were a few trees dotting the landscape.
Little time was devoted to the business of settling down and getting comfortable
in the new home. Intensive training was resumed immediately. This phase was
known as Post-Maneuver training. It was to be the last of the dry running; the final
pre-combat stage. It included everything from a hasty review of basic subjects to
the most elaborate divisional maneuvers. The first emphasis, after the basic subjects, was on the integration of a squad as a fighting unit. Realistic situations were
presented, allowing leaders to use their initiative much as they would in a similar combat situation. Concurrently training was given in all phases of marksmanship. New ranges, such as the transition course and the moving target course,
were set up.
Despite the full schedule, which included many night problems, it did not take
long for the men of the Regiment to exploit fully all the recreational facilities
of the surrounding country. Memphis, Tennessee, famed for its pretty girls, was 100
miles away. On Saturday afternoon the Memphis train was cra~med wih pleasure-seeking soldiers. The citizens of Memphis greeted the 316th with typical warm
Southern hospitality. The Knights of Columbus, the YMCA, the USO and the many
church societies all cooperated to make week-end passes as delightful as possible.
The 316th continued to maintain its reputation of being fun-loving, without being
over noisy and ill-mannered.
For those who sought relief from the arid laws of Mississippi, an unoffical Saturday night headquarters was established in the crowded, smoke-filled Creel Room of
the Peabody Hotel in Memphis. Those who sought quieter relaxation migrated to
the smaller towns of Mississippi. In Grenada, Winona, Oxford, Greenwood, Jack-
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At a Division Review to honor the Expert Infantry units, Colonel Harold
H. McClune receives the Expert Infantry Streamers from Major General
Harry J. Malony, Division Commander, at Camp McCain, Miss., June 1944.

son-all quiet church-going towns-many men found the homelike atmosphere
for which they yearned. Homesickness was also alleviated by furloughs, which
were granted to seven percent of the Regiment at a time.
Nor were recreational facilities in camp neglected. An Inter-Company Basketball
league was organized at once, with active participation by all units. Under the
direction of ex-pugilist Sergeant Benny Cohen, of Company I, boxing training was
given daily in the Regimental Recreation Hall. Each company had its day room,
with a radio, comfortable chairs and a "coke" machine. PX's were well-stocked
with beer, soft drinks, candy, cigarettes and other needs. The moving picture
theatre in the Regimental area presented latest features nightly.
During the Winter, replacements began to arrive to fill up the half-strength
squads. Many of the new men were former students under the Army Specialized
Training Program. They brought to the Regiment much needed youth and vigor. At
first these "college kids" were looked upon with disfavor by the older soldiers of
the Regiment. But it soon became apparent even to the most obstinate that intellect
and education did not prevent a man from being a good fighting soldier. Other
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replacements came directly from reception centers. These were trained in provisional
companies by experienced non-coms, and soon became integrated into the Regimental fighting team.
On February 14th the 376th moved to Holly Springs National Forest, Mississippi
for two weeks of field problems for the squad. Here the squads encountered conditions which called on each man for the utmost in resourcefulness and ingenuity.
But just as in maneuvers, there was the enjoyment of getting "back to nature". At
the same time the Regiment began a thorough course in map and aerial photo
reading for officers and non-commissioned officers.
On February 21st, Private First Class Charles P. Seaman, Headquarters Company,
Third Battalion, was engaged in a grenade throwing problem. One grenade,
thrown by another man, hit an obstruction on the throwing pit, and rolled back
into the pit amongst Seaman and five other participants. Seaman quickly siezed
the live grenade and threw it, the grenade bursting in air shortly after clearing
the dugout.
For this heroic action, Private First Class Seaman was awarded the Soldier's
Medal by War Department General Order 44, April 31st, 1944, the presentation
being made by the Division Commander on June 3rd at Camp McCain. Seaman was
fatally wounded by sniper fire during the crossing of the Saar in February 1945.
With early Spring came the graduation from squad to platoon problems. The
first problems were held on the McCain reservation, but late in April the
Regiment moved again to Holly Springs for a more realistic series. The platoons,
entirely on their own, had to follow difficult compass courses over all types of
terrain, across streams and over high wooded hills, meeting all kinds of simulated
resistance.
Interests in sports mounted when the Regiment was represented in the annual
Golden Gloves Boxing Tournament. Private First Class George McDonald, Company
M, won the Mid-South Heavyweight Title in Memphis. Going on to the Golden
Gloves finals, held at the Chicago Stadium in Chicago, McDonald dropped a very
close decision to the national title-holder.
Begiiming in May almost everyone devoted off-duty hours to the national
pastime, baseball. The Regimental team took on all comers and each company had
its own softball team. Star of the seas on was Private First Class Carl Heidel,
Company F, who pitched a no-hit, no-run game.
Post Maneuver Training Period Number Two terminated with the Platoon Firing
Problems and the Rolling Barrage Exercise. The firing problems simulated combat
in minute detail. In the rolling barrage exercise the troops experienced the thrill
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of advancing close to the enemy under a barrage of supporting artillery. At this
time tests began for the Expert Infantry Badge. These tests covered every phase
of the training of the combat soldier. Requirements included marching 25 miles
in 8 hours, and 9 miles in 2 hours, with full field equipment; physical fitness tests,
compass courses, and all the myriad subjects a soldier must learn before he is
ready to meet the enemy. The entire Regiment undertook the tests with such
vigor that it came as no surprise when early in June the War Department made
the announcement that the 376th Infantry was the first regiment in the United
States Army to qualify as an Expert Infantry Regiment. •
For this distinction the Regiment was complimented by then Chief of Army
Ground Forces, General Leslie B. McNair. At a Division review held to honor the
Expert Infantry units, Colonel McClune received the Expert Infantry Streamers;
one for the Regiment, and one for each battalion and company, from General
Malony, who added his personal congratulations.
Although the Regiment had begun company firing problems in May, an acceleration of the training schedule caused the cessation of this program, and the
immediate introduction of battalion problems. Combat experience early in the
war had taught the need of thorough training of battalions as independent fighting units. This was repeatedly emphasized in the problems that followed, and the
results of the training are apparent in the splendid record of the three battalions
in combat.
A demonstration of the terrific fire power contained within a battallion was
given for Under Secretary of War, Robert S. Patterson, who visited· the Division
for two days. The Second Battalion Firing Test involved preparation of a defensive area and an attack with live ammunition against a position prepared by a
different battalion. Extensive artillery and mortar fire was incorporated in the
problem. The test was valuable training because of the firing restrictions, which
were left almost entirely in the hands of the battalion and company commanders.
From June 13th to 20th, the Regiment participated in the final phase of combat
training; a rugged, complex, all-weather Divisional pro_blem. To begin with, Regiment motored to Kilmichael, Mississippi, several miles from the camp reservation.
From there they advanced, in sweltering heat, through many obstacles to Dale
Road within the reservation. Here live ammunition was substituted for blanks,
providing a grand finale to the situation.
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011 to tbe Wars
On June 23rd an advance party of the 376th Infantry started out on its journey
overseas. This was the occasion for many rumors as to the destination and the
eventual mission of the Regiment. Until the very last, the unofficial G-2 set up in
each company latrine maintained, "Oh, this outfit will never go overseas!" Training was confined chiefly to physical fitness exercises, and to making up deficiencies in the training of some of the newer replacements. Chief activity was the issue
of new equipment. Password for this period was "POM" which stood for Preparation for Overseas Movement. Every man, every tent pole, every legging lace had
to be POM qualified and combat serviceable before the Regiment could move. Then
came packing and crating. There could be little doubt that a long trip was ahead.
But the reactionaries still mumbled things about Iceland and other non-combat stations. They couldn't believe that the 376th was at last ready to enter the big show.
On July 26th the first elements of the Regiment were speedily loaded into Pullmans and departed for . . . they knew not where. The roundabout route meandered through Mississippi into Tennessee, then south into Mississippi again, down
further south into Alabama, from there north once more into Georgia, through the
scenery of the Carolinas and Virginia, then through the Nation's Capital, where
the doughfeet yelled uncomplimentary remarks at the MP's along the route. After
Washington the train headed into Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey
and around New York City and deposited its duffle-laden passengers at Camp
Shanks, near West Nyack, NewYork. Shanks is a pretty camp, nestled in the
pine hills of the lower Catskills. WAC's are numerous and friendly, the PX's
overflowing with good things, and the trains to New York City run at frequent
intervals. Every one wanted to stay there a long time. But it soon became apparent
·that such was not to be the case.
Everything that remained to be done before the Regiment could ship was accomplished in a hurry. New gas masks were issued and explained, "abandon ship"
drills were given, censorship rules qualified. The supposedly strict POE physical
turned out to be a "short-arm" in dou'ble time. When all these things were done,
short passes to New York City were issued. Knowing that they had little time
left to look at America, most of the men tried to see as much of its largest city
as possible in a few hours. Some got only as far as the first bar on 42nd Street,
while two men from Tennessee enjoyed the ferry ride from New Jersey so much
that they made the trip fifteen times.
On Saturday, August 5th the entire Regiment again took the train for New York
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City ... This time not to return the same day. Every man and officer carried
all of his T/E equipment from the train to the ferry. As the ferry touched the New
Yo,rk side, a Transportation Corps Band broke into the strains of "Sidewalks of
New York." The American Red Cross served lemonade and doughnuts, which refreshed every one enough to make the haul up the gangplank. At the end of the
gangplank was the largest ship that any of the men had ever seen. In fact it
was the largest ship the world had ever seen-the famed HMS Queen Elizabeth.
When the loading was complete the entire division plus numerous smaller detachments were aboard.
The motors of the Elizabeth started to churn the waters of New York Harbor at
exactly 0125, Sunday, August 6th Soon every one was taking a last look at the
American shoreline.
Although quarters were close and often uncomfortably hot, the sea was smooth
and almost everybody enjoyed the entire trip without a trace of mal de mer. Daily
routine was determined by the ship's calls, which were mostly chow, boat drill
and blackout. Only two meals a day were served, but these occupied most of the
daylight hours, the vast number of men necessitating six shifts in three mess halls.
The food, though usually ample, was typically English, and strange to the palates
of most of the men. After the last shift of the morning meal, every one reported to
the boat deck for "abandon ship" drill. At this formation news and announcements
were published.
Ireland was sighted on Friday, August 11th. After sailing down the scenic Firth
of Clyde, the Elizabeth dropped anchor in the harbor off the picturesque village of
Grenoch, Scotland. Not until the next day did debarkation begin.
Despite the blazing sun, the orders called for the wearing of overcoats and the
carrying of all equipment. By the time land was reached, everyone was sweltering.
But the Red Cross came to the rescue with beverages and doughnuts. And there
was a kilt-clad Scotch bagpipe band playing weird melodies as the men boarded
the unfamiliar English trains. The train trip from Grenoch to Hullavington, England
was filled with unusual and lovely scenery. And for the first time men of the
376th heard the now historic plea, "Any gum chum?"
At Hullavington the troops were met by members of the advance party who had
been preparing the camp site for over a month. The Regiment was located at Pinkney Park, situated one mile from the village of Sherston, Wiltshire, England. Quarters were pyramidal tents, with headquarters and mess halls in Nissen huts.
The Regiment immediately began training, consisting mainly of hedgerow tactics,
conditioning marches and range firing. Many valuable tips were received from
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officers who had returned from Normandy in regard to hedgerow fighting. New
vehicles and crew-served weapons were issued, as was ammunition and all other
equipment needed to fill combat loads.
As usual the men of the Regiment applied themselves to off duty activities as
assiduously as they did their official functions. Dances were held at Pinkney Park,
with partners recruited from neighboring civilians and WAAF's. Bristol, Gloucester,
Malmsbury, Cheltenham and Chippingham were visited nightly. Most of the men
were fortunate enough to get passes to London, where the Red Cross provided
rooms, food, and a tour of the city.
It was on September 5th that the organic transportation left Pinkney Park for the
embarkation area at Southampton. The next day the rest of the Regiment marched
to Hullavington, entraining at the same station where they had detrained a month
previously. On the afternoon of September 6th troops were filing up the gangplanks
into the HMS Cheshire at the Southampton docks. That E!Vening, under cover of
darkness, the 376th left the blacked out coast of England behind. Destination: Somewhere in France.
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CHAPTER II

ForgoUen Front

Arrival in France

~[]

t was the afternoon pf September 8th, 1944 when the HMS Cheshire, carrying two battalions and some special companies of the
376th Infantry Regiment, dropped anchor off Ste. Mere Eglise on
0~0
the Normandy coast. Some hours later the first LCI's grated to a
stop on the sands of Utah Beach, and the first streams of cold and heavily laden
men filed down the ramps and set foot in France.
The beach was quiet in the gathering darkness, and there were only rusted
tangles of wire, old shell cases, and craters that already were sprouting tufts
of grass to testify that 94 days before O)l these same sands American assault
forces had chiselled one of their first precarious toe-holds on Festung Europa. This
time the landing was unopposed except by the tide which kept many of the LCT's,
LCI's and "Rhino" craft with which the landing was made hovering in the dark·
ness off shore past midnight.
All during the night of September 8th, and the cold and drizzling dawn of September 9th the landing craft continued to move in, and the troops continued to file
slowly ashore, gather in groups and move off inland in slow, winding columns.
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FORGOnEN FRONT
ST. NAZAIRE
o --- ~

j
:i
SCALE IN MILES

~t

18

For most it was the first sight of France, but there was little to see. Only flat,
uninhabited moorland that seemed, in the darkness, to stretch endlessly · inland
from the beach.
It was Q. memorable march, from the beach to the marshalling area between Carentan, and Ste. Marie du Mont, with a light drizzle of rain making a sticky quagmire of the roads over which the Regiment moved, burdened with sodden packs
that included "everything on the Form 32 except the form itself."
The march was a straggling and noisy affair and . "griping" was rampant, favorite subjects being France in general, the rain and the mud iri particular, the lack
of transportation and the distance to the bivouac area which, for some companies,
was as much as ten miles.
The first bivouac area on the continent, much to the disappointment of those
who had consoled themselves during the long miles of the march with thoughts
of the warm, or at least dry houses which would fall to their lot for the night,
turned out to be a green but sodden assortment of orchards and pastureland.
Here, as Technician Fifth Grade Glen F. Kohl of Headquarters Company, First
Battalion explained, "with the slight amount of strength remaining in us, we managed to unroll our blankets and, careful of the places where the stale odor of
cows was the strongest, drop on top of them."
Here, during the next few days, the Regiment paused, spread in seeming confusion over acres of pasture. But the pause was not for rest. Hardly were the
packs unrolled when training began again-specialized training in hedgerow
tactics that set rumor-mongers going in a burst of renewed activity. Every one
applied himself tensely and earnestly, knowing that this would be the last of
training.
By September 12th the Regiment had moved again This time by truck to another bivouac area 7 miles northeast of Rennes where they halted to await their
transportation. The unloading of many of the trucks had been delayed by the
same equinoctial storm lhat had mired the roads to Carentan four days before.
It was while the Regiment was at the marshq.lling area that the men had learned
what their first mission was to be-the containing of the Lorient pocket on the
Atlantic coast of France. It was here near Rennes that they learned even official
announcements are subject to change. But changed or not, this was still the first
combat orientation. The moment had been long awaited, and the words were
no less awesome and momentous when they came: "to contain and screen ·the
enemy in and about St. Nazaire."
Finally this was "it".
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At last the trucks had come, and following the staffs and commanders who had
previously set out to reconnoiter the area to be occupied, the Regimental convoy
moved out for the coast of Brittany.
It was 0900 on Sunday, September 17th that the 331st Infantry of the 83rd Division was officially relieved, and the 376th, two years and two days after its activation as a member of the 94th Division, began its first combat mission.
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First Assignment
"To contain and screen the enemy in and about St. Nazaire." This was the first
mission, and to understand its import we must first glance at the map of France
and learn what the "big picture" was on September 17th, 1944 when the 376th took
over its new duties.
During the preceding two months the tide of the Wehrmacht in France had
ebbed at an ever increasing tempo before the onslaught of General Eisenhower's
spearheads. First from Normandy, then, after the breakthrough at St. Lo from
.
'
the Breton Peninsula, and finally, under the miraculously swift and devastating
thrusts of .General Patton's armor, fro:m north central France. In September the
last long tentacles of Nazi might west of the Siegfried Line were fast crumbling
to nothingness.
So rapid was this ebbing of the Wehrmacht flood that backwater tidal pools of
resistance were inevitably left in its wake. With the logic of water finding its
level, these forces poured into natural centers of resistance along the Atlantic
coast of France, then turned menacingly to face their would-be captors with their
backs to the relative security of the sea.
These were the "forgotten fronts"-forgotten by a press and public whose
eyes were fixed on the titanic struggle raging further east. They will never be
forgotten by the thousands of American and French troops who held some 75,000
strongly fortified, well fed, and well equipped Germans at bay along this coast
from late Summer until the last of the island strongholds surrendered with the final
collapse of the Hitler War Machine on May 8th, 1945.
The "forgotten fronts" stretched along 300 miles of French coastline, from Lorient on the underside of the Breton Peninsula all the way to the left bank of the
Gironde River above Bordeaux. Their existence denied the use of France's greatest Atlantic ports to Allied shipping, and continued to furnish safe harbors for the
U-boat wolf packs that, with the liberation of France, would have otherwise
been hard-pressed for refuelling stations. Of the 75,000 Germans isolated in these
areas, approximately 34,000 were divided among the Pointe de Grave Peninsula
on the Gironde, Le Tremblade, the island of Oleron, and the La Rochelle region
The remainder was concentrated in St. Nazaire and Lorient.
In St. Nazaire, the region with which we are primarily concerned, some 23,000
troops were occupying an area of between 200 and 250 square miles in size,
which forms a rough triangle on the map. One side of the triangle is the Atlantic,
another side the Loire River. The third side, if we complete the triangle with a
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straight line, is some 45 miles of gently rolling hedgerow country, interspersed with
almost impassable salt marshes. It is this third side which was the mission of the
376th, along with other units of the 94th Division, and a number of FFI units, to
occupy.
In containing this ring of defenses, the 376th Infantry formed the core of the
Nantes Task Force, which was established on September 18th under the command
of Brigadier General Henry B. Cheadle. This task force included, in addition to the
376th Infantry and elements of the 302nd, the 919th Field Artillery Battalion; the
473rd Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AW) SP Battalion; Company C, 319th Engineer
Battalion; Company C and the first platoon of Company D of the 319th Medical.
Battalion. Also included were signal and other miscellaneous detachments.
The sector of this defense ring assigned to the 376th was a line running nearly
22 miles north and south from the Loire below Le Temple de Bretagne up through
Fay and Blain to the vicinity of a road junction 5 miles north of Blain where ten
roads came together like the spokes of a wheel. It was this road junction that was
appropriately dubbed "the spider" by the men of Company L who have much cause
to remember it.
The Regimental CP was established on September 17th at Heric, a small and
ancient farming town 7 miles east of Fay and 15 Il!iles north of the city of Nantes.
This was an ideal location, as it was almost directly behind the center of the defense line, and almost equi-distant from the three main centers of resistance that
were established at Blain, Fay, and Le Temple.
Of these three centers, on~ was assigned to each infantry battalion. As the areas
were first allocated upon taking over from the 331st, the First Battalion drew the
sector nearest the Loire around Le Temple. The Second Battalion was assigned
to Fay and vicinity, while Blain fell to the lot of the Third Battalion. North of the
Third Battalion was the 302nd Infantry of the 94th Division, and to the south, between Le Temple and the Loire, several FFI units held positions on the left of the
First Battalion. These units were at first poorly organized, but later received
arms and equipment from the U.S. forces through the Regiment and became a
vital link in the St. Nazaire chain of defense.
Throughout the Regimental line, a Main Line of Resistance was maintained
with two rifle companies of each battalion on line and one usually held in reserve. No large scale offensives were attempted throughout the campaign, as the
mission of the 376th was not to clean out, or reduce the pocket. Other than a few
assaults on limited objectives undertaken from time to time with the object of
straightening the lines, the entire action was limited to patrolling, observing,
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and repulsing the occasional small scale attacks launched by the Germans.
It was not a "phoney" war in any sense of the word. Hardly a day passed without clashes along some portion of the line. The whisper of artillery passing overhead and the shrill whine and crashing of the 88's soon became a familiar sound
to every one. But there were many days when nothing happened, and the Autumn
hedgerows were quiet as if no enemy were lurking in them. These were monotonous days that passed slowly in the damp and cold of the dugouts . But th ey
served as an important lesson in two of the worst phases of modern warfare : its
waiting and its silence.
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Typical St. Nazaire dugout, combination of Yankee ingenuity and any
material available. Here Private First Class Norman J. Pierce of F Company relaxes with Stars and Stripes after coming off front line guard duty.
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The Hedgerows
The story is often told in the 376th Infantry of the Colonel who arrived in the St.
Nazaire sector one day to inspect the front line positions. After visiting several
dugouts and guard posts he expressed his surprise at the quiet. "Why don't you
move forward?" he asked the battalion commander who was with him. "It's obvious there aren't any Germans within miles of here." Whereupon a German soldier thrust his head out of a nearby hedgerow and said in perfect English, "I see
you're new around here."
This story is somewhat apocryphal, and has undoubtedly been told of several
different fronts, but it is particularly adaptable to St. Nazaire where such deceptive
silence was a common experience. As Private First Class Richard J. Kamins, of
Company A describes it, "It was listening to strange sounds and seeing phantom
warriors." It was days on end of seeing nothing and night after night of tense
and incessant listening, and of hearing nothing. Yet always there was the feeling
that the enemy was lying in wait in the next hedgerow, or lurking just beyond
the limit of vision in the darkness. The moments when the Germans stopped being
shadows and became imminent and threatening reality; the sounds of a fire-fight,
shellfire, or even the mere rattle of tin cans in the warning net around the dugouts came sometimes almost as a relief from the monotony of waiting.
To the casual observer, the St. Nazaire front did not have the look of a battlefield. In the small, hedged-in fields a few hundred yards behind the lines and even
in the early days, in front of the lines, cows were grazing and farmers went
about their business in the fields. They pushed their slow and nondescript carts
along the roads as if the war were the business of those who fought it only, and
none of their concern. Even the line itself was hardly distinguishable from the
surrounding fields. Here and there gray lattice skeleton showed through the red
tile of a farmhouse roof, a wall was crumbled, or a field was pocked with 88
craters that looked like divots gouged in a giant golf-course. Otherwise there was
little sign of war.
Every hundred to two hundred yards along the line was a dugout, but these, of
necessity, were well camouflaged. From such vantage points as the church steeple
in Bouvron, the Germans were eternally on watch for signs of telltale smoke or
new humps in the landscape that had sprung up overnight. Each dugout, within
a miraculously short time after the raw earth was first heaped on top of it, had
became an inconspicuous part of a hedgerow corner or a tumbled bit of fence.
These dugouts were the front line. There were no communication trenches
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between and few foxholes. The dugouts were home, shelter, cover, guard posts
and gun positions all in one, and they were as varied as to comfort and interior
arrangement as the individual tastes of the occupants. All were of a basic design
with an entrance camouflaged by undergrowth, cut down through the yellowish
sandy soil. The walls were of sandbags. revetted with dirt to form a gentle slope
as well as to provide maximum protection. They were roofed with corrugated
iron buried so deep under the earth and sod that it was proof against anything
but a direct hit from a 240mm howitzer. There was little danger from these, as
those that the Germans had did not have sufficient observation for such pinpoint
accuracy.
Each dugout had gun and observation ports in at least the three walls facing
the enemy. Around each was an elaborate system of trip-flares and warning devices such as tin cans tied together in strings with trip wires across the most
likely approaches. Booby traps were at first used to supplement these warning nets.
but after several heedless cows and uninformed French civilians had come to grief
on them this practice was largely discontinued.
Most of the dugouts hous.e d from three to five men, so that three of them
would easily take care of a squad. Considering the average distance between
dugouts, this gave each squad a frontage of about a quarter of a mile. Each platoon was thus responsible for nearly a mile of front, which was a rather wide area
for so small a unit; the customary platoon front being something nearer 150 yards.
However, such seeming over-extension was thoroughly in keeping with the containing mission in which these units were engaged and was unavoidable if the
Regiment was to cover its assigned frontage of approximately 22 miles; a distance
that would not be assigned in normal circumstances to anything less than an entire
division.
Each squad, that is each three dugouts, had a telephone connected up with its
platoon CP, which in most cases was located in the comparative luxury of a
farmhouse a short distance behind the line. As ordinarily the guards stood their
watches in their dugouts, these phones, which somewhat exceeded the tables of
equipment for a rifle platoon, were a convenient means of making hourly reports to the platoon headquarters. They also had their recreational uses. On
many occasions they were used to "pipe" music to the forward positions from
Command Post radios. During the Army-Notre Dame football game in November
several men who interrupted the program to phone in routine reports were classed
by eager listeners as out and out saboteurs.
The interiors of the dugouts were made as comfortable as their size and struc-

26

ture would permit. Most of them had at least straw mattresses for the occupants,
and several more resourceful individuals even managed to acquire box springs
to sleep on. Another staple item was stoves. These were largely improvisedoften from large French milk cans which were adequate, if not ideal for the purpose when a hole was cut near the bottom of one side for ventilation and stoking.
The occupants of one dugout even went so far as to import a full-fledged cooking stove from a nearby farm. However, it was not often that these stoves, improvised or otherwise, could be used to any great extent. The resulting smoke
proved more of a hazard than the cold.
Chow for these men in the squad areas and for the weapons platoons, usually
located in buildings just behind them, Was served hot, and brought to the platoon
Command Posts by jeep. Laundry facilities were provided by the Quartermaster,
but most of the men preferred to use a building set aside for this in their area
and do their own, as that way they got their clothes back more quickly. These
buildings also provided facilities for shaving and washing more extensively than
was possible in the dugouts.
Ordinarily two rifle companies of a battalion would be on line at a time, with
the third held in reserve; the reserve company being constantly rotated. The company in reserve, however, had little opportunity for additional rest or recreation,
as the time was invariably filled with those old stand-bys, care and cleaning of
weapons, close order drill, and road marches. Recreational facilities were somewhat limited, first of all because there was little time for them, and second because few were available. At one time Company F reported to a Regimental observer that the sum total of reading matter available in the company area was
seven books.
Twelve hour passes were at first granted to visit Nantes, where many members of the 376th had their first experiences with cognac, French beer, women
and the far-famed "calvados." There were also passes to Paris but these could
be granted only sparingly, and even the Nantes passes were later cut down to a
maximum of six hours. Brief and infrequent as the passes were however, there are
still many fond memories of Nantes lurking about the Regiment. And even the
long cold days in the dugouts when often as not "Jerry" would wait for you to start
something before returning it in kind produced their share of nostalgia in the grim
days that were still to come.
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Patrols
During the months at St. Nazaire when the line was firmly fixed and changed
little from week to week, or even month to month, the main action consisted of
point to point contact with the enemy through the use of patrols. Most of these
were sent out with reconnaissance missions, though occasionally information thus
gathered would subsequently call for a combat patrol with a specific "pinpoint"
objective. Scene of most combat patrols was the "spider," the Brest-Nantes Canal
west of Blain, and the country around Bouvron.
Roughly an average of one daylight and two night patrols were sent out daily by
each battalion, though, of course this figure might vary widely with circumstances.
The Regiment, between the 17th of September when it took over the St. Nazaire
sector, and the end o~ the year when the organization for departure had begun,
accomplished a total of 634 patrol missions of all kinds.
It would be difficult to classify these patrols as to strength, composition and
general mission. This .information, as well as the route to be followed, means
of communication and time of departure, was establisl.led and sent to the companies concerned by the battalion the day before the patrol was to set out, a?d
all of these factors varied ' with each patrol. This was the. usual variety. In addition the Third Battalion had their "raiders," a group of five men led by Private
Benjamin J. Desko of Company I who were often sent out under Battalion control
for special night reconnaissance missions.
If we are to obtain a clear picture of the type of operation usually carried out
·and the circumstances under which these patrols operated, we must look back
through the Regimental files and the reminiscences of the men and officers who
performed them, and follow several missions that were actually undertaken from
their starting points to their accomplishment-or in some cases, their failure.
Some examples of typical reconnaissance patrols can be found in notes made by
Regimental observers who were sent from time to time to check on the activities
and performance of the various companies on the line. the quotations that follow
are from notes made by one of these observers on two :patrols from Company F sent
out on the 14th and 15th of December:
0

0

0

"On 14 December a half squad day patrol was sent to a lone farm house directly in front of First
Platoon defense area.

The objective was in full view of the front lines.

A .50 cal. MG

was set up in position with mission of supporting the patrol. One 81 mm mortar section was designated as priority call for the patroL The patrol carried one 300 radio which was in a net with Bn

28

and Plt CP. The patrol accomplished its mission. Excellent detailed information was obtained. One
German hand grenade, and one letter which had been used as toilet paper were found and brought
back.

The patrol was briefed well by the battalion S-2.

He gave information that a previous

patrol had .placed a satchel charge in the farm house to blow it up but the charge had not
exploded. The patrol brought back information that the charge was no longer there. The patrol
took particular note that a truck had been to the farm since the last rain and that wagons which
had previously been there were missing. The patrol stated that the wagon tracks ran up to where
the truck had stopped, then disappeared. Thev deduced that the wagons had been hauled away
by the truck. This information confirmed a report two nights before that noise from a truck had
been heard from that vicinity . .

u
0

0

0

"Daylight patrol of seven men was sent out · t 5 Dec. to a hill with the mission of observing and
adjusting fire on any enemy emplacements.

The weather was rainy and foggy. Visibility was

very poor. The Bn S-2 delayed the patrol for one hour but the weather did not clear so the patrol
was sent ahead . . . Priority of fire from 60mm mortar section was given to the patrol. The patrol
consisted of 1 BAR. 2 carbines, 3 Ml's and a radio operator with a 300 radio. A cannon officer
was located at the platoon CP to receive and adjust calls for cannon and artillery fires. This patrol
is a usual one and has been performed many times.

The patrol reached its objective and went

into a position from vvhich to observe. The men were disposed so as to give maximum flank
security. The radio operator, after about fifteen minutes of observation saw some movement behind
some bushes about 100 yards away on the reve.rse slope. Lt. Mason and one man went to investigate. While en route to investigate, a German MG opened fire, soon another . .. The patrol pinned
the enemy down with BAR fire. The radio opera tor became excited . when the second MG opened
fire.. He believed the patrol was being outflanked and sent back word to that effect without consulting the patrol leader. The report was false. Immediately upon contact the patrol sent word ba.c k
and all mortars, artillery and each platoon was alerted. The patrol called for 81mm mortar fire . . .
The mortars fired about 30 rounds and then the patrol began to receive enemy mortar fire. At that
time artillery was called for . . . The enemy was close so the patrol withdrew to a defilade
position to allow arty fire. The fire was effective. Orders were given to the patrol to return.
0

0

0

The mortar and artillery mission mentioned in the second patrol was typical.
Heavy weapons, artillery and Cannon Company played a very important role in
covering, supporting and sometimes coming to the rescue of these patrols. The
way this worked is that every time a patrol started out, battalion and heavy
weapons CP's were notified. Cannon Company, or the supporting artillery, as well
as the 81mm mortars, then would aim at the first "check point" along the patrol's
route of advance, ready to fire at or near it if need be, until the patrol called in that
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they had reached the point. Then the guns were laid on the next prearranged
"check point, " and so on until the patrol returned. During the day these "check
points" also served as points from which routine reports of progress could be made.
At night however, reports were only made in emergencies.
One of the fitst patrols undertaken during the stay at St. Nazaire was . a large
reconnaissance patrol which served as Company C's baptism of fire. Scene of this
mission was the rolling hedgerow country in the vicinity of Le Temple which, in
the early days of September, was the area assigned to Colonel Russell M. Miner's
First Battalion. The patrol consisted of 27 men under the command of First Lieutenant Ben R. Chalkley, and its mission was to probe deep into enemy lines in an eftort
to learn as much as possible of his strength and disposition in the area. A reconnaissance patrol is not expected to get involved in much fighting, but in the
light of what was to come it is fortunate that the size and armament of this particular patrol was adequate to engage the enemy if it became necessary.
The patrol started out in full daylight down a highway leading towards a chateau, occupied at that time by the FFI. The section of the line which the patrol was
to pass through was outposted by the French, an.d therefore it was necessary to
oiient them on the route and mission before getting under way. After the FFI had
been brought up to date on the proceedings, Lieutenant Chalkley's men continued
on. in deployed formation across the open fields, patrol leader, messenger and radio
operator in the center of the formation. They had not gone far, how·ever, before
they were greeJed with a sudden burst of machine gun fire. Everyone hit the dirt,
and it was some moments before it was discovered that their first taste of "enemy"
fire was only .the French, doing a little target practice in the area.
After this the patrol proceeded uneventfully for over a mile, coming finally to the
top of a ridge overlooking a shallow valley to their front. At this point they
changed directi_on slightly and pointed towards Chateau Kerlan which was believed
to be occupied by a large number of Germans. The approaches to the chateau,
across the shallow valley, were completely without cover, only natural cover in
the vicinity being the fringe of woods along the-crest of Ule hill to their front which
was in all probability full of Germans.
Followed by the patrol, the scouts had reached a point halfway down the forward
slope of the hill when things began to happen. A number of snipers, accompanied
by bursts of machine gun fire, opened up from their front, pinning down the scouts
and causing the rest of the patrol to scramble for cover. This time it really was
the Germans, and Private First Class Russell H. Riggs, wounded in the shoulder by
a sniper, became the Company's first casualty. Immediately after this German
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mortars began to come in on the patrol which had managed to reorganize on top of
the hill where ~here was at least some cover, and upon Riggs and Private First Class
Paul V. Hart who had remained behind with him in the open to help bandage his
wound. Seeing the dangerous position of these two, Sergeant Guellermo Jaso and
Private First Class Gerald D. Davis disregarded the incoming mortars and sped
down the hill across the open to help them.
Just at this point some friendly 81mm mortars from Company D began to come
over, and the 60's with the patrol were put into action and began traversing the
whole area where the German positions were. Between them they effectively
silenced the Jerries for long enough so that the four men in the open could get
safely back to the top of the hill. Then, under light mortar fire, the patrol began
to withdraw.
On their way back a concealed machine gun opened up on them from the left
rear, but was soon silenced by rifle and BAR fire. During the brief scuffle caused
by this incident Private First Class Howard S. Heulitt somehow lost contact with the
patrol and got left behind.
Hardly had Lieutenant Chalkley's men polished off the machine gun when they
found themselves face to face with a very surprised column of Germans, crossing
the road just ahead. The Jerries were so astonished they could do nothing but
stand and gape until Private First Class John Thomas cut loose with his BAR. The
burst was low, but the Jerries took off like a flock of sheep without making any
attempt to fight back.
During the critical moments on top of the hill, Lieutenant Chalkley had radioed
his situation back to the Company, and asked for support. Now as they proceeded
back towards the lines, they met their support; several halftracks loaded with men
from the Third Platoon. Two men were missing from the patrol, ·Heulitt, and the
second scout, Private First Class Norman Polner, who had been pinned down
during the first of the firing and had been unable to get back to the patrol, so the
halftracks kept on in an effort to find them.
The halftracks met with some mortar and machine gun fire during their search,
to which they replied by spraying the hedgerows with their 50 calibers, but they
were unable to locate the twD men and suffered several casualties, one man being
fatally wounded when the leading vehicle ran into a mine. The patrol, including
Riggs who, in spite of his wound, had got back under his own power, returned
safely. Heulitt and Polner, having finally found their way back through the FFI
lines, returned the next day little the worse for their experience.
Another typical mission of those early days of St. Nazaire was a combat patrol
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conducted by Company A on September 22nd with the purpose of knocking out a
particularly bothersome enemy artillery OP. The story is told by Private First Class
Jack Zebin of Company A:
Who of us can forget the scenic beauty of Brittany? The apple orchards and neat farmlands divided by those ancient hedgerows. Those same hedgerows that gave us so much comfort and safety
in tough spots unfortunately gave us our headaches also, as the enemy used them with all. the
cunning that can be gained by a determined force in a defensive position.
Able Company was. oh line on the outskirts of the small town of Fay. Our platoons were dug in
on a rather thin line with two men to each position. We had been sweating out very accurate
artillery fire for four or five days a.nd we realized that Jerry had a very good OP from which he
was directing his fire.
On the two days preceding 22 September 1944 we had sent out small reconnaissance patrols to
try and find this OP. They were successful in fi·nding the spot, but had run into heavy enemy opposition each time.

The enemy had dug in around a beautiful chateau on high ground which over-

looked Fay, Bouvron and Le Temple, and from there was able to direct artillery fire on practically
all of the First Battalion's positions.
On 22 September the order came down from Battalion for Able Company to organize a combat
patrol of 32 men to go out and knock out this thorn in our side. Lieutenant Tom Hodges, Platoon
Leader of the Second Platoon, was to lead the patrol. He had led the reconnaissance patrol on the
previous day and knew the terrain.

Lieutenant Hodges knew the mission would be extremely dan-

gerous, so he asked for volunteers. When sixty volunteered to go he decided that forty-five would
be enough.
The patrol was loaded for the kill. It had two light machine gun squads, and one 60 mm mortar squad. Two BAR teams and riflemen loaded down with ammunition and grenades made up the
rest of the patrol. He also took along a 300 radio which was in direct communication with our
81mm mortars and supporting artillery. Due to the size of the patrol, he designated T/Sgt Mcintyre
to control eighteen. of the men and one machine gun squad. He himself would handle the remainder.
After a good noonday chow the men were briefed as to the mission and the NCO s checked them
for ammunition and to see that they had no unit identification on them. The·plan was to make a wide
circle and then to come in on the chateau from the left where there was high ground. Flank security
was provided for, and the patrol was set to move out.
The weather was ideal; a beautiful sunny day, with not a cloud in sight. The patrol moved out in
fine fashion, everyone knowing his job, and everyone confident that the job would be done.
Back at our forward OP, our Battalion Commander, Colonel Miner, a man whom we had all
learned to love. and respect, and our Company Commander, Captain Shetler, were in direct communication with the patrol. Also on hand was an artillery liason officer, and Lt. Springer of Dog Company was there to give the men support with his much vaunted 81's.
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The patrol had been moving along nicely for over an hour without meeting any enemy, but

wen~

now approaching the territory where we knew Jerry had been. PFC James Alex, the first scout,
had just started up a hedgerow when all hell broke loose. Jerry was directly ahead with well concealed machine gun positions, and a few minutes after the fire fight started, began laying very
accurate mortar fire around the patrol.
Lt. Hodges immediately organized a firing line and called for mortar fire which came in very
quickly and accurately. After about thirty minutes of heavy fighting, Jerry began to withdraw
and our patrol started right after him. The results of this encounter were for us one casualty
Blackie Johnson with a piece of shrapnel in his leg -

for the Germans three casualties.

In pursuing the enemy, first scout Alex got ahead of the patrol and in coming around a hedgerow,
was shot and seriously wounded. The second scout, PFC Holton, immediately signalled the patrol
and again a fire fight was begun. PFC Wakester, in spite of heavy enemy fire, and in complete
disregard of his own safety, crawled out and gave Alex first aid.
Seeing that Alex was bleeding very badly, and needing immediate aid, four of the men, Kettler,
Jenkins, Costello and Murlin, crawled out to him and dragged him back. They then proceeded to
make a litter. With only bayonets and pocket knives they cut down two small trees and with their
shirts and belts made a litter. With two men carrying and two covering, they proceeded to carry
Alex back. They carried him for over a mile all the way back to the starting point of the patrol
where he was immediately rushed to the aid station. Unfortunately, in spite of their gallant efforts,
Alex died from his wounds later that same day.
In the meantime the enemy, with superior observation and better concealment, tried to outflank
the patrol, but Lt. Hodges quickly moved his men to counter the threat.
The patrol had again overcome the enemy resistance, killing two and woundii:lg four others. There
were many acts of bravery in the course of this action.

The men were functioning beautifully

as a team with every weapon at their command being put to good use. The mortar squad, in spite
of losing sight and bipod for its weapon, proceeded to fire very accurately without them. The
machine gunners were firing without their tripods. It was a fine example of what can be done by
well trained doughboys.
At times Jerry was on one side of a hedgerow and our boys were on the other. The grenades
were flying thick and fast. At one point a Jerry grenade hit PFC Chandler's helmet, bounced off and
exploded harmlessly nearby.
The men of the patrol, after overcoming this last resistance, proceeded on to the chateau, where
they scouted out all of the enemy's positions and brought back information which later proved
ve ry valuable when we moved up our lines. The men returned after being out for five hours,
a very happy but tired bunc-h. Final score reads : two casualties for our side, nine casualties for
Jerry -

a job very well done.
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A favorite spot for patrol activity was the country around Bouvron. The town
itself had a tall church steeple which provided an excellent OP for the Germans,
and subject of constant speculation was the question of how strongly occupied the
town was, whether the steeple had been knocked out yet, and whether it would be
possible to take the town. o'ne of the many patrols sent into this strategic area in
search of answers to these and other questions was one that has become one of the
milestones in the history of Company K. This was a combat patrol consisting of
that company's First Platoon, that stepped over the line into "no-man's land" at
0730 on the cold and drizzling morning of November 11th with the mission of
locating enemy dispositions in the vicinity of the town of Bouvron, about 3,000 yards
in front of the lines.
It was not yet light when First Lieutenant Thomas A. Daly and his men, along
with the Weapons Platoon and some BAR men from the Second Platoon, were
called together for briefing in a small metal hut in the reserve area. By the light of
a hissing Coleman lantern they learned what was in store for them. Division G-2
believed the enemy had withdrawn from Bouvron. The patrol's job was to find out
if the enemy was still there. If he was, the task ahead was to engage him, find
out how strong he was and then pull back through the line set up by the Third
Platoon which was acting as support, and protecting the flanks of the patrol.
Breakfast that morning was at 0430 for the First Platoon, and soon afterwards
the trucks were pulling out for the assembly area just behind the lines. Dawn
had come by the time the First Platoon with its attached machine guns and
BAR's moved past the outposts into the still, sodden country between the lines.
But the stillness did not last long. As the patrol glided cautiously towards the
Bouvron church steeple, looming in the grayness ahead of it the air was split with
the sharp, hurried cracking of the dreaded German MG 42. Apparently Company K's
Staff Sergeant Henry Williams, whose sarcasm had waxed eloquent on the subject
of there being no Germans in Bouvron, was right after all. The town was indeed
occupied.
It was shortly after this first burst of machine gun fire that the artillery Piper
Cub, hovering dutifully above the fight, reported that reinforcements were joining
the German advance posts. The answer to this discovery was an all-out barrage by
the 919th and by Cannon Company, both of which poured shells into German gun
positions and farm houses where troops were concentrating. Meanwhile the BAR's
of the patrol had opened up in answer to the machine gun, and the 60mm mortars
went into action, covering the patrol as it advanced. The Germans replied to these
with their own mortars and artillery which increased in intensity all morning.
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By 1200 the mission of the patrol was considered accomplished, and the order
came to withdraw. Shortly afterwards the patrol had reorganized under artillery
cover and began to move to the rear.
Three men failed to return with the patrol; t~o who had been slightly wounded
by German mortars and had been evacuated, and Private First Class John A.
MacDonald who was killed.
On the credit side: 8 German prisoners taken and many killed both by the
patrol and the artillery which scored at least one direct hit on a farmhouse.
Another patrol that is memorable in the chronicles of Bouvron and vicinity is a
night patrol with a reconnaissance mission, featuring First Lieutenant James W. Cornelius and a selected group from Company C.
0

0

0

Company C, after its first week of duty on the line (as Private First Class Raymond Fournier
tells it), had moved into a reserve position in a woods near battalion headquarters which was situated in a large French chateau. About nine o'clock of our first night in reserve the Battalion was
directed by Regiment to send out a small reconnaissance patrol to the vicinity of Bouvron, and our
Company was designated to furnish the patrol. This was to 'b e a very special mission to determine
the truth of the intelligence received by Regiment that German Infantry, tanks and Artillery were
massing in the town of Bouvron for an attack which was to take place early the next day.
With this in mind Captain Duckworth selected his men as carefully as possible. Lt. Cornelius, who
had led the first combat patrol made by the Regiment, was selected as leader. TiSgt Maddock, Sgt
Soka, Pfc Goldman, Pfc Skipworth, Pfc Maniatty and myself were selected to follqw him.

I was

chosen because of my. knowledge of the French language and Pfc Maniatty because he was an experienced radio operator who could maintain . good contact with our base.
After making careful preparations, blackening our faces, discarding all excess equipment, ridding
ourselves of all letters and papers, sharpening our knives, donning wool knit caps instead of helmets-we set out for battalion headquarters. At the chateau we were oriented on our mission, our route,
and where we could expect to find German installations and garrisons.
It was exactly 2200 when a Service Company truck came to transport the patrol, the Battalion

Commander, and Captain Duckworth to a very small village about half a mile from Fay de Bretagne.
At this village we picked up two men from Company A who were to accompany us as guards for the
tadioman.
At about 2300 the patrol, accompanied by Col. Miner, moved out in the direction of Bouvron. For
the first mile and a half we travelled in squad column on both sides of a muddy dirt road. The
weather was fine when we started, but the sky soon began to darken, and within a short time we
were walking in almost complete darkness. Finally we reached a point where the road turned to
the left. We halted here while Col. Miner gave us last minute instructions before we went on. I
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don't believe any of us will ever forget the concerned and solicitous manner in which Col. Miner
wished us good luck. More than anything, it made us feel we were part of an important operation.
Striking out along the road, we soon reached a large open field. Crossing the field one man
at a time, we resumed our original direction through a series of hedgerows. It was decided from
the outset that all of us were to rotate as scouts. The exact enemy positions were so much in
doubt and the night was so black that the job of first scout was particularly nerve-wracking.

When

I took my own turn as first scout I felt as if I were walking in a huge dark cave, expecting at any
moment to step off into a bottomless pit. All along the long and tortuous route ·we expected to
barge into the enemy at any moment. The atmosphere was tense and strained.
We must have covered about a mile when a slight cold rain began to fall. Even though it made
us physically cold and miserable, everyone was grateful for it because it provided the perfect cover
for whatever noise the patrol made. The men operated perfectly, but even the slightest unavoidable
noise increased the nervous tension considerably. Mentally, I vowed to shoot any noise-maker
at the first opportunity.
Climbing down a small hill through very thick brush we were all forced to make considerable
noise, but luckily the Germans in the vicinity did not hear us. We halted for several minutes at
the base of the hill and then proceeded through what we could vaguely discern in the darkness as
an o.rchard. At the far end of the orchard the road forked, and it was here the patrol became separated. Nothing could have been worse. In the darkness it was impossible to differentiate between

a

German soldier and an American soldier because we knew we were deep in enemy territory,

none of us dared to venture so much as a whisper. For almost ten minutes the two parts of the
patrol groped about looking for each other until finally Goldman and I bumped into each other.
Reorganizing, the patrol moved on. After about half an hour Lt. Cornelius took over as first
scout because we were passing a large chateau where there was known to be a considerable garrison of enemy troops. Moving cautiously behind hedgerows and rock walls, we skirted the chateau
one window of which was lit by candlelight, without encountering any enemy sentries. The entire
circumference of the chateau was mined and boobytrapped. It was only because of a great deal of
luck and our extreme caution that we detected and escaped the traps set for us.
About three hundred yards further on, in a small orchard, we left Pfc Maniatty and the two
guards to set up a radio relay station and report on the progress of the patrol while the rest of us
moved on further.
Soon we came to a small French village, supposedly unoccupied.

After sending out a scout for

reconnaissance we began, one- at a time, to feel our way through the town, meeting again at the
other side. Ahead of us lay a long, straight road, but, deciding that the route was too dangerous,
we again took to the hedgerows.

Later we entered a small orchard near Bouvron. In the orchard

we hadn't advanced ten feet when we stopped cold. Immediately to our front we could hear German
voices. The first scout had walked to within a few feet of a couple of German guards on the other
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side of a hedgerow.

The shock was so great that he almost collapsed into Lt. Cornelius · arms.

Crawling on our stomachs to peer through the hedgerow, we could hear men snoring while others
talked in whispers. Occasionally we could hear the "clank" of a rifle or see the glowing end of
a cigarette.
degree.

The Germans were dug in all around us. Everyone began to get the shakes to a slight

I tried to keep cool and calm by eating an apple, but every time I bit the crunch sounded

like an 88 going off in my ear.

We remained in this position observing and listening for about half

an hour before we decided to pull out, having ascertained from what we had heard that the Germans were not preparing for a large scale attack at dawn.
Coming back through the French village we were physically and mentally exhausted men.
purposely arranged, every clock in town began to chime the hour as we filed past.

As if

Every chime

that disturbed the supreme stillness was a crashing blow that made your heart beat faster and faster.
If ever there was such a thing as psychological warfare, this was it.

Everything that happened after this seems anticlimactic .

We returned to pick up our radioman,

reported on our progress and began the long trek home.

We were forced to exercise the same

caution as before, and, on several occasions came on booby traps we hadn 't found on the way out.
Our luck held, however, and we succeeded in getting back without setting any of them off.
Just as the early light of dawn was breaking over the horizon, we entered the small village we
had left the night before.

The skies had cleared slightly and the effects of the previous few hours

began to pass away. We were safe and had accomplished our mission without casualties. Everyone
breathed a sigh of relief.
0

0

0

In the early Fall another scene of much patrol activity was the "spider," a spokelike crossroads in the tangled and gloomy Foret du Gavre. It was on the second
day after Company L had moved into this area that they received orders to
send a reinforced combat patrol to the little village of La Pessouis, south of the
"spider" near the Brest-Nantes Canal. This was familiar ground to First Lieutenant
Joseph H. Klutsch and his men who led a similiar patrol over the same area not
long before; a patrol characterized by the use of half-tracks borrowed from
attached AAA units.
It was familiar ground, but ground to be approached with caution none the less.
On that last patrol tbe company had suffered its first losses when Tech Sergeant
Gerrish F. Smith was seriously wounded, and Staff Sergeant Charles F. Luzader,
affectionately known to everyone in the company as "Sgt Lou," was killed.
The patrol set out early in the morning with the Second Platoon, led by
Lieutenant Klutsch, in the lead and First Lieutenant Charles P. Macke's Weapons
Platoon in support following. With the patrol that day were Captain William A.
·Brightman and First Lieutenant Robert E. Foster, the company commander and
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executive officer. Following the column was a communications jeep and behind
it the familiar "meatwagon," or medical jeep. Also along on this patrol was Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin E. Thurston, Commander of the Third Battalion, acting in
his favorite capacity-front line observer and "rifleman."
0

0

0

Everything went according to plan (as Lieutenant Macke tells it) with Lieutenant Klutsch taking
a group to the left and Lieutenant Foster taking his group to the right, Lieutenant Macke placing
his machine guns in position and then returning to see how the mortars were coming along. On the
way down the forward obsezver climbed atop a house from which he thought he could observe activities across the canal and also do a little adjusting.

He had no sooner gotten down to say that

he could not see anything when four quick rounds from a well-concealed position across the
canal blew away the portion of the roof where he had been.
but robot bombs were dropped on that little town.

In the next few minutes everything

We of course then had many targets to fire,

at, and with Lieutenant Foster giving corrections from his position and Lieutenant Macke relaying
them to the mortars from his position the firing went on until a patrol of Heinies hit us from
the rear immediately behind the mortars.

Bullets from Schmeissers sprayed through the hedgerow,

and the mortar section literally dove for cover to get in a position to start firing back. It seemed
that every time one of us moved we were picked up and those Schmeisser bullets would start
clipping the hedgerow above our heads

When he became aware of the situation Captain Bright-

man somehow grabbed the tube of a mortar, and with Colonel Thurston pulling the pins, Staff
Sergeant Alvin Marten dropping the rounds and Captain Brightman aiming the tube with uncanny
accuracy we finally managed to wiggle out of a tight spot.
It would not be fitting to relate this story without mentioning the heroic deed of Private Stanton
Null of the mortar section . . . who gave his life that the rest of us might effect our getaway.
It was he who, along with Privates Harvey Pilcher and John Ice, first saw the Heinies and started

firing at them. Pilcher, and Ice, wounded by the initial burst, played dead and we finally managed to get them out.

Null, firing from the kneeling position, emptied his carbine repeatedly, hold-

ing their attention until we could get concealed. He lost his life in so doing.
0

0

0

Another episode deserving mention occurred at an outpost that was dug in in
front of the lines on November 19th. The positions were suddenly fired upon by
four German 88's which repeatedly traversed the entire area. Whereupon Privates
First Class Joseph M. Nicholas, and James L. Belliston, Jr., both of Company L, got
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out of their foxholes, climbed a nearby tree which afforded observation, got telephone communication with the artillery, and adjusted fire on the 88's with the
result that they were soon as effectively out of action as if the artillery had been
using their own observers for the registering.
Nicholas and Belliston's success in the role of forward observers was a fruit of
the Regimental policy that all men, regardless of their primary duties, should know
how to adjust artillery fire. These two men had been studying an article on the
subject that appeared in the Infantry Journal.
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Milestones
It would be difficult to compile a chronological history of the events that took

place during the three and a half months at St. Nazaire. There were not enough
events for one thing; the situation was not one that developed and changed from
day to day. Although, when it left Brittany in January, the 376th had performed
its mission, its mission had been to maintain the status quo. The Blain-Fay-Le Temple
front had changed little since September 17th. In the light of this our story of those
days is more of a series of episodes than a history. The nearest we can come to
making a chronicle of it is to take a fWeeping glance over the whole period and
pick out milestones. Some of these will have military significance in that they are
problems solved, or steps taken in the face of certain circumstances. Others will be
only recollections, of interest mainly to those who have a share in them.
Perhaps the most significant milestone in the life of any organization or individual in the war is the moment of first contact with the enemy-the first
impact of battle. The moment, for it is always a moment, when the first shot
is fired, or the first man falls, and those who see and hear are changed in that
instant from novice to initiate in the blood-brotherhood of the combat wise.
To the 376th battle initiation was a series of such episodes, coming to ea:ch
company at different times and in different ways. But in all the Regiment the first to
learn that this was the beginning of the "real thing" was Company K.
It was on the evening of the first official day of combat-Sunday, September
17th-that the Germans sent a boxcar loaded with explosives rattling down the
tracks into the town of Blain. The boxcar, with its deadly cargo, jumped the
bombed-out tracks, continued on into Company K's area near the railroad bridge
on the outskirts of town. Here it exploded, killing Private John T. Miller, and
wounding several others who were in the vicinity. Of these Sergeant James L.
McMillen, also of Company K, can claim to be the first casualty evacuated through
medical channels in the Regiment.
This was the first blood drawn. Within the next three days each company and
each man who carried a weapon in the Regiment had learned at first hand in his
own way the stern truth of the philosophy of "kill or be killed."
Other "firsts" followed in quick succession. Company E can claim to be the first
company in the Regiment to take up positions on line. To Company C goes credit
for the first prisoner taken by the Regiment, and to Company B credit for the first
actual engagement inflicting losses upon the Germans.
The first prisoner was a frightened eighteen year old sniper picked up by a patrol
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led by First Lieutenant Clovis H. Youngblood of Company C. The young sniper
surrendered after being pinned down by rifle and BAR fire, and seemed glad to be a
prisoner. He was much impressed with American artillery and had apparently had
quite enough of it.
The first large group of prisoners came in the next morning. They were not
Germans, however, but Russians serving in the German army as artillerymen. Seven
of the group walked into the town of Fay which at that time was occupied by Company A. Two of them volunteered to bring in the rest of the battery who were
waiting to surrender. The rest of the group, which totalled one officer and 47 enlisted
men, destroyed their battery of 155mm guns in the vicinity of Bouvron before
coming in. The officer had in his possession a map showing German artillery concentrations and locations of other gun positions. After this the Germans, somewhat
mistrustful of their unwilling co-belligerents, placed all other Russian organizations
in their pocket under close guard, and issued an order to shoot any who attempted
to surrender.
Although it was undoubtedly not the first exchange of shots between the 376th ·
and the Germans, the first actual fire fight for the First Battalion and probably for
the Regiment came when a 12 man German patrol hit the outposts of Company B
while it was manning the OPLR. The patrol appeared during the noon meal when
everyone was in for chow except one man at each position. One of the outposts
spotted the patrol coming and immediately contacted First Lieutenant William H.
King, leader of the Third Platoon. It was the Third Platoon area that the patrol was
approaching.
Lieutenant King immediately sent everyone back to his position, and with Tech
Sergeant Fritz H. Gibson, and Staff Sergeant John F. Nagy, hurried to the positions
nearest the oncoming patrol.
0

0

0

We got there in time to get every one in a good firing postition and then waited tensely for
the enemy to get closer.
soon.

We were afraid someone would get trigger happy and start things too

But no one fired until Lieutenant King gave the order.

The order did not come until the

lead man in the Jerry Patrol was only about 15 yards from our positions. Then the men all opened
up at the same time and the Jerries just dropped in their tracks. The leader of the patrol attempted to get a MG into position to fire, but our BAR man opened up on him and blew the top of his
head practically off.

The rest of us continued to fire while Sgt Nagy went back to the CP and

brought up a mortar squad which set up immediately behind the line of riflemen where even the
gunner could see the target. They were so close to our lines that the mortar squad could only
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fire behind and to the flanks of the Jerries, which kept them penned in.

After this the return fire

from the enemy died down.
The screams of the German wounded finally got under our skins, and Sgt Gibson and Corporal
Frank Anderson (medic) went forward with a handkerchief tiEid to a stick to help the wounded
and get them out of the way.

They received no fire so the Assistant Squad Leader, Sgt Lawson

and Lt. King and Sgt Nagy went forward also to help in carrying in the wounded. While out in front
of our positions, Sgt Lawson, with Pfc Linder who had also come up, came upon four Germans who
were desperately trying to dig in with their bare hands to escape the shrapnel from the mortar
shells which were falling very close to their positions. They immediately surrendered. The operation netted four dead, four wounded, and three unwounded . prisoners. ·only one of the patrol was
unaccounted for.
0

0

0

One of the more interesting phases of the St. Nazaire mission was the series
of unique technical problems that faced some of the Regiment's specialized sections. Big~est of these headaches was perhaps the one that fell to the lot of Captain
Thomas J. Mcintyre, the Regimental Comuunications Officer and his crew of
experts.
Communications men are among the least sung heroes of an infantry regiment.
Their job is neither conspicuous nor, in the sense that a rifleman's is, dramatic.
Yet without them the best of infantry regiments would soon crumble into an
inchoate mass of men and materials, powerless to strike or even move. Daily
they perform near miracles, but since these are technical miracles, beyond the province of the majority who benefit by their results, they are usually taken for granted. It is more apt to be the occasionally "snafued" wire or juiceless radio that
brings them into the limelight.
Captain Mcintyre's problem at St. Nazaire was the length of the front line.
Between the "spider" and Le Temple was space enough for a division to operate
in normal circumstances, and the men of Tech Sergeant Franklin H. Neumann's
wire section shook their heads hopelessly at the thought of attempting to extend
the signal facilities of a mere regiment over such an area. The problem of wire
alone-that of laying out the more than 200 miles of lines that would be necessary
in such an extended situation - was a formidable one. There simply were not 200
miles of wire in the Regiment.
Telephones too were a problem. The twelve alloted on a Table of Equipment
that had been designed to fill the needs of compacter warfare did not come near
filling the bill, and the departing 331st, that somehow had acquired a total of some
fifty phones, was sympathetic, but left none of .them behind.

4.2
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It was the initiative of Warrant Officer Walter G. Dobinson that saved the situa-

tion. The FFI, hopelessly tied down themselves due to lack of transportation,
proved a remunerative source of information as to the whereabouts of abandoned
or captured Wehrmacht equipment, and Mr. Dobinson, with his driver, Technician
Fifth Grade John P. Durika, were often seen in those early days speeding about the
<::ountryside as they ran all possible leads into the ground.
It was not long before this search brought forth an amazing assortment of relics
and "gems" of signal equipment. The regimental signal supply room soon began to
take on the appearance of a "combined corps signal dump and a city junk yard."
There were French commercial installations, battered German field phones, old
American switchboards (vintage World War I) electric motors, handsets of all
descriptions, multi-colored W ehrmacht field wire, and assorted radio parts by the
boxful. It was this maze of tangled wire and broken parts that developed, under
the endless patience and ingenuity of Sergeant Neumann and his men into one of
the most intricate communications nets ever devised by an infantry regiment.
One of the more colorful aspects of this hook-up was the message center on
wheels which was constructed from an old boxcar discovered by Staff Sergeant
Jack L. Bowler and Private First Class John P. Jasper in the town of Ancenis
nearby. The astute carpentry of Jasper and Technician Fifth Grade James J. Sommers, Jr. soon turned it into "one of the finest message centers in Northern
France;" complete with office and sleeping accomodations for the entire message
center crew. It was a sad day when time for moving came in January, and the
boxcar, its small wheels proving inadequate to cope with the sticky French mud,
became hopelessly mired and had to be left behind.
During the months at St. Nazaire the only real offensive action that could not
be classed as a patrol was a push undertaken ·in the Third Battalion area with the
object of straightening the lines north of Bouvron. Center of activities during this
advance was the area along the Brest-Nantes Canal in the vicinity of La Pessouis.
It was on the morning of October 6th that Company I jumped off along the south
bank of the canal in the face of shelling and small arms fire which was particularly
heavy in the vicinity of the old chateau just east of La Pessouis. Late in the
afternoon they passed through the town, which the Germans had hurriedly
evacuated in the face of the advance, and occupied the high ground beyond the
town. Here their troubles really began. As they started to dig in on the slopes of the
hill, artillery began pouring in from both directions. Apparently the artillery with
the 302nd Infantry across the canal had spotted the digging and had mistaken
Company I for enemy troops. Under fire from both sides they were finally forced to
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withdraw east of La Pessouis again, and to allow the Germans to reoccupy the town.
All during the next two days the Second Platoon of Company I, commanded
by Second Lieutenant Pablo Arenaz, laid siege to the town they had once taken
and been forced to relinquish. With them was a mortar section from Company M,
commanded by Lieutenant James K. Tracy. The siege consisted mainly of a
murderous barrage laid on the town by these mortars, as well as by one of Company I's own 60mm mortar squads.
It was on the morning of the second day that an SS sergeant, clad in camouflaged jacket, walked towards the besieger's line, whistling and with his hands in
his pockets. Under the muzzles of an outpost's Ml's he explained his reason for
surrendering, "I've been on the Russian front, but I've never seen so many dead in
one town." So saying, he cheerfully gave up.
Once again La Pessouis was in Amer ican hands; this time for keeps. On the
morning of October 9th when the push was over and the Third Battalion was relieved, an advance of 3500 yards had been made.
One of the interesting sidelights of this period in the history of the 376th was
the series of truces arranged between October 23rd and 28th. These were effective from 0700 to 0900, and from 1500 to 1900, and their purpose was to allow the
French Red Cross to carry out the business of evacuating 9,000 French civilians
from the German-occupied area. These truces were hardly a relaxation for anyone on the lines. There was a tense silence about them, with the men of each
outpost ready at their weapons, and sharply alert for the first indication of a
violation of the truce.
Few violations occurred, but the Germans had a disconcerting habit during the
days when these truces were held. Each morning and evening in the last few minutes before the suspension of hostilities was effective they would lay an artillery
barrage on some portion of the line, secure in the knowledge that there could be
no counter battery from the American side due to the onset of the truce. In retaliation the 919th and Cannon Company often resorted to this ruse themselves.
There were many however who claimed that revenge was not complete until
American shells had landed on "Jerry's" only movie house, an occurrence which
was bitterly deplored by the Nazi officers wh0, the story goes, maintained that
such action on our part was extremely detrimental to their morale.
Only major change in the front line deployment occurred on November 2nd when
the First Battalion, which was in reserve at La Gacilly, moved to the Lorient Sector near Hennebont to relieve the Third Battalion of the 302nd which subsequently
took over the First's former positions at St. Nazaire.
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The three battalions had been taking turns in Division reserve at La Gacilly and
when the First's turn came they found themselves, just as the other battalions had,
deep in an intensive training program, the purpose of which was ominously clear
to everyone.
0

0

0

The Westwall on the big front was still a German product (as Captain Henry C. Bowden Jr. of
Company B explains) and we had heard a lot about its great pillboxes from way back. In fact we
had trained for pillbox reduction back in the States, but had kind of forgotten it after the new
type of warfare we had become accustomed to at St. Nazaire. So training in reduction of pillboxes
got the vote, and as the A & P Platoon built dummy pillboxes, the companies organized into assault
detachments and Major Sam Roper scouted ammo dumps for extra ammo.
The training area was, we thought, typical of the type of country we would see when and if we
hit the Siegfried.

Three dummy forts were built to support each other. They were on the military

crest of a hill, and the center one covered the mouth of a draw. For a couple of days the separate
assault detachments worked with the individual weapons of an assault team. The 319th Engineers
came down and gave us instruction in the use of the flame thrower, bangalores, pole and satchel
charges. They ended their instruction by putting on a demonstration of how to attack a fortified area.
After all this priming, the doughs in the assault teams were pretty anxious to get at these dummy
forts with all those special tools and really find out what they themselves could do.
the Battalion was pretty cocky anyway.

Everybody in

There was hardly a man who hadn't shot at a Kraut and

most of them had been shot at by a Kraut, and had been under artillery several times. Even the
Battalion CP had been shelled a couple of times.
An assault team from each company jumped off early one morning firing everything it had.

We

used the 81's as artillery preparation, and they didn't spare the ammo. The HMG's in support fired
box after box of tracer and ball and lifted their fire only after the assault teams were closing in on the
forts themselves.

The rifle companies fired their 60's from close behind the teams, and sometimes

were even attached to them.

The LMG's were sometimes attached and sometimes just followed

along, displacing every time their firing was masked. The doughs who handled the flame throwers
and demolitions were sometimes too aggressive. On more than one occasion they almost ran into the
machine gun fire.

Bazookas were fired as frequently as the rifles and from any angle or position.

The 81's would lift to fire beyond the targets when the assault teams got too close, but would continue to pound the hilltop with artillery effect. Many times the flanks of the teams would be pinned
down by fire from one of the other companies, and hand grenades were thrown, around in a manner
that seemed almost careless. On numerous occasions the men of the company not taking part in the
problem were pinned down by fire from an automatic weapon that was acting as support to the
assault teams, and it even became SOP that spectators assume the prone position.
The companies ran these problems time after time, using live ammo each time and each time
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becoming more aggressive and more efficient. This type of training was a company commander's
dream.

There was no problem in keeping the men interested, there were no restrictions on ammo,

We had learned from our
.
stay at St. Nazaire that it paid to be aggressive and it seemed that everyone in the Battalion realized

and we were not as careful as we had been in training in the States.

it.

We also knew that it was just not in the books for

a division

as well trained as the 94th to stay

on a forgotten front till the war was over. All these things, put together, led to the spirit that went
into the realistic training we got at La Gacilly. It was the best training we had ever had in this type
of warfare, and later on in the game when we really began to play for keeps, we knew we were
ready. We knew how to take a pillbox, and how to use the special tools that were used for the job.
To many people in the Division, La Gacilly was just a little French town with a beer joint and a
few good-looking French babes. But to the First Battalion it was ten days of training that later proved
to be most valuable in the accomplishment of our most important mission.
0

0

0

When the First Battalion moved to Lorient after its "rest" period in La Gacilly
nobody knew exactly what to expect. There were many rumors afoot in regard to
a big German push that might soon open up in that sector. Source of the rumors
was largely unofficial reports from the FFI who, in their characteristically mercurial and effervescent manner, sometimes tended to jump to conclusions. However
some weight was lent to such reports by the fact that the greater part of the Division's artillery was at Lorient. Whatever the actual G-2 was, it was apparent that
the threat of attack was stronger there than it was in the St. Nazaire pocket.
Information brought back by the officers who had made the preliminary reconnaissance of the area to be taken over from the Third Battalion of the 302nd was not
encouraging. They brought word that 1,000 rounds of artillery had fallen there in
one day and that the positions left much to be desired in the way of warmth and
comfort. Everything was underground. Even the battalion CP was a mere dugout
with logs and dirt piled six feet over the top. Perhaps the most disconcerting thing
about the new area was the vast frontage which the one battalion, together with
a battalion of the FFI, was going to have to cover. Extended as a battalion front
had been at St. Nazaire, the area that the 302nd's Third battalion had covered at
Lorient was even wider.
When Colonel Miner's Battalion first moved into the new area, it initially took
over the same positions which had been left them by the 302nd. Company B
moved into the same dugouts that "I" of the 302nd had occupied on the right of
the area, while Company C moved in on the left. The area between the two
strong points established by Companies B and C was held by the FFI. Company A, in battalion reserve, set up in the vicinity of the battalion CP.
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The enemy, as they soon learned by constant and aggressive patrolling, was if
anything more elusive than he was at St. Nazaire. Near Strongpoint One, which
was in "B's" area, patrols seldom contacted the Germans until they had advanced
some 2000 yards in front of their positions. In front of Strongpoint Two they were
sometimes encountered as close as 600 yards. Main strongpoint of t~e Germans
was the battered town of Kervignac, situated approximately in the center of the
Battalion front, which they used as an artillery OP. The area around this town
was the scene of constant activity as daily patrols were sent out to keep tabs
on the enemy strength there. An attack on this town was planned late in Decem
ber, but abandoned when it was learned the Divisiqn was leaving the area.
Until the arrival of the Battalion no prisoners had been actually captured in the
Lorient Sector. A few had come in voluntarily, but none had been taken by force.
The distinction of taking the first one went to First Lieutenant John Narewski who
led a patrol behind the German defenses and captured a German machine gunner.
Despite ominous rumors and forebodings, the Lorient Sector turned out to be if
anything quieter than St. Nazaire. There was a moderate amount of artillery which
almost invariably came in at 1000 in the morning and 1600 in the afternoon, and
there were some casualties as a result; among then Private First Class Samuel
Previte of Company D who was killed when an 88 scored a direct hit on his
machine gun emplacement. But other than this, the Germans initiated very little
activity of any kind, and the men soon began to venture out of their foxholes and
emplacements to seek more comfortable quarters. By the middle of December when
the Battalion left Lorient a number of men were living in wooden frame houses
right on the front line and finding that the risk was negligible.
Life at Lorient was a series of curious incidents, and somewhat colorful episodes
arising out of working hand in hand with the FFI. The countryside itself was more
picturesque than that of St. Nazaire, and the operations there had a more intimate
flavor. From several places on the front line one could look right down into the
German occupied town of Lorient, and watch activity along the wharves.
One of the many incidents characteristic of the days at Lorient is told by First
Lieutenant Joseph A. Coffey of the First Battalion Communications Platoon. On
reconnaissance in Hennebont, site of the proposed alternate Battalion Command
Post in case of a German breakthrough, Lieutenant Coffey was tracing tangled wire
circuits with his assistant, Sergeant Kenneth Perigo. One set of wires which they
followed disappeared under a pile of rubble. This in itself was not surprising as the
entire town of Hennebont had been reduced by artillery to a mere shell; it was the
fact that voices were coming from under the rubble that called for investigation.
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Painstakingly digging their way through the ruins, the two wire experts came
finally on a small subterranean room which had been part of a cellar while the
house above it still stood. It was from here that the voices were coming. A Frenchwoman was sitting at an elaborate and still functioning switchboard, busily engaged in maintaining civilian telephone connections between the two neighboring
towns of Auray and Plouay, apparently oblivious of the cataclysmic nature of her
surroundings. At a small table behind her sat an elderly man, apparently her relief
operator, quietly eating his supper.
Two events which stand out in the history of our "forgotten front" took place
in December on two succeeding days. It was on December 29th that Colonel
Harold H . McClune assumed command of the St. Nazaire Sector. Sector Headquarters being dissolved, and its functions reverting to the Regiment for control. For
the first time since its entry into combat, the Regiment became the 376th Infantry
Combat Team. On the following day, each battalion and each company except
Headquarters and Service were formally awarded the Combat Infantry streamer,
and the 376th Infantry became officially the veteran outfit it was soon to prove
itself in the "big league" battles for the Siegfried Line.
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The French
Nobody who was with the 376th Infantry at St. Nazaire will be likely to forget
the French; both the civilian French of Brittany, and the French fighting units.
They will be remembered not only for the close cooperation and deep friendship
that existed between them and the men of the Regiment, but also as ardent, if
sometimes over-ebullient fighters who taught us much about our common enemy
and the grim business of fighting him.
When the 376th first came to St. Nazaire, the French who were fighting there
were a chaotic and miscellaneous assortment of resistance groups, mostly without
arms or any means of waging war other than a grim determination to fight and
destroy the "sal boche." Of the 25 different groups into which these guerrilla
fighters were loosely organized, most belonged to the FFI, but there were many
others. The regular French Army was represented as well as the Marines and
Navy, and these groups were mixed in with remnants of the Polish, Belgian and
Dutch armies, and a scattering of French peasants from the neighborhood who
joined the fight with whatever weapons they had at hand whenever the spirit
moved them. There were also a number of individuals who, though hungry for
German blood as their more organized conferes, still clung to political opinions
that prevented them from joining with them. These were the men who appeared
from time to time in the various headquarters of the 376th and begged to join the
Regiment and fight with the Americans.
One of the first jobs facing the Regiment-the whole 94th Division, in fact-was
tracking down the leaders of these various groups and organizing them under one
command. This was in no sense an easy task as the operational procedure of the
FFI and allied units was far too elastic and spontaneous to include anything so
conventional as a command post or even an established location for headquarters.
In those early days before they had become organized and integrated fighting
units under Regimental control, the French fought in any sector of the line in which
they happened to be, and the sometimes "calvados-inspired" mission of their patrols
was more often shooting than reconnaissance, or the acquiring of enemy information.
Nobody could be sure in those early days just what was going to happen when a
French patrol was sent out. Often the patrol would receive its instructions-perhaps
a reconnaissance mission-and disappear eagerly into the night. During the next
ten or fifteen minutes utter bedlam would break loose in front of the lines, and the
patrol would then return and announce that they were out of ammunition. Patrols
of this sort often resulted in a high local mortality rate among the Germans, as
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well as a considerable bag of sparrows and other small game.
Out of this largely unarmed confusion of eager guerilla fighters, the Regiment
soon created some semblance of order. Nearly 3,000 German small arms, many
mortars, a large supply of ammunition, and finally captured German artillery were
scraped together. The French were instructed in the use of the last item by Division artillerymen. By November 14th the following French units were placed under
the command of the 376th Infantry : 17th Battalion Chausseurs a Pied, 1st Battalion
32nd Regiment, and 6th, 7th and 8th Battalions of the FFI.
The individualists who were not members of these outfits, but had applied
directly to the 376th for permission to fight with the Regiment were given M1's,
uniforms, and other necessary equipment and were assigned to rifle companies.
They received no pay, but considered ample food, rations and a chance to fight the
Germans reward enough.
In return for this they gave their all. They proved to be the most eager soldiers
in the Regiment, ready at any time to go out and kill "boche," and failing completely to understand the American practice of taking prisoners. At first the sergeants to whose squads the Frenchmen were assigned had linguistic difficulties in
handling their new recruits, but after a few weeks they claimed that these men
had become an indispensable part of the squads.
The final episode in the relations of the 376th with the French fighting forces
and government came in January after the Regiment had moved on to its new
mission in Germany. On January 29th, General de Gaulle, awarded the Croix de
Guerre for "exceptional military services rendered in the course of operations for
the liberation of France" to two officers and three men of the Regiment.
Colonel Harold H. McClune, Commanding Officer of the 376th, and First Lieutenant James W. Cornelius were awarded the Croix de Guerre with Palm, while to
Staff Sergeant Robert W. Lodin, Technician Fifth Grade Antony M. Palladino and
Private Warren R. Heen went the Croix de Guerre with Bronze Star.
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011 to Germany
Ever since the Germans had begun their December counter-offensive in Belgium the rumor mills had been grinding out "hot poop" on where the Regiment
was going. The stories were as numerous as the tellers, but on one thing all were
agreed: the 376th would not long remain in the comparative quiet of St. Nazaire.
Something bigger was in store.
By the end of December the truth of this had become apparent. Advance parties
of the 66th Division were already appearing on the lines, and trucks and equipment of the incoming 263rd Infantry were gathering in the rear areas. The day
finally came on January 1st, 1945. It was at 2045 that evening that the 376th Infantry,
after 106 days on the line at St. Nazaire, was officially relieved, and destined for
a new and as yet unknown assignment.
Chow that afternoon was a memorable occasion. In the midst of the confusion
of moving the Quartermaster had not forgotten it was New Year's Day, and the
Regiment, spread over acres of winter field only a 1,000 yards behind the lines,
enjoyed a turkey dinner with artillery still whistling over their heads. It was at
this point, just as each man was casting baleful glances at the mountainous pack
he would soon have to shoulder for the moving out, that the Christmas mail came
through. For a number of men the pleasure of receiving as many as five packages
from home was somewhat dampened by the imminent problem of where and how
to carry them.
That evening, having eaten or left behind the contents of the Christmas packages
that could not be carried, the seven mile march to Vigneux began. At Vigneux
most of the Regiment bivouacked for the night, the luckier ones quartered in a
series of battered and moribund shacks that had apparently once been barracks.
On the morning of January 2nd they moved by truck to the assembly area at
Chateaubriant.
Chateaubriant was the last stop before setting out for the new and to most,
still unknown destination. Here the Regiment bivouacked in pup tents on a open
and windy field which was soon covered with the first snow of the season. Passes
to Chateaubri.ant were eagerly welcomed, not only as an opportunity for a final celebration, but as a pleasant means of finding shelter from the weather.
The three days of waiting at Chateaubriant for the trains that would take the
Regiment on the last long lap of its journey across France marked the end of the
St. Nazaire epoch of their history.
It had been a colorful epoch, and an instructive one. It had been over three hard
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months of combat; combat of a sort that was arduous and dangerous enough to
condition the men to the ways of war and give them the calm sureness of veterans, yet mild enough so that after three months of it the vitality of the Regiment
had not been drained by losses or fatigue. It had been a unique apprenticeship and
the 376th went forth to the greater battles that still lay ahead unscarred by its
experience, and with the confidence of men who have been under fire and know
what they can do. They were ready.
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CHAPTER ill

HiDing the Switch
Boxcar Travel

r~~

inter at last had really set in. The first snow of the season that had
begun to fall on the pup tents outside of. Chateaubriant had continued spasmodically during the next two days, and it was bitter cold.
0~0
On the frosty afternoon of January 5th, with hands stiff and numb,
and overcoat collars turned up, the men of the 376th prepared to load on the trains
that would take them to their destination. Spirits, already dampened by the biting
weather, were not improved by a first look at the trains.
One of the many items which had become comparatively scarce in France during four years of war and occupation were passenger coaches. Many of these that
had not been turned into twisted and rusty masses of scrap metal by Allied bombing of strategic French rail' yards had been transported to Germany to serve as
transport for the Wehrmacht. There were not enough left to move whole Infantry regiments across France. The only alternative was the "40 hommes 8 chevaux" boxcar of World War I fame. It was a seemingly endless procession of
these that waited that day in the Chateaubriant railroad yards.
The French boxcar is considerably shorter than its American counterpart, and
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Goodbye to the Forgotten Front - Doughs of the 94th Division wait for
trains to the Big Show in a barren marshalling area near Chateaubriant.

subject of much discussion was the question of just how it was possible to get 40
men or 8 horses into one of them. Loading tables of the 376th called for 100 pounds
of straw for bedding, and approximately 27 men in each car. General opinion
among the men who were hard put to find room for themselves as well as their
bulky packs and equipment was that 27 was the absolute maximum.
The "40 and 8's" were designed neither for comfort nor cold weather. They had
no seats and no lighting and there was no means of communicating between cars
while the train was moving. In Winter, light was a problem even during the day.
Most of the cars had small panels high up in the walls that could be used for
windows, but the icy blasts of winter air that poured through them when they
were open prohibited their use. Even the sliding doors in the center of the cars
which were the only other source of light could be opened only part way without
freezing the occupants.
During the three day trip a few of the hardier souls braved the icy wind by the
doors where they could watch the snowy scenery slip by. But most remained
wrapped in their blankets on the straw-covered floor, dozing, talking, playing cards
or reading when there was sufficient light. Meals were irregular in timing but extremely consistent in type. "C'' rations supplemented by more "C" rations. Often these
were heated in the kitchen cars and served during stops.
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Among the more striking differences between American and French railroads
are the comparative cruising speeds, and the apparent whimsicality of French engineers. All night long the boxcars would jolt and rattle and pitch from side to
side as if the train were hurtling along the tracks at breakneck speed, yet dawn
would find it just pulling into a town perhaps fifteen miles from where it had been
the night before. Another problem was stops. Often a two or three minute stop
would lengthen into half an hour or more. On other occasions when a fifteen minute or half-hour stop had been announced and the men had jumped off to stretch
their legs or attend to the demands of nature, the engineer would apparently
change his mind inside of three minutes and start off without warning. Those who
had ventured off the train were left to get back aboard as best they could, and a
wild scramble would ensue at the doorways of the moving cars.
For three days the trains moved eastward, skirting Paris to the south and passing through Lorraine. Finally, on the chill evening of January 8th they pulled
into Thionville near the junction of the French, German and Luxembourg
boundaries. It was there that the men of the Regiment first heard the guns of
the Western Front, rumbling amidst the heat-lightning flashes of distant artillery
on the horizon.
At Thionville a brief stop was made for coffee before the trains moved onward
again. The final destination, which was reached later the same evening, was
Uckange, a smaller town south of Thionville. There the packs were rolled and
shouldered again and stiff with cold and long sitting in cramped positions, the
men at last got off the trains and loaded almost immediately into trucks that were
to take them to nearby towns where billets had been arranged for the night.
All of the Regiment could not travel by "40 and 8." The organic vehicles had to be
driven across France in time to be at the destination when the bulk of the troops
arrived. So the motor convoy was made ready to leave Chateaubriant on January
4th, the day before the foot elements were to board the trains. Colonel Harold
H. McClune and half his staff accompanied this convoy.
At the time of departure, the Regiment's orders were to proceed to Rheims,
France, to go into SHAEF reserve, ready to be used wherever necessary on the
Western Front. Plans at that time called for 'e.bout a week of coordinated infantryarmor training in Rheims.
Amidst a driving snow storm before dawn of the 3rd the vehicles pulled reluctantly from the adhesive mud of the Chateaubriant assembly area and headed east
across France. The bad weather that accompanied the departure was only a hint
of what was to follow. As the day progressed, the cold became more intense and

55

the snow flurries more frequent. To add to the misery of driving in such weather,
the need for adequate anti-aircraft defense made necessary the rule that all jeeps
and weapons carriers be driven without tops or sides. The whistling wind whipped
through the open vehicles, making it impossible for the occupants to keep warm
no matter how they tried. Most drivers wore both sets of woolen underwear
under their uniforms, and covered them with one or more sweaters and an overcoat or mackinaw. But the drivers had no mittens for their freezing hands, only
the inadequate gloves which the Quartermaster was not able to replace until later
in the Winter.
Nor did the end of the day's driving provide relief from the bitter cold. There
were no warm billets in which to thaw frozen bodies. Instead the convoy bivouacked in puptents in an open, wind-swept, snow-covered field. By morning
the shelterhalves were stiff with ice. Only someone who has had the experience
can realize how demoralizing it is to arise from what little warmth one has managed to create within the confines of a sleepingbag, and bring one's stiff body
into contact with the early morning chill; then attempt to fold a frozen and
muddy piece of canvas into something resembling a pack. So it was on this dreary
January morning. With nothing warm but the motors, the column headed once
more to the east. The cold grew more fierce and the snow increased as the convoy
reached its supposed destination.
Upon arriving in Rheims every one in the convoy was ready for a rest. But it
was not to be. The orders for the Division had been changed since the departure
from Chateaubriant. The 376th Infantry Regiment was in SHAEF reserve for approximately 20 minutes. Now it was assigned to the Third Army. The convoy was
to go to Sierck, France to join the XX Corps.
Hardened to their fate, the drivers once more hit the icy roads on what they
hoped would be the last leg of their journey. The terrain beyond Rheims was
more rugged than anything that had preceded it, and the weather was no better.
But the trip was made without undue mi~hap, and the vehicles were in Sierck
by the time the trains had arrived at Uckange.
The soldiers who had come by train were a bit amazed to find themselves
practically at the front. Upon departure from Chateaubriant they had been informed that they were going to Rheims for at least a week of training. The change
of destination had been given to the Transportation Corps men in charge of the
trains, but not to the passengers. As a result, the men who boarded the trains
contemplating a week of good living, clambered off the cars trying to adjust themselves to the idea of going on line almost immediately.
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That night, the night of January 8th, was the eve of a great new chapter in the
history of the 376th. By daylight on the morning of January 9th, Third Cavalry
Reconnaissance Squadron was to be relieved, and the men of the Regiment were
to have moved into their first positions on the Western Front; positions from which
they were to push across 100 miles of stubbornly defended German homeland in
the next 15 days. At last the curtain was rising on the main event; the event
for which two years of training had been the preparation, and for which more
than three months of actual combat at St. Nazaire had been but the dress rehearsal.
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The Switch
Regt CP at SIERCK .. .
1st Bn CP at PERL .. .
2nd Bn CP at EFT .. .
3rd Bn CP at KIRSCH . .
All troops closed in 2330.
Relief of 3rd Cav Rcn Sq will be completed by daylight 9 Jan.
SANDOZ
S-3

This was the message sent to 94th Division G-3 from the 376th during the early
hours of the morning of January 9th. This was the setting of the stage; the announcement that the Regiment was ready to begin its first mission in Germany. It was a
mission of imposing significance. Just how significant did not become a matter of
common knowledge until months later when the Battle of the Rhine was in its ultimate stages. Only now, long after the smoke of final battle in Germany has cleared,
can we look back on the task that at that time lay before the Regiment and see it
in the light of the greater over-all strategy of the Allied Armies, complete with its
causes and antecedents.
Properly speaking, the Siegfried Switch Line was not a part of what was generally
thought of as the Westwall, though it was hardly less formidable. It was a narrower
belt of fortifications, running at right angles to the main line, from the Saar River
above Merzig to the Moselle River in the vicinity of Remich on the Luxembourg
side. For 12 miles it wound its way over steep hillsides, terraced with vineyards,
and dotted with thick clumps of spruce forest, passing through or near the towns of
Oberleuken, Borg, Tettingen-Butzdorf and Nennig.
Purpose of the Switch was to guard the approaches to Saarburg and especially
Trier, vital communications center some five miles northeast of the junction of the
two rivers. It also served as an outpost defense ring and buffer for the main Westwall defenses on the other side of the Saar, which were a crucial link in the whole
Siegfried chain. As far back as 1942 when General Eisenhower presented his plan
for the Battle of Germany to General Marshall, Allied military leaders had realized
that this heavily fortified outguard would have to be breached before any largescale penetrations of the main Siegfried positions could be made. If it were not, the
part of the main line it shielded could not be neutralized and would be a constant
threat to the flanks of any penetration made elsewhere. Once the Switch was overcome, a wedge-shaped salient could be thrust into the German line between the two
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rivers, imperiling their flank to the northwest. Such a wedge would also provide a
firm springboard for further Allied attacks to the east.
With this strategy in mind, the 90th Infantry and lOth Armored Divisions had
been thrown against these positions early in December. But their attack had
achieved only partial success when, on December 16th, events on the Western
Front took an unexpected turn. Field Marshall Gerd von Rundstedt, mustering what
strength remained in the failing Wehrmacht, launched a final and desperate blitz
against the American First Army to the north.
The first days of this never-to-be-forgotten 'Battle of the Bulge" were so alarming that all major offensive plans had to be abandoned temporarily to save the
situation. Most of the 90th Division and all of the lOth Armored were hastily withdrawn from the Saar-Moselle sector and speeded north to stop the panzer columns
that were rapidly advancing through the Ardennes Forest in Belgium.
For the moment further attacks on the Switch were out of the question. Liquidation of the "Bulge," which by Christmas Day had reached near catastrophic proportions, had first priority. Best that could be done in the Saar-Moselle area was to
keep matters as they stood. This mission, which was purely a holding one, was
assigned to the Third Cavalry Reconnaissance Group which held that section of
the line without attempting any offensive action until the "Bulge" was choked off
and relegated to history and bitter memories.
By the last week in December the situation had improved; not greatly, but
enough so that certain operations could be undertaken that would have seemed
too risky a week earlier. Among these were the transfer of the 94th Division from
the relative limbo of Brittany to SHAEF reserve where it would await a Western
Front assignment as soon as the situation cleared enough for the offensive timetable to be resumed. Possible reason that the 94th had not been transferred to a
more active front during the most crucial days of the "Bulge" was that reinforcement units could be sent more quickly direct from the ports of debarkation on the
Channel. It is entirely possible that if the 66th Division had not lost so many men
when one of its ships was torpedoed crossing the Channel, it would have gone to the
Western Front that first week in January while the 94th continued its holding
assignment on the Atlantic Coast.
After the twenty minute stay in SHAEF reserve at Rheims the 94th was assigned
to the XX Corps of General GeorgeS. Patton Jr's renowned Third Army. Under the
Command of Major General Walton H. Walker, the XX "Ghost" Corps had played
a dramatic and brilliant role in the Third Army's blitz through France. Now the
316th, with the rest of the 94th, was to join it and take up defensive positions facing
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the Switch until orders came through to carry on where the 90th had been forced
to leave off three weeks before.
The positions which the Third Cavalry Squadron had inherited from the 90th, and
which they were now relinquishing to the 376th Infantry were within sight
of the dragon's teeth and snow-filled anti-tank ditches that marked the frontier
defenses of the Switch. First mission upon relieving the cavalrymen was to
establish an MLR and an OPL which would be maintained until the orders came
to start the offensive.
The dragon's teeth wound through a series of small farming towns which had
themselves been converted into formidable strong points. In addition to dragon's
teeth, anti-tank ditches, communications trenches and barbed wire, the approaches
to these towns were guarded with mines and by pillboxes, which had disconcertingly perfect observation from neighboring steep bluffs.
Facing this ominous array of power, the men of the 376th began the work of
setting up an MLR just south of the front line villages of Besch, Wochern and Borg.
The morning of January 9th was biting cold and they worked under cover of an early
morning ground haze. The job of hewing foxholes and gun positions in the iron-hard
frozen ground was far from easy. But one thing at least could be said for it; it was
a good way to keep warm.
In these positions, from the 9th to the 13th of January, the 376th waited, poised
like a wary fighter, watchful eyes glued on the quiet winter countryside ahead
where the enemy also watched and waited. On the left, in and around Besch and
Wochern was the First Battalion. To the right, near Borg and Hellendorf and extending as far east as Oberleuken, the Second. Behind them the Third Battalion
prepared the reserve positions.
It was not good weather for patrols. A man dressed in olive drab is too good a
target against the unbroken white of snow in such open country. But there was
constant patrolling, and it was not long before white outer garments began to
appear, hastily improvised out of sheets, or any piece of white cloth large enough
to serve the purpose, that could be found in the nearby towns. Day. after day these
ghostly sheeted figures moved forward over the snow, cautiously probing in front
of the lines towards where the Wehrmacht lay snug in their concrete pillboxes and
fortified villages. From the lines themselves came the snow-muffled sound of pickmattocks chunking in the frozen ground as foxholes widened and deepened and new
emplacements were dug.
Chill winds swept the towns along the Moselle mud flats and crept into sleeping
bags to torment the resting sentries along the OPL. Fingers, toes, and noses turned
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numb with cold. Houses abandoned in apparent haste by German civilians obeying
Hitler's order to evacuate the fighting zones were left intact, complete with coal,
food and livestock. These the troops used for shelter and billets wherever possible.
Only thing that could be said for the weather was that it was ideal for hunting.
There was plenty of game-deer and rabbits especially-and markmanship was excellent. Often the crack of an M1 ringing out in the clear sub-zero air would mean
that at least one company would be having something other than "C" rations for
supper that evening.
Those first five days, from the 9th to the 13th of January, were quiet as many of
the days in Brittany had been. But they were to be the last five days of any kind of
quiet for a long time. On January 13th the warning order came:
. . . 94 Div will conduct offensive operations within Z involving not more than one reinforced
Bn in ea operation . . . 376 Inf will atk at daylight 14 Jan 45 . . . 1st Bn atk at 0730 14 Jan 45,
seize and hold the town of TETTINGEN-BUTZDORF. Be prepared to repel counterattacks from
the W, N or E.
0

0

0

This was the gist of the Regimental Field Order which reached the ears of only
the battalion commanders and their staffs. But it was not long before Lieutenant
Colonel Russell M. Miner had his order before his company commanders, they in
turn had oriented their platoon leaders, and so on down until each rifleman knew
the part he was to play at 0730 in the morning when the Battalion was to move
forward through the dragon's teeth and take the town of Tettingen.
Receiving the news the men looked at one another significantly and said little.
Each knew that this was the first real test. The battle about to begin would be a
battle in its fullest and most terrible sense-a far cry from the skirmishes of
St. Nazaire.
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Tellingen-Butzdorl
By 1800 on January 13th the Third Battalion had relieved the First of its positions along the MLR and OPL, and Colonel Miner's men had pulled back to the
vicinity of Wochern to reorganize for the jump-off on the following morning.
Grouped around glowing stoves in dimly lit rooms, the men were oriented on
the job to be done. It was not going to be an easy one. First of all the Switch Line
was a mighty opponent for a single reinforced battalion, narrow as the attacking
front might be. Colonel McClune himself, whose plan had been to make a coordinated Regimental attack, was a little uneasy at the prospect of striking with so
small a force. But XX Corps had been specific in this respect and there was no
alternative. Second, the men were on edge This was their first attack on the
Western Front, and it was not as they had anticipated it would be. During the last
days in Brittany they had heard many talks on armor-infantry coordination, and
had been told that such attacks would be carefully rehearsed beforehand. Here
there was no opportunity for rehearsal and no tanks. True, Company B of the 607th
Tank Destroyer Battalion would be attached, but they were to be used only if
absolutely necessary. Company C of the 319th Engineers would clear a mine free
path to the Line of Departure; the 919th Field Artillery, other units of Corps
Artillery and Cannon Company as well as Company C of the 81st Chemical Battalion
would pound the enemy positions in preparation for the attack. But from there on it
would be up to the doughs to close with the enemy and destroy him. There were no
tanks, because it was not a situation in which tanks could be used effectively.
Nonetheless, each rifleman in the First Battalion was acutely aware of the unique
feeling of hollow aloneness that comes to the infantryman before such an attack as
this was to be.
In the darkness before dawn of January 14th the attackers were given a hot
breakfast, and each was loaded with enough "C" ration to last him the rest of the
day. Everyone draped himself with as many bandoleers of ammunition as he could
carry, and hung grenades from every available pack-strap ring and buttonhole.
Otherwise the load was light. No one, in spite of the intense cold, carried more
than one blanket, a shelter half or a raincoat. Speed and maneuverability came
first. No man could be so loaded that he was unable to attack aggressively.
It was at 0730, with six battalions of artillery still engaged in making the little
town of Tettingen look like "the capital of hell" that the First Battalion crossed
the LD; Company A on the right, Company Con the left, and Company Bin reserve.
The air was filled with the whine and jolting of artillery that formed a moving
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First Battalion Infantryman under fire from German artillery dashes for
cover. Scene is a shell-pitted orchard just outside village of Tettingen.

wall a scant 200 yards in front of the attackers. Terrain was unfamiliar, and snow
and bitter cold were silent allies of the defenders of the town, but everything went
smoothly. Private First Class Philip L. Russo, Company I machine gunner, who
witnessed the entire attack from his position on the Third Battalion OPL, said it
was an almost perfect attack: . . . " just like we used to do in training when no one
was firing back at us."
Surprise is a formidable ally of advancing infantry when they are the ones to
do the surprising, and it was a sharp weapon in the hands of the First Battalion
that morning. The defenders of Tettingen were caught off guard, first by the stunning blasts of artillery and then by the swift, determined attackers who closed in
so quickly in its wake. There were hurried attempts at futile resistance and some
firing from windows and trenches in and about the town. But the attackers closed
in implacably and by 0815 it was all over. Companies A and C were, for the
moment, in undisputed possession of their first objective.
With surprising ease the first round had gone to the 376th. But there was no
time to pause and contemplate the victory. The silence that followed the last
shots of the first encounter was tense and threatening. With feverish haste Com-
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pany C began the business of setting up perimeter defense against the counterattacks that could be expected momentarily. Company A had hardly paused to
catch its breath when it received orders to move on and take Butzdorf.
Just as a good boxer will invariably bore into an opponent still staggering from
an unexpected blow, it is axiomatic in the infantry that, when the element of surprise has been initially achieved, it must be followed up. Tettingen had been
"caught with its pants down." Butzdorf across a few hundred yards of open ground
from Tettingen, might be open to surprise as well. Company A was to jump off at
1000 and find out.
At 0953 the comparative silence was again broken by the jarring slam of exploding shells, landing this time on Butzdorf. The men of Company A, facing north
from the streets of Tettingen, watched them fall and waited. This was the seven
minute preparation for their attack; the inevitable softening up that a target of
infantry receives before the foot-soldiers move in for the kill.
At exactly 1000 they set out again. This time however, the Germans were alert
and the attackers had hardly gained the northern edge of Tettingen when the firecracker snap of small arms fire coming dangerously close filled the air about them.
It was followed by the unmistakable whine of incoming artillery. Further advance
was, for the moment, impossible, and the men hugged the ground while Captain
Carl J. Shetler called back for further artillery assistance. After five more minutes
of softening up, fire from Butzdorf itself slackened and advance was again possible.
But the troubles of Company A were just beginning.
The open grqund between the two towns was comparatively flat and completely
without cover. To the east it rose sharply to form a ridge which overlooked the
flats and both towns as well. This ridge was an ideal location for mortars, and it
was soon obvious that the Germans had taken advantage of it. Half way between
the two towns Captain Shetler and his men heard the familiar popping sound from
the ridge. The barrage was murderously accurate, and to the men who took the
full brunt of it in the open, it was "like standing at the bottom of a well and
helplessly being stoned by a group of small boys at the top." When the smoke
had cleared there were numerous casualties, among whom was Captain Shetler,
mortally wounded by flying fragments.
Once across the open, the attack went more easily, and by 1142 Butzdorf too
had fallen. The Company, now commanded by First Lieutenant David F. Stafford,
set about preparing its defenses for expected counterattacks. The attack had
succeeded initially, but the long, finger-like salient which the taking of Tettingen
and Butzdorf had produced thrust 2000 yards into enemy-held territory, and was
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only some 400 yards wide. Strongly defended as it was, with the added fire-power
of Company D and the cannon fire which First Lieutenant Hjalmar W. Nielsen could
bring to bear at a moment's notice, it was still vulnerable, and would be harder to
hold than it had been to take.
The main problem at this point, aside from hewing defenses out of the frozen
ground around the town and keeping an eye out for further attacks at the same
time, was the several hundred yards of open ground that Company A had just
crossed. To reach Butzdorf from either Tettingen, where Company C was still
dug in, or Wochern, Battalion hub of supply and communications, it was necessary
to cross this open ground under perfect observation by enemy artillery and mortar observers. But if Company A was to receive much needed supplies and ammunition, if artillery-disrupted communication wires were to be maintained, and if the
many wounded that still lay on the field where the attack had passed were to be
reached and evacuated, it had to be crossed. And it was crossed many times. It
was crossed by men like Privates First Class Donald W. Meals of Company A
and Wesley E. Phillips of Headquarters Company, First Battalion, who constantly
disregarded their own safety to keep the telephone wires intact, and Private First
Class Russell Merritt, one of the many aid men who risked their life to get the
wounded to cover.
It was in no small measure due to the heroism of such men as these that Company A was able to hold out during the next four days when their positions at
Butzdorf became a veritable "Bastogne" and they came near to being written off
as lost by their battali.o n.
It was at this time that the "Caldwell Bib" first put in its appearance. Artillery
is unavoidably impersonal as to its victims and will blow up a medical man as
quickly as an armed soldier, but it soon became evident that German riflemen
were at times equally indiscriminate. Consensus of opinion was that this was
partly due to the red crosses in white circles which the aid men wore on their
helmets not being distinct enough against a snow background. Major Samuel W.
Cal,d well, the Regimental Surgeon, had finally devised a solution; a white, armless
jacket with a large red cross front and back which could be slipped over a field
jacket and could not fail to be seen even at a distance. Captured Nazi battle flags
provided the red for the crosses, and Red Cross workers in Thionville manned their
sewing machines. By the time the First Battalion attacked Tettingen all front line
medical personnel were provided with these bibs, and many lives were saved in
the following weeks while snow remained on the ground.
The first counterattack came at 1225. A reinforced platoon of about 40 German
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infantrymen descended on Butzdorf from the excellent approaches afforded by the
woods just to the east. But the defenders of the town were not to be so easily
daunted, and drove them off with little trouble, killing about ten of them.
Nothing more happened during the next hour, but at 1335 Company B was
moved up from its reserve positions near Wochern to strengthen "C's" defenses in
Tettingen. The First Platoon was sent on up to Butzdorf to reinforce Company A.
However, the afternoon passed quietly. It was a time of waiting and "sweating
out" the enemy's next move. Artillery and 120mm mortar shells fell continuously
on both towns and on the only routes of approach to Butzdorf.
In the early hours of January 15th the shelling increased. 120mm mortars, 105's
and 88's rained down devastatingly on Tettingen, Butzdorf and Wochern as well.
This was the prelude to the first of the really strong counterattacks which came
at last at 0300. Four hundred infantrymen swept down from the high ground
on three sides of Butzdorf and, covered by heavy supporting fires from emplacements overlooking the town, succeeded in completely encircling it. At the same
time part of this force attempted to encircle Tettingen.
With a crackling roar that echoed from the ridges to the east, the First Battalion
struck back. The darkness was shattered with blinding flashes as three rifle companies, the mortars and machine guns of Company D, and all available artillery.
adjusted with deadly accuracy by forward observers and infantry alike, raised a
solid wall of flying steel in the face of the attackers . It was a fanatical assault,
and time and time again the first waves thrust to within fifteen yards of the
defender's positions, only to be hurled back and annihilated.
There were some busy moments for Company D in Tettingen during this attack.
Mortar and machine gun positions were well spread out, and it was not long
before the pounding of enemy artillery in the streets of the town had completely
disrupted communications between them. But Staff Sergeant Estle E. Templeton
was equal to the occasion, and during the heaviest enemy firing continued to move
from one gun position to another, coordinating their fires, while at the same time
he bore the burden of adjusting both mortar and artillery fire. It was his inspiration and leadership that kept many machine gunners coolly and determinedly behind their weapons while the enemy repeatedly approached to within a few
yards of them.
After more than two hours of such desperate fighting, ammunition began to run
low. A hasty check showed that only 1,000 rounds remained for the heavy machine
guns. Considering the fact that 32,000 rounds had been used since the attack began,
this was not going to last long. Somehow some one had to get back to the ammu-
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niti'on dump at Wochern and get some more. Hand carrying as much as would
be needed would take too long-it would have to be brought up by truck.
So far no vehicle had dared the road from Wochern to Tettingen. Even had there
not been an attack in progress it would have been practically suicide to risk it.
But if Tettingen was to be held there was no alternative, and Corporal Donald W.
Kreger, Company D transportation corporal, immediately volunteered for the job.
He returned without mishap and with 64,000 rounds of ammunition, but by that
time one house in the area defended by ··c s" Third Platoon had been taken. Kreger's
next job was to contact the TD's and have them bring fire on the house with 90mm
cannon. When this had been accomplished he moved from one gun position to another, cheering the gunners on, and picking off Germans with his M1 as they were
pinned down by the machine guns.
For three hours the battle raged at its fullest. Then, shortly before dawn, the
smoke at last drifted away and all was quiet again. The First Battalion, grimy, exhausted and bleeding, still held Tettingen and Butzdorf. Hundreds of still and
twisted shapes scattered on the shell-blackened snow of nearby slopes bore mute
evidence of the attackers' fate. There had been 120 prisoners taken-these were
the remainder. Almost the entire enemy force had been wiped out.
Again after this it was comparatively quiet. Artillery and mortar fire continued
and the defenders of Tettingen and Butzdorf were forced to· stay close to the
heavier walled cellars. The houses themselves, by this time crumbled and tottering, offered scant protection, and walking the streets by daylight was inviting
almost certain disaster.
The next counterattacks came on the evening of January 15th. Company B in
Tettingen bore the brunt of the first of these. But there were only fifty in the
attacking force this time and the survivors were soon driven off. Not long after
this four Mark V tanks, accompanied by infantry, rumbled down the slopes
towards the flank of Company C but the defenders, in their dug-in positions
around the town, were ready for these as well. Bazookas were added to a stunning volume of small arms, machine gun and mortar fire, and two of the tanks
retired from the field, smouldering from close range hits. The remaining two, as
doughs of Company C closed in on them with bazookas and satchel charges
also beat a hasty retreat. Most of the infantry that had accompanied the tanks
was either killed or wounded.
All that can be said of the next two days, January 16th and 17th, is that there
were no further counterattacks, and that the shelling continued. Much could also be
said of the paralyzing cold, of the lack of sleep, of the dead and hollow look of
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weariness that was beginning to come into the eyes of the frostbitten and isolated
survivors of Company A and B's First Platoon. But there are many times when the
actuality of modern war is beyond the power of mere words written afterwards.
During those two days Company A still held Butzdorf. What it cost them to hold
Butzdorf is better left to the memories of those who were there, and will bear the
mark of those days and the days that followed for the rest of their lives.
These were grim days even behind the front line. In Wochern 9 were killed and
24 wounded by enemy artillery, and on several occasions there were direct hits on
the Battalion Aid Station. Not once, however, were the all-important medical supply
and communications operations seriously interrupted. Wounded were evacuated
by litter bearers who were forced to seek cover along with their charges en route.
There are countless stories of individual heroism behind the simple statement
"forward companies were resupplied with ammunition and rations."
At 0300 on the morning of January 18th a patrol sent out from Company A
returned with two prisoners from the 11th Panzer (Ghost) Division. This was the
first definite indication that an armored unit of this calibre was in the vicinity, and
preparations were immediately made to reinforce all anti-tank defenses and bring
up extra bazooka teams. At daybreak that morning the First Platoon of Anti-Tank
Company under First Lieutenant George W. Peters nioved up from Wochern and
began to dig in their guns around the town.
The attack came at 0715. It began with twenty-five minutes of artillery preparation on the two already crumbling front line towns. Crouching in their emplacements, the defenders knew that, in spite of all they had been through, the worst was
yet to come, and this was the beginning of it.
Following the artillery preparation came tanks and infantry of the First and Tenth
Companies of the llOth Panzer Grenadier Regiment and the 714th Infantry Regiment.
In the last few days the Germans had learned to their surprise and sorrow that the
Regiment facing them was a fierce and capable one, and not to be taken lightly.
Against it they were now sending the best they had.
This time the tanks literally swarmed down the slopes to the north and east of
Butzdorf, and vast numbers of supporting infantry came with them. The tanks
caught Lieutenant Peters' 57's still digging in, and one of his prime movers was
knocked out by a direct hit from their 88's. At the same time Lieutenant Peters
and his Platoon Sergeant, Joseph J. Quentz, were wounded by another 88 and had
to be evacuated.
Once again the withering firepower of an entire battalion was turned against
the attackers; small arms, machine guns, artillery, , and mortars slashing at the
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infantry, while bazookas and 57's pounded the oncoming tanks. But this time the
enemy had sheer weight of numbers overwhelmingly on his side and by 0755
tanks had reached the center of Butzdorf and their 88's were firing point blank
into the walls of houses still held by the desperate fighters of Company A.
But the defenders fought on. Tanks tha had E!ntered the town were singled out
and buttoned up with small-arms fire, then attacked by bazooka teams. Those
that were stopped were finally finished off with satchel charges, and before long
the streets of the town and the nearby fields were landmarked with smoking hulks.
Meanwhile Cannon Company, back behind Wochern, was working its gun
crews in two shifts as the missions kept coming back from Lieutenant Nielsen and
anybody else who could get communications. It seemed as if everybody in the
battalion knew the concentration numbers. By the end of the day 70 missions had
been fired - a total of 1143 rounds. From the Jerry point of view this was 19
tons of shrapnel and explosives.
On top of this the 919th was having its biggest day since its arrival in combat.
During this one day the battalion fired a total of 72 missions-3132 rounds.
By 0835 that morning the infantry that had supported the tanks had been cut
to ribbons and were forced to withdraw, and the remaining tanks retreated with
them. There had been many moments when the outcome seemed in doubt, but
Tettingen and Butzdorf were still in American hands.
While this attack was in progress Private First Class Virgil E. Hamilton of Company D was driving his jeep from Tettingen to Butzdorf. With him was Transportation Corporal Bernie H. Heck, and Corporal Earl N. Vulgamore, who at that
time was Company D's mail clerk. For the past four days the road from Tettingen to Butzdorf had been no place to be driving a jeep-to b~ caught there on
the morning of January 18th was practically suicide. But there was only one road,
supplies had to get to the companies on line and these three men had volunteered
to bring them, so there was no alternative.
Among the supplies in Hamilton's jeep that morning was a bazooka, complete
with a plentiful supply of rockets, which was being rushed to supplement Company A's anti-tank defenses. None of the three men in the jeep had fired a
bazooka or knew much about using one. They were not supposed to. Their job was
not firing them but seeing that they got to those who did.
They had not gone far along the road when four German tanks suddenly
loomed in front of them, apparently unaware of the approaching jeep. Hamilton
however, quickly sized up the situation and adroitly swerved his vehicle behind
a farmhouse before it was spotted. There was only one thing to do, and Corporals
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Vulgamore and Heck did a remarkably fast job of assembling the bazooka and
getting the rockets out of their boxes. There were a few moments of puzzlement
as to the proper technique of loading, but by the time the first of the tanks had
rattled within range everything was ready.
It was Hamilton who finally shouldered the bazooka while Vulgamore and Heck
feverishly unpacked the rest of the ammunition and stood by to reload. From
his concealed position behind the farmhouse he took careful aim at the lead tank,
I
now about 40 yards away, and fired. There was a deafening roar and the tank,
hit squarely amidships, went up in flames.
Hamilton, spurred on by his success, let fly at the second one just as one of
the astonished crew was raising the hatch to see what was going on. He was
scanning the horizon for American troops or planes when the rocket creased
his stomach and caromed down the hatch into the tank. The score was now
two down and two to go.
It took five rounds to get number three, the guns of which were ready, but
still silent for want of a visible target. It was after this that the fourth tank turned
tail and set out at full speed for a less unhealthy area. But there were two
rockets left and the three impromptu bazookamen set out in hot pursuit. When
the last rocket had been fired number four had shared the fate of the other three,
and four smoking hulls were all that was left of the formation.
After this the three men continued on to Butzdorf to deliver their supplies,
apologizing on arrival for being late, and for delivering a somewhat used bazooka
without ammunition.
All during the day infantry and tank attacks continued against the two towns.
Companies A and C, near to total exhaustion, and reduced to not much over
half strength after four days of continuous fighting and "sweating out" artillery
barrages, fought on and still repulsed the attackers who once more during the
day reached the streets of Butzdorf and even began to dig in on the flat ground
between there and Tettingen. The odds were fantastic, but they continued to give
their all and were determined to stand together until the end that was beginning
to seem both near and inevitable. Message received by Battalion from the Commander of Company A that afternoon: '"No alternative, will fight it out to the
finish.··
That day, January 18th, will be remembered by Company A as one of the
darkest and most terrible in their history-yet one of which they may be
justly proud. Out of the smoke and confusion of that day and the days before
come many names that will be long remembered: the name of Staff Sergeant
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Joseph R. Mendrick of Company D who, on January 15th, rescued three comrades
from the upper floor of a house in W ochern that had been set on fire by enemy
mortars and which was full of small arms ammunition and grenades that exploded as they burned; of Privates First Class W. T. Pillow and Jack Zebin of
Company A who, in the face of point blank 88 fire from oncoming tanks,
manned a bazooka and destroyed four enemy armored vehicles; of Corporal Duncan N. Leach, Jr., of Compq.ny A who, with a borrowed bazooka, knocked out
one tank, crippled another, and then calmly proceeded to pick off the occupants
of the two tanks with his rifle as they emerged, all while under intense machine
gun fire; of Private First Class Earle T. Mousaw who, in Butzdorf on January
18th, took charge of his machine gun section after the section leader was wounded
and, though wounded himself, inspired them by his own example to hold out
through two tank attacks during which the guns of one of the other sections were
overrun.
These are only a few. The credit for a stand such as the First Battalion was
making in Tettingen and Butzdorf goes as much to those who will be nameless
in the years to come as to those whose names are singled out and preserved
by records or awards. For success in battle is the result of a teamwork where no
one man's part is less important than another's, and is equally the achievement
of all who shared its suffering.
Shortly before noon two platoons of Company F, which had been engaged in
clearing out pillboxes in the woods to the west, were attached to the First Battalion and sent to the vicinity of Tettingen to support Companies B and C.
Towards evening the rest of the Second Battalion began to move up to relieve
the First.
But the situation was desperate in Butzdorf. Under constant shelling and counterattack the men of Company A and B's First Platoon fought from the houses;
moving from house to house as their defenses shifted by means of "mouse-holing"
the walls with blocks of TNT and crawling through. They had beaten off the best
the enemy had to offer and still held what they had taken. But there is a limit to
the endurance of even the strongest and most determined. Casualties had reduced
the company to not more than 100 men, and many of the survivors were nearly
helpless from trench foot, frost bite and the last stages of weariness. One way or
another the end could not be long postponed. That evening after further tank
attacks had again threatened to oyerrun the streets of Butzdorf, it finally came.
Orders came to pull out, and the battered and weary remnants of the defenders
of Butzdorf fell back to Tettingen under cover of heavy smoke. The time was 1830.
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At the same time the relief of the First Battalion was completed and the Second
Battalion moved in to occupy the new line which still included Tettingen.
This five day saga is an impressive monument in the history of the First Battalion. Swiftly and skillfully they had hammered the first crack in the Siegfried
Switch Line, and for five days had stubbornly held their initial salient against
incredible odds. That they had to relinquish one town is unimportant. What is
important is that during that time ten Germans had been killed to every one
American. There had been 170 prisoners taken, and eight tanks and eleven halftracks, left silent and broken on the field, testified to the effective and valorous
fighting of the infantrymen. Far outnumbering the Americans as they did, elements of one of the best divisions Hitler could put in the field had more than met
their match in the men of the First Battalion.
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Nennig-Wies-Berg
During the first days of the attack on the switch there were two major battles
in progress at the same time. So far we have followed only the First Battalion which
was occupied with driving a long, thin salient into the eastern part of the sector assigned to the 376th. To the west the Third Battalion was carrying on a
simultaneous assault, object of which was the taking of Nennig, Wies and Berg,
three heavily fortified towns along the bank of the Moselle. Between these
towns and the battlefield of the First Battalion was a large tract of woods which
the Second assaulted on January 16th with the object of straightening the lines.
On January 13th Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin E. Thurston, Commanding Officer
of the Third Battalion, first received word from Colonel McClune that he would
attack Nennig. There were no details as yet as to the exact date, time or attachments. It would be necessary to await the outcome of the initial attack on
Tettingen and Butzdorf before these particulars could be definitely established.
But it was not too early to study the ground over which the attack was to move.
For the results of Colonel Thurston's reconnaissance we turn to his battle critique
of the Third Battalion operations from January 15th to the 19th:
A study of maps, aerial photos and a cursory reconnaissance showed that the town (of Nennig)
consisted of 48 thick-walled stone buildings, set in the mudflats dug by the Moselle and two small
tributaries flowing into it from the east, and nestled close to the rock cliffs which rise steeply to
the east of town.

To the west and south of Nennig stretches a. wide and deep prairie, quite flat and

broken only by a few gullies and streams.
The approaches to the town are ideal for defense.

To the south along the main road where the

ground is flat, mine fields, tank traps and pillboxes form fearsome barriers.

From the east an attack

must rush down a steep hill with consequent disorganization, or must pass along a very narrow
gorge which a machine gunner or six riflemen could easily defend.

The approaches from the north

are easier, but all pass through narrow defiles which also are easy to defend.

The west would

appear to be the most logical approach, provided the attacking force could get across the level
ground.
The town is protected first by the village of Berg, 600 yards to the north, which holds some
twenty buildings, including a powerful "Schloss," and by Wies, a somewhat larger group of buildings 1500 yards to the northwest of Nennig. All three of these towns lie in a hollow, commanded
by steeply higher ground to the east and northeast.
Boiled down, the information available indicated that the attack would be a formidable task.

A

previous attempt (by the 90th Division) to take the town from the south had piled up before five
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pillboxes. An attempt from the east meant a long and meandering route through unreconnoitered
forest and very probable contact with pillboxes and mine fields not charted. That left only the north
and west approaches worth considering. If the attack could come as a surprise and could cover the
three miles between the front lines and the objective unobserved, it might have a chance from
either of these directions.

Therefore, since the west route would be shorter, and the railroad would

serve as an excellent line of departure, I chose to try that method of attack, and accordingly warned
the company commanders and my staff that I planned to hit Nennig from the west.
0

0

0

By early afternoon of January 14th the details of the attack were forthcoming.
At that time the commanding officers of the units that were to support and be
attached reported to the Third Battalion CP in Besch. Also at the CP were General
Malony, General Cheadle and Colonel McClune. When everybody had arrived the
remaining details of the Regimental order were handed down, and Colonel Thurston
outlined his plan of attack. The plan, which an hour and a half later had the
approval of all concerned, was, as stated in the Third Battalion Field Order issued
that evening, as follows:

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*•

2. This Battalion, with a Chemical Company and Engineer Company (less one platoon), and one
platoon TD all attached, and supported by six battalions Field Artillery will attack, capture and
hold NENNIG.

Formation: Column of Cos, K, L, I; LD see overlay (along tracks), time of attack 0715 . ..

3. Co. K with one sec 81mm attached will capture and hold NENNIG.

It will take up a defen-

sive (position) to the east and south of that city after having captured it.

Co. L following Co. K at 500 yards will relieve north platoon Co. K upon capture of NENNIG, will then capture BERG and WIES from the rear.
NENNIG-BERG-WIES.

Co. L will defend the line North half of

Co. L will be responsible for protecting the north flank of the Battalion

during the attack.

Co. I will await orders in BESCH. It will protect the Engineers in mine remov al by one squad
and will secure the LD.
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Co. M, less one mortar section, will initially protect the north flank of the attack by one
platoon of .30 cal.; upon capture of NENNIG it will protect the areas of Cos K and L by one platoon respectively of .30 cal. It will be prepared to give general mortar support to the attack.

Engineer Company, beginning at 0300 15 Jan, will clear a lane from BESCH to LD, removing all mines and taping this lane.

It will furnish four pole charges each to K and L Cos and

will carry forward four flame throwers to be used by the latter companies.

Chemical Plats will furnish smoke at 0705 on areas designated . . . prepared to continue the
smoke till further notice. It will be prepared to fire targets of opportu.nity.

A & P Platoon will move ammunition by hand to NENNIG.

AT Platoon will furnish eight mines and carriers each to Cos K and L. It will remain in
reserve at BESCH.

4. Aid station-BESCH; DP-BESCH; administrative details later; evacuation-BESCH.

5. Axis of signal communication-BESCH-NENNIG.

CP"s-Bn-BESCH opens 141900, Cos-open BESCH same time-thereafter select and report.

THURSTON

In the chill dark of early morning on January 15th the Engineers left Besch to
begin the long and arduous job of sweeping the route of approach clear of mines.
This was at 0300. Two hours and fifteen minutes later the battalion column was
shuffling into position in the dark streets of Besch. The route of approach was
a long and circuitous one, stretching diagonally northwest towards the river and
meeting it at a point 1000 yards west of the LD along the railroad tracks. The
route then followed tile river for some five hundred yards to a point 1500 yards
northwest of the town itself, and concealed from it by a slight rise in the open
ground. From there it doubled back south and east to reach the tracks directly
west of the town. Company K, the lead company, reached the LD at about 0705,
just at the time the chemical mortars began to lay their screen of smoke between
the attackers and their objective. The Germans in the town, looking into the gray
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pall of smoke to their south and west must have known that something was up,
but could not have known from which direction it would come.
Company K ran into its first snag when it discovered on arriving at the
railroad tracks that the Engineers had not completed their mine sweeping, and
that it would not, as a result, be possible to cross the LD on time. However,
the artillery continued its preparation, supported by Cannon Company, for another
30 minutes until the situation could get straightened out.
Finally, at 0745, "K" crossed the Line with the heavy weapons following.
Their formation was First Platoon on the right, Second on the left, and Third
in support.
The smoke was thick by this time-so thick that even in the gathering light
of day it was hard to see where you were going. It was not long before Captain
Julian M. Way became aware that, in striking east from the tracks, he had not
hit the point he was expected to hit. As he and his company moved through
the gathering smoke, plain open country continued to loom ahead of them instead of the houses of Nennig. They had gone too far north and had reached a
position somewhere between Nennig and Wies.
About the time this discovery was made Captain Way was further disconcerted
to find that his Second Platoon, which had been on his left flank, was no longer
there. They too had got lost in the smoke. Immediately he tried to contact his erring platoon and bring them back, but soon realized that this would take valuable
time and changed his mind. He assigned his support platoon, the Third, less one
squad, the mission of the missing Second. If the element of surprise was to be
turned to good use there was nothing to do but continue the attack immediately,
striking Nennig from the north instead of the west.
As the leading elements of "K" reached the outskirts of Nennig, they broke
into a run as they had been instructed to, and raced into the town yelling, and
firing into every building. The surprise was completer than they had expected.
Even after their delay in starting, and the smoke, which should have indicated
to the Germans that something was about to happen, many of the defenders
were still in bed or eating breakfast. Those that were alert were watching to
the south. In less than an hour the town had fallen at a cost of only a few
casualties. Thirty-five Germans were taken prisoner, and thirty more were killed.
The rest of the garrison beat a headlong retreat up the draw towards Sinz.
Meanwhile the wandering Second Platoon was having far more serious difficulties. After it had become separated from the rest of the company it had turned
north, and was soon approaching the town of Wies. According to later estimates,
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Gun crew waits for 20 German tanks advancing along road near Besch.

there were some 50 Germans garrisoning the town, and the Second Platoon soon
found itself engaged in bitter house to house fighting in which the platoon leader
was wounded and about a squad was lost.
While K was thus engrossed in taking Nennig and Wies, Company L was
following 500 yards behind them, having crossed the LD at 0818. By 0900 one
platoon of L reached Wies, where they assisted the Second Platoon of K in taking
the town which did not fall until 1630. During the Wies attack the Germans captured several men who were trusting enough to observe a short truce which their
medical men had requested. The rest of the company held back in some confusion
as to what turn the situation had taken. It was not until afternoon that enough
information on exact positions was available to Captain William A. Brightman,
Company Commander of L, for him to send a platoon into Berg. Finally, at 1730,
with Captain Way looking for his Second Platoon which was still in Wies, Berg
fell, and with it the last of the day's three objectives came into American hands.
Total cost of the day's operations had been four killed and seventeen wounded.
As it was with the First Battalion when it had taken Tettingen and Butzdorf
the day before, the initial capture of Nennig, Wies and Berg had been, except
for the fight at Wies, comparatively easy-far easier than holding them would
prove to be in the next few days to come.
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Once the three towns were taken, the main problem was preparing the defenses,
which, if the area just taken were to be properly outposted, would cover some
3,000 yards. To Colonel Thurston this frontage seemed a little over-extended for
even a battalion-certainly it was for two companies, so that evening at 2130
Company I, which had assembled in Besch after the completion of its mission of outposting the battalion front during the attack, was sent to Nennig.
Upon arrival they took up positions on the south and west edges of town.
The night passed fairly quietly. There were no disturbances other than light,
although frequent patrol activity, most of which centered around Nennig itself.
The town was too large for every building to be occupied by the men of Company K, and the Jerries had a disturbing habit during the night of infiltrating
with small patrols into the buildings that were not occupied. As a result Captain
Way, his executive officer, First Lieutenant Ralph C. Brown and First Lieutenant
Jess Hodges, leader of the Weapons Platoon spent most of the night driving them
out with the aid of Company Headquarters personnel who were the only "reserves"
of manpower available.
At this time, since the Engineers had not succeeded in clearing the road to
Nennig from Besch, supply and evacuation were beginning to be a problem. There
were no additional men for carrying supplies available in the Regiment except
the Mine Platoon. These Colonel McClune turned over to the Third Battalion.
Colonel Thurston then organized a carrying party of about forty men and, leading
it himself, set out from the Battalion CP in Besch to Nennig, carrying food and
ammunition.
Communications had been excellent all day. The companies had kept constantly
in touch with the Battalion CP by phone, and the SCR-300's worked perfectly.
Often messages were relayed from Nennig to Besch via the "Benning School Solution" OP which Battalion S-2 in conjunction with the I and R Platoon Leader, had
set up across the river in Luxembourg. During the attack on Nennig and subsequently, this OP conducted frequent fire missions and furnished much valuable
information which could never have been obtained by an OP located on the east
bank of the Moselle where there was no high ground that could be used. With the
OP located on the bluffs across the river, the Germans could make no move in the
vicinity of Nennig without being detected.
The first real opposition since the three towns had been captured came on the
following day. At 0300 on the morning of January 16th artillery began to fall on
Berg. For fifteen minutes a concentrationfrom at least two battalions battered the
town, and in its wake came the first counterattack. A combat patrol of about 100
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men moved up under cover of darkness through the wooded draw leading into
Berg from the east. They fanned out in front of the town and came forward yelling
"hands up!" and "surrender!" in English, concentrating their attack on the machine
guns which the artillery had forced to move into the lower stories of the "Schloss."
Some two hours of confused and heavy hand to hand fighting followed during
which Second Lieutenant Dale E. Bowyer of Company L lost one of his platoon's
attached machine guns and one whole rifle squad which was captured by the enemy.
The squad however, subsequently got away from its captors, and returned
unharmed. Finally the patrol was repulsed and driven off, leaving about 60 of their
number dead on the field.
In Nennig too it was far from quiet that morning. At 0400 enemy artillery and
mortar fire heralded the next attack which came from the draw leading to Sinz.
Company M's machine guns, posted above the draw, first spotted the attackers
who came forward on the run, shouting obscenities and invitations to surrender
as had the attackers of Berg. The attack hit the area covered by Lieutenant Thomas
A. Daly and his men, who held their fire until the Germans were almost on top of
them and then opened up. At the same time First Lieutenant Raymond J. King
placed mortar fire behind the onrushing patrol so that they could not escape up
the draw. Result of this was that not one of the patrol--which was somewhat
larger than a platoon-escaped and all were killed or captured.
But there were more where they had come from, and they kept coming back. Near
daylight mortar and artillery fire again increased in Nennig, landing with surprising accuracy in the streets where it would do the rnost damage instead of
on top of the buildings. This was the forerunner of still another combat patrolthis time a larger one with the strength of nearly two platoons. This one was
picked up simultaneously by the OP in Luxembourg and by the heavy machine
guns of Staff Sergeant Leroy McPherson of Company M which were posted on
the ridge north of the town. Sergeant McPherson's heavies accounted for about fifteen of the attackers before the rest broke and ran for the woods east of town.
Before this attack was repulsed however, one enemy machine gun crew had
managed to work its way through Company K's defenses to within 50 yards of the
CP in Nennig, and had started to fire down the main street. Their fire kept the
members of a tank destroyer crew from reaching their tank destroyer while a
German bazookaman was creeping up on it to finish it off. It was Colonel Thurston
himself who saved this situation by braving the machine gun fire to reach a position where he could bring his Ml to bear, killing the machine gunner, wounding
the bazookaman, and directing artillery fire on the rest of the infiltrating Germans.
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At this time the battalion received orders to extend its line to the east, tying
in with the Second Battalion which, on the morning of January 16th had advanced
into the woods between Nennig and Tettingen with the purpose of straightening
the lines. Company I was selected for the job, and moved east in a column of
platoons at 1330. By 1530 they were in position along the south edge of the woods
east of Nennig; the ground to their south, between them and the main Regimental
line, still full of enemy occupied pillboxes which as yet there had been neither the
time nor men available to attempt to clean out. From these, Company I began to
receive heavy mortar fire as soon as they had moved into their new position.
Meanwhile the heavies above Nennig were taking an unmerciful pounding from
artillery, and six more small combat patrols attempted to crack the line during
the day, their main object being to infiltrate to the rear of the machine guns. But
the line held firm and all of these were repulsed.
During the day communications began to fail. Wire parties would no sooner
mend one break than the constant artillery fire would disrupt the wire at another
point. It was dangerous and heartbreaking work, but Sergeant Floyd W. Smith,
Company L Communications Sergeant, and his crew of messengers moved back
and forth across open ground all day and most of the night to keep his wires in.
In spite of the constant artillery and mortar fire he succeeded sufficiently so that
Third Battalion observers never completely lost communications with their guns,
and return fire could be kept up just when it was most needed. Sergeant McPherson
of Company M lost his life at this time attempting to bring communication supplies
from Nennig to his guns which were in imminent danger of being cut off.
A vital factor in the ultimate solution of the wire problem was the OP in Luxembourg across the river. Colonel McClune had his Communications Platoon work
all night the night of the 16th laying wire from his CP in Perl across the Moselle,
through the OP on that side, then back across the Moselle and into Nennig where
the Third Battalion forward CP was established on the evening of the 16th.
The night of January 16th was similar to the night of the 15th except that patrol
activity was somewhat heavier. The enemy was apparently trying to locate weak
spots in the flanks of the positions. Main trouble centered around Schloss Bubingen,
just north of Wies where, just before midnight, the men of Company L spotted a
large enemy patrol. A combination of mortars, artillery time fire, machine guns and
small arms soon routed them, however, killing about twenty of them. Company I
spent a fairly quiet night, and was not as much bothered by patrols as by the
incessant mortar,s that kept up a harassing fire most of the night. The heavy
weapons were busy with small patrols in front of Company K and L which, during
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Company M mortar crew examines enemy ammunition left behind near
Nennig, Germany. These shells were subsequently used against the Germans.

the night, somewhat timidly probed almost the entire front searching for a gap.
There was one large patrol at about 0500 which attempted to enter Berg from
the northeast, but was completely annihilated by Lieutenant Bowyer's platoon
which allowed them to get up close before opening fire . In Wies, Private First
Class James F. Johnston of Company L posted in the Company OP, was hit by shell
fragments, but refused to quit his post until relief appeared. He died the next day
from his wounds.
During the night, food and much-needed ammunition continued to arrive by
manpower, and the last man who had been wounded the first day was evacuated.
But the supply situation was becoming critical nonetheless. Food was not so much
of a problem, as the men were living rather well on German food picked up in the
front line towns. But there was not enough ammunition to stave off a prolonged
attack. Reason for this was that the Besch-Nennig road, which should have been
the main supply route, was not cleared as yet, and daylight supply operations could
not be carried on because of the excellent observation the Germans had over the
entire area.
One thing that was worrying the higher echelons as well as Company I was the
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stretch of woods southeast of Nennig that still held active pillboxes. Orders had
come down to Colonel Thurston that night to attack this area and clean it out.
First Lieutenant Ravnel Burgamy's First Platoon of Company I was slated for the
job. After as many flame throwers, pole charges and satchel charges as were
available had been gathered together, they set out for the first of the pillboxes.
The time was 2030. It was a bitter cold night and the platoon had to move across
800 yards of open, snow-covered ground. Looking more like shadows than actual
men, they clung to what scant cover was offered by folds in the ground and an
occasional solitary tree. Stiff and numb from the cold and from long standing iq
open communication trenches, the men were in no condition for what lay ah~ad.
The cold had crept into their weapons too until some of them were almost useless.
Ice had formed inside the light machine guns despite their constant efforts to
prevent it, and the gunners raged impotently at bolts that would not operate
when needed. Because the machine guns were useless to Lieutenant Burgamy the
fire power of ten Ml's and one BAR was all he could bring to bear to neutralize
the pillbox, the strength of which was an unencouraging question mark.
When they had reached the steep draw in the middle of the open ground, still a
hundred yards from the pillbox, Lieutenant Burgamy and Private First Class John
Mauro, Jr., went on ahead of the main body, but halted when they came on a
number of trip wires. Here, while the two waited within 100 yards of the pillbox
the BAR and ten Ml's opened up as planned. Their fire was returned, not from the
pillbox itself, but from several positions around it, the existence of which had
not been suspected. Immediately after this, flares went up from the pillbox, and the
bark of its mortar was heard. The flares were apparently a prearranged artillery
signal, for shells of a heavier calibre soon began to mingle with the mortars that by
now were landing with deadly accuracy on the First Platoon. Fortunately the almost
vertical slope of the draw provided cover, and no one was hurt, though many of the
platoon were showered with loose bits of rock and dirt from the nearness of the
mortar bursts.
One thing was plain. The pillbox was not going to be tak.en by any force so small
as a single platoon. Lieutenant Burgamy ordered Private First Class Ray Sweeney
to cover the withdrawal with his BAR, and the assault team retired hastily from the
field. Receiving their report of the situation, Colonel Thurston went himself to
investigate the lay of land. He ordered Lieutenant Burgamy to make no further
attempts on it.
The third day, January 17th, was the quietest the Third Battalion spent in the
Nennig area. Artillery and mortars fell on the three towns during the day at the
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rate of about two rounds a minute, but · this was light compared to the shelling of
the last two days. The main problem during the day was getting supply lines
open, and maintaining communications. There was very little patrol activity, and
what there was was successfully driven off.
The evening of January 17th it rained-one of these near-freezing rains that, to
men who must wait it out in the open, is more chilling even than snow. A sharp
wind ripped through buildings and it was pitch dark. It was a perfect night for
patrols and the Germans made full use of it. Following an artillery barrage that
had increased in intensity to the point where it could be called a concentration,
constant reconnaissance and combat patrols began hitting the entire area. They
would hit in one place, bounce off and hit another. Some of them tried to get
through; others merely attempted to draw fire. The biggest of these, consisting
of about 200 men, hit First Lieutenant Ramon G. Fox's platoon of Company I at
0230, and surrounded it on three sides before they were driven off with the loss of
about half their total strength.
0

0

0

For the men in Company I (writes Colonel Thurston in his operations report covering this period}
this was a most miserable night. By now they were standing in water-filled trenches, most of them
soaked through by long hours in the rain, and constantly harassed by unremitting shellfire and
patrols hitting from the east, south and west. Morever, their strength had fallen rapidly.

One pla-

toon that night had only 19 men, including the officer.
It was the following day, January 18th, that became the critical moment in the defense of the
area. Reports were coming in of enemy tanks in the area, and Captain Brightman had observed

a group of German officers on a nearby ridge-top, pulling out maps and pointing out objectives
in the towns of Wies and Berg. German wire parties were observed laying wire from pillboxes to
various OP's, and the Luxembourg OP was sending in reports of large scale troop movements observed just to the north.

It was increasingly obvious that a major counterattack was impending.

Towards noon the firing in the entire area visibly increased in tempo so that it was dangerous
to appear outside a building anywhere.

About 1430 an estimated four battalions of light artillery hit

Berg and Wies with a fiteen minute concentration. When they lifted fire, at least a battalion of
infantry hit Berg and Wies simultaneously from the east and north, with the "Schwerpunkt" on Berg.
Telephone communication failed from the cut wires, and the forward observer's radio was destroyed.
However, Captain Brightman conducted the artillery fires by SCR-300, relaying the messages via
Luxembourg to the liason officer at Besch. The fires were perfect. I have never seen better or more
.accurate support, and the attack was thinned down to where individual riflemen and the heavies
took care of the remaining few.
By 1700 the last living German had loped back across the ridges and the attack had failed. From
the number I saw, and from the estimates of others, I judge that a full-strength battalion attacked
Berg and Wies; that some 300 dead or wounded remained on the snow-covered fields when the last
shot had been fired. Moans and cries of the wounded were plainly audible from both towns.
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The fourth night passed with relative quiet. Apparently the stand of Companies L
and "I" had broken the back of German resistance in the area, for there were no new
attacks, and even the few patrols that hit the lines that night were small ones. But
the men of the battalion were exhausted and tired almost to the breaking point.
Lack of food, unceasing rocket, mortar, small arms and artillery, firing day and
night, had all taken their toll. Rain and cold had also done their work, and almost
every man who had stood in wet clothes in the freezing trenches and foxholes during
the last few days was suffering from some degree of frostbite or trench foot.
On January 19th there were still no new attacks. But small patrols continued
active, and the sheer physical suffering of the men became almost intolerable.
During the day the already heavy casualties of the Battalion were increased
by a steady flow of frostbite, fatigue and trench foot cases which, under the
circumstances were unavoidable. The trouble had been that Company I, which
had suffered the largest share of casualties, had not enough men to outpost their
exposed positions for four days and still rotate the men back to warmer quarters
in the cellars of Nennig. But during those four days it had stood its ground in spite
of rain, water-filled trenches, frost and shelling.
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Relief
While the First Battalion was beating of counterattacks in Tettingen and Butzdorf
and the Third was clinging stubbornly to Nennig, Wies and Berg, the Second
Battalion was faced with a task of no mean proportions. The objectives of the two
forward battalions, key positions though they were, were only strong points. Taking
them did not force back the entire enemy line, but drove wedges into it between
which was still much ground to be cleared. There were ridges and masses of forest
ominously dotted with unexplored pillboxes and gun positions. Their hands full
with the tasks specifically assigned to them, neither of the battalions had the time
nor men to do anything about these areas, and it was left to the Second Battalion to
clean them out.
In the middle of the Regimental line was a large gap, created by the two salients
at Tettingen and Nennig. This part of the line had to be levelled off to safeguard
the flanks of the attacking battalions as well as to establish a straight and continuous Line of Departure for further attacks that would soon be forthcoming.
This was the purpose behind the attack made by Companies F and G on the
morning of January 16th on the woods southwest of Tettingen. The plan was that
Company G should move into the woods from the left, mopping up all pillboxes in
its path, while "F" struck from the right, astride one of the deep antitank ditches
along the frontier of the Switch.
It was during this attack, while the First Platoon of Company F was held up
along a road that cut across the northeast corner of the woods, that Private First
Class Clair Honeycutt deliberately drew the fire of concealed machine guns along
the road in order to make them expose their positions. In doing so he was mortally
wounded. The aid man, Technician Fifth Grade William A. Cleary went immediately
to his aid, although the machine gun was still firing, tended to his wounds, and was
attempting to drag him to safety when he himself was fatally hit.
The pillboxes within these two companies' zone of attack fell at last after some
hours of fighting, and the occupants, who had at first put up stiff resistance, began
to surrender wholesale. By noon a large portion of the woods had been taken, the
line considerably straightened, and the left flank of the First Battalion was no
longer dangerously exposed.
This was a small scale attack in comparison to the assaults on Nennig and
Tettingen and its cost in killed, wounded and suffering was far less. Yet it was no
less significant in the big picture of the Regimental advance than the larger
operations of the other two battalions. With the taking of the woods southwest of
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Tettingen, east was tied in with west, and the new front was sufficiently consolidated
to be turned over to the 302nd Infantry who were to carry on the attack while the
376th fell back into Division Reserve on the morning of January 20th.
During this period from the 14th to the 19th January, the Regiment took a total of
258 prisoners, killed or wounded some 900 Germans and destroyed 15 tanks and
eight half-tracks. For the 376th losses were 36 killed and 146 wounded.
By noon on January 20th the entire Regiment was back at Monneran, France, and
for the first time since January 8th, out of contact with the enemy. Here time was
devoted to orienting new and much-needed reinforcements, the inevitable care and
cleaning of equipment, and general reorganization and resupply. Some training was
carried on as well, and preparations made for future operations. But what was most
important to the men themselves was the hot food, the quiet, and the comfortable
indoor beds where at last there was a chance to sleep away some of the gnawing
weariness of battle, and gather new strength for what lay ahead.
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cHAPrER IV

Through the Switch
Back to Nennig

[1]
0~0

eez, they can't send us back up there already; we just got relieved!"
"The hell they can't. You better get a move on, bud. We're mavin' out but quick."
"Somebody musta screwed up."
That was the way the talk went in the Second Battalion that afternoon of Janu-

ary 22nd when the alert order came down. They had been in reserve only a day and a half, hardly
time to get the mud scraped off. Meanwhile the Jerries had thrown everything in the book at the
302nd and managed to knock them out of Nennig. So now the Second Battalion was going back up
to help the 302nd Joes retake the town.
That's the way it went in the Infantry.

Always some damn thing to keep you from getting

any rest. If it wasn't the brass with a training schedule, it was the Kraut acting up.
0

0

0

In a small, candlelit room in Perl, Captain Simon D. Darrah of Company-E passed
the attack order on to his platoon leaders. The attack was to be at 0700 on January
23rd which was the following morning. Company E was to have one platoon of heavy
machine guns from "H", under the command of First Lieutenant Louis R. Iacuessa, and
one platoon of medium tanks. The First Platoon, commanded by First Lieutenant
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Gus E. Wilkins, was to attack Nennig from the railroad tracks with one section of
heavy machine guns in close support. The Second Platoon, under First Lieutenant
Guerdon A. Hanson, was to attack Berg from the same LD. First Lieutenant Bernard
F. Simuro's Third Platoon was to furnish security for the tank platoon.
Attacking Nennig had not been the original purpose of bringing Colonel Martin's
Battalion back to the lines in the middle of its rest period. The Second had been
destined to establish a Main Line of Resistance just in front of the Peri-Eft road. But
while the initial reconnaissance for this mission was in progress word had come
to Colonel Martin that the 302nd was in trouble. The 302nd had taken over the
Third Battalion's positions in Nennig, Berg and Wies on the 19th, and had been forced
eventually to relinquish Berg and part of Wies. On the afternoon of January 22nd it
was having considerable trouble holding the few houses it still occupied in Nennig.
So the plans had been abruptly changed, and Company E found itself with the,
mission of retaking the town.
The attack began quite successfully. The First Platoon, with one 60mm mortar
· squad, led by Sergeant David H. Godfrey, captured the first four houses in Nennig
with only two casualties, rounding up a total of 22 prisoners. After this the going
got rougher. The platoon split into two forces with Lieutenant Wilkins in charge
of one and Tech Sergeant Nathaniel Isaacman commanding the other. When the
platoon had taken three houses on the right hand side of the street, three Mark IV
tanks appeared, their guns making it certain death to advance up the street.
At this point Sergeant Isaacman with Private John F. Pietrzak got up on the
roof of one of the houses and continued over the rooftops until they were above
the tanks. All this time they were under machine gun fire from Berg. With three
well-aimed rockets they knocked out the lead tank and the one bringing up the
rear as well. This left the center tank an easy prey for Private Albert J. Beardsley
who set it on fire with a rifle grenade.
By taking each house, and mouseholing through the walls, the First
Platoon had retaken all but about 30 houses by 1500. It had captured 88 prisoners
and killed an estimated 100 of the defenders. Meanwhile however, because the
Tank Platoon had entered the town ahead of schedule, the Second Platoon had
advanced only 300 yards towards its objective in Berg before it was pinned down
by three deadly streams of heavy machine gun cross-fire coming from the hill
directly to its front, from the houses on the northeast edge of Nennig, and from
the Schloss in Berg. All our tanks but one were knocked out by enemy Mark IV's,
leaving the Third Platoon, which was to have provided their security, without a
mission. Due to the position of the Third Platoon, Captain Darrah was unable to
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move it to the rear, so the only thing to do was to commit it between the First and
Second Platoons with the mission of moving forward and capturing . a cemetery
which was concealing three German machine guns.
One squad, under Staff Sergeant Anthony S. Rao, manag~d to reach the cemetery
and silence one machine gun, but received a heavy mortar barrage and was forced
to withdraw to the road. The Second and Third Platoons with the light machine gun
section were able to move forward about 400 yards from the LD. But they were held
up there until dusk when they were withdrawn under cover of darkness to Nennig
where they gave additional security, and assured the holding of the town.
By 1330 it had become impossible to keep contact with the three platoons, so
Captain Darrah split his headquarters group and placed the Second and Third Platoons under the command of First Lieutenant Arthur Dodson, with First Lieutenant
Harold M. Maness as liaison officer. Captain Darrah, with the First Sergeant, radio .
operator, Communications Sergeant and three runners, attempted to move into
Nennig. At this time Company G, led by Captain John D. Heath, was moving in
back of the LD to the left of Company E with the intent ot moving into the town
of Wies and giving "E" flank protection from the north. When Company G reached
Wies, Company F, which had been in Battalion reserve, moved up to fill in the gap
between them and the left flank of "E."
During the next three hours the headquarters group moved towards Nennig,
dodging constant sniper fire from the hill behind the town. All the way it was
under observation from the Schloss in Berg, and received about 400 rounds of mortar fire. By the time the group reached the first building in Nennig there was only
Captain Darrah, First Sergeant Ernest N. Dyrlund, Sergeant Milburn W. Seal and
Private Jenkins Wong left in the group. The Communications Sergeant had been
.evacuated for frozen feet. The radio operator had got lost and did not get into Nennig
until about 1900 that night. Two of the runners had been hit by shrapnel.
Captain Darrah reported to Lieutenant Colonel Cloudt of the Third Battalion,
302nd Infantry who gave him the latest situation. Lieutenant Wilkins was cut oii
in six houses in Nennig, and was unable to send any messages. By 1800 Captain
Darrah, with one squad of Company K, 302nd Infantry, was able to clear out one
house. Lieutenant Wilkins pushed through an additional two houses, and they
finally made contact. At 2000 Lieutenant Dodson moved the remainder of Company E into Nennig under cover of darkness.
Security was posted throughout the entire town with orders to report any movement of troops or armor, as counterattacks were anticipated. At 2100 the Company
received C rations, but could not do much with them. They were frozen too solid to
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eat, as they were, and it was impossible to build fires to heat them while the
enemy had such perfect observation on the town.
During the night, mortars, rockets and artillery fell on the town with clocklike
regularity every hour. Just enough to keep any one from moving about too much
and to keep those who had the chance from getting any rest.
At 0100 on the morning of January 24th the First Platoon of Company E with
a special platoon of the Third Battalion, 302nd Infantry, continued clearing houses
in Nennig. By 1030 the town had been cleared of all enemy and for the second time
in the last ten days was completely in American hands.
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Schloss Berg
By noon of January 24th the Second Battalion held a line extending from Nennig
northwest to Wies. Company G was holding Wies; Company E, Nennig, and the
area in between was occupied by "F". Further to the east the line was still held by
the 30lst and 302nd, as the rest of the 376th was still back in Division reserve.
Butzdorf had been retaken by the 30lst, and the pillboxes in the woods between
Tettingen and Nennig that had given the First and Third Battalions so much trouble
had finally been reduced. Only one salient was left, thrust like a pointing finger into
the otherwise straightened line, The salient was the enemy occupied town of Berg
with its massive and ancient Roman Schloss still bristling with enemy mortars and
machine guns.
Berg, as the reader will recall from the story of its first capture by the Third Battalion ten days before, was scarcely a town in its own right. Situated on the
forward slope of a hill looking down on Nennig from the north across a mere
100 yards of open ground, it was more like a northern portion of Nennig itself. Tactically it commanded the positions of Company E far too effectively for comfort.
Also, as long as Berg was German held, it was impossible to use the Nennig-Wies
road which ran right through it past the Schloss. Thus it served as a knife blade,
thrust into the front of the Second Battalion and so effectively separated Company G
on the left flank from "E" on the right that it prevented any further coordinated
advance by the two companies to the northeast.
It was hardly surprising, therefore, when at 1230 on the 24th Colonel Martin
received an order to attack Berg. It was to be a coordinated attack with "E" striking
the town from the north edge of Nennig, and "G" attacking southeast fromWies and
assaulting the Schloss. Company F would remain in its present positions as Battalion reserve. In this way a pincers would be formed around the enemy salient.
However, according to best tactical theory attackers should have at least three
times the fire power of the defenders, and the Second Battalion, badly depleted
after its attack on Nennig, had no such advantage. The commanding terrain which
the Germans held further lessened its chances of success. Both Colonel McClune
and Colonel Martin realized that should Berg and its Schloss prove to be strongly
held, the outlook for the attack was far from promising. But in combat it is seldom
possible to choose one's circumstances and advantages. Berg had to be taken,
and for~ better or for worse the attack was scheduled to jump off at 1300.
The mission of taking the first house was assigned to Lieutenant Simuro and
his Third Platoon of Company E. The house was 100 yards from the northern edge
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of Nennig across open ground and under direct fire from the Schloss. At 1329 a
tank destroyer opened up, hurling four rounds into the house. At 1330 the Third
Platoon, with two light machine guns under Sta~ Sergeant Charles B. Ring attached,
opened fire and the riflemen moved across the open ground to the house. Lieutenant
Simuro was wounded while crossing the open, but continued on, and with 26 men
finally captured the house, taking 29 prisoners. At this time direct 88 and machine
gun fire opened up on the house.
Lieutenant Dodson, who was in the OP at the time, sent one squad of the Second
Platoon with Sergeant Vincent J. Maisto in charge to take the second house and
direct some of the fire from the Third Platoon. Sergeant Ray Ketner took off with
his First Squad right behind him, reaching the objective without any casualties and
taking six prisoners. One of the tank destroyers got a direct hit on a Mark IV,
which eased the fire somewhat. But the shelling was still so intense that Captain
Darrah gave the order for Lieutenant Simuro and Sergeant Ketner to withdraw
back to Nennig.
On his return, Lieutenant Simuro, who had started with 40 men, had 17 left.
Sergeant Ketner had lost two of his squad. The Company then reorganized with
First Sergeant Dyrlund as Platoon leader of the Third Platoon and Sergeant Maisto
as Platoon leader of the Second. After this the men set up their security in Nennig
for the night, still with nothing but frozen "C" rations to eat.
On the other side of Berg, Company G was having troubles too. Three days before
some men from "K" of the 302nd had worked their way into the Schloss, but there
had been no communication .with them for three days and "G" had been receiving
considerable fire from the old castle since. It was increasingly evident that the present incumbents were not GI's.
The Third Platoon had led off Company G's attack, followed by the Second
and the FirSt. Up ahead were two scouts who moved out into the open field between Wies and the Schloss. They had not gone far when mortars began to come
in. Fortunately, however, there was a deep anti-tank ditch about 100 yards in front
of the castle which they managed to reach just in time, One by one the three
squads moved up in their wake, and the last men of the rear squad had just
tumbled into the ditch when four German MG 42's opened up from further up the
hill. It had been slow going across the field through the six inches of new snow
that had just fallen, and the bottom of the ditch, under the snow had a thin
layer of ice. Breaking through this as they tumbled hurriedly into the ditch,
many of the men were soaked, after which their clothes froze almost immediately.
The ditch was comparative but not complete safety from the mortars that were
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still coming in. One man, leaning against the side to catch his breath, was killed
instantly when a shell hit the edge just above his head, and another was badly
wounded.
Once in the ditch the men scouted it in both directions. In one direction it
became impassable with knee deep mud; in the other direction it veered away from
the Schloss and went deeper into German lines. Only approach to the Schloss would
be straight towards it across the open in the face of the four machine guns. Two
men were seen in the courtyard, carrying a bazooka. They were dressed in OD's
:;o some of the men called out to them, but received no an~wer. Finally two men
volunteered to try to make contact with them.
The two men climbed out of the ditch and had reached the wall of the courtyard when a hail of sniper and machine gun fire forced them to turn back. It was
obvious that any attack over that route would meet with complete disaster.
The Platoon Leader, seeing the impossibility of the mission, radioed for support
and artillery. As a result, the First Platoon was sent around the right flank through
Berg. It had only reached the first houses, however, when it too was stopped by
artillery and machine gun fire.
0

0

0

When our support was stopped (writes Sergeant Donald D. McCort, who was one of the platoo n
scouts during this operation) we realized we were in a tight spot. We couldn't go back to Wies over
four hundred yards of open ground covered by machine guns and zeroed in by artillery and
mortars. For the same reason we could not go forward to the Schloss. We pulled up the ditch to
the left away from the Schloss and let the artillery and TD's pound it.
All day long we lay there.

We had come in light, wearing · field jackets and with one K

ration. Our clothes were wet and frozen. Our canteens froze the first hour. Our 536 was frozen. We
were on our own. Every time we stuck our heads over the edge of the ditch the machine guns on
the hill would open up, throwing snow in our faces. Some of the men started chopping holes in
the side of the bank, trying to keep warm and to pass the time.
Finally about dark the medic said he would try to get our wounded man out. So the doc and
the man, hobbling on his good leg, took off for Wies. About an hour later the medic returned and
told us they were going to lay in smoke and to get out as fast as possible. The smoke came and
we got, but fast.
The white snow was now black. Every few feet was a shell hole. We got back to the cellars of
Wies, frozen, but we still had our skins.
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It seemed certain that the Second Battalion would be relieved. Companies E and
G had suffered heavy casualties trying to crack their way into Berg. The Battalion
as a whole was exhausted. The continual butting against such discouraging odds had
cost much in spirit as well as in casualties. Wiremen from all companies had
been driving themselves day and night in an attempt to keep the lines repaired, but
the enemy mortars and artillery were consistent in their destruction.
After dark on the night of the 24th, the commander of CCA of the 8th Armored
Division visited Colonel Martin's Command Post in Wies. Very soon after his arrival
Brigadier General Cheadle appeared with the disheartening order that the Second
Battalion would again attack, this time at night, in order to establish a bridgehead
for the armor to break through. The scene in the small Command Post was like one
in the movies- only light was a pulsating Coleman lantern. The artillery liason officer's switchboard was constantly buzzing. Windows were plugged with mattresses
to stop the shrapnel. In the middle of the room, seated around a large table, were
the three commanders with their maps. Off in the shadows hovered S-3's, S-2's,
aides, and special staff officers.
"I have orders that Martin's Battalion will attack at 0300 to establish a bridgehead for the armor, which will pass through and continue the attack", said
General Cheadle, wasting not a word.
"General, here is my situation," replied Colonel Martin: "I have elements of two
companies . .. here . . . and here. The men are dead tired, what's left of them.
My communications have been constantly shot out, the only supply route is over
open ground at night, and we're up against a powerhouse of a fortified enemy.
We've been blasting that castle . (Berg) with everything we've got, and it hasn't
done a thing. We can't get close enough to it to use assault troops, and we'll have
to attack over open ground all the way. My battalion has been messing with this
damned thing for a long time now, and we've just petered out. A night attack
by my battalion at this time would be costly-very costly. The thing we really
need is a coordinated regimental attack, but we aren't allowed to do it. I have
the utmost confidence in my men, and it's a good battalion, but I can't see for
the life of me how my present strength can crack this thing. " All this in a low,
quiet voice with not another sound from the assembled group.
"My armor can't do it without infantry support, and besides, we've never seen
the terrain," replied CG CCA.
"Here's what's out there, General: the damn Krauts are set up here . . . and
here ... and here ... They have every point zeroed in with artillery and mortars,
but their men are as whipped as ours. A night attack will do the trick - if we had

"
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fresh troops with some tank support. I'm prepared to issue orders for the attack,
but I won't have half of what I have now after we try it.
"All right," said General Cheadle. "How soon can CCA attack with their own
armored infantry?"
"0600."
"Right. Here's the plan- Martin's Battalion will stand fast and be passed through
by armor at 0600. After the establishing of the bridgehead, your tanks will move
out and your infantry follow. Your S-2's and 3's pass on any information that you
have, and .. ,"
Very quietly Colonel Martin moved from the table and walked to his chair by
the stove. Utterly exhausted, he rested his head on the back of the chair, and
opened a K ration with the air of a man who was following the habit of many
years-mechanically, hardly realizing what he was doing.
Just before daylight CCA passed through the Second Battalion and continued the
attack. By 1900 on January 25th the 7th Armored Infantry Battalion had captured
all of Berg, including the Schloss, but not without extremely heavy casualties.
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Attack Northeast
Colonel Martin had managed to gain a brief respite for the exhausted remnant
of his Battalion, but it had been but the shortest of respites, and the real rest that
everyone felt could not help but come now after days of frozen C rations
and fighting in the bitter cold was not to be. Companies G and E had relieved
the armored men at 2300 on the 25th and dug in for the night on the hill east of
Nennig, still anticipating relief the next morning. But at 0230 on the morning of
the 26th the company commanders were called to Battalion. There they learned
that they were to attack once again before anybody could rest. This time northeast
with the mission of occupying the portion of the Sinz-Bubingen Road which passed
through the Battalion Sector. The attack would be part of a large scale offensive
in which the other two battalions, by this time back on the line, would also
participate.
At 0700 on the 26th they jumped off again. On the right of Company E were
the remaining men of the Third Battalion, 302nd Infantry, and Lieutenant Gordon C.
Weston's Platoon of Company Fl 376th. On their left were the other platoons of
Company F and Company G of the 376th.
Company E had not moved a hundred yards when it struck a Schu-mine field,
losing four men. For a moment the advance was halted. Lieutenant Dodson,
however, realizing how important it was to keep going, called the men to follow
hirri and moved right on through the mine field.
After this the company moved about 1500 yards before it was fired on by wellplaced machine guns that pinned it down on an open hill. Company E had advanced
so far that, the 302nd having been held up by heavy opposition just across the
LD, it found itself with no one on its right flank. The critical nature of this position
soon became evident when Sergeant Gerald W. Jende of the mortar section
spotted two machine guns attempting to fire on the whole company from the rear.
Two well-placed shots from his M1 eliminated the danger from these, but the company was still powerless to move until 1300 when the right flank was able to
move up.
At 1300 the First and Second platoons attacked over an open point of terrain
facing two dug-in machine guns. The attack was costly, but netted another 300
yards and 29 prisoners. By this time Company E had reached the Sinz-Bubingen
Road, and the right flank was held up by three German light tanks. It was then
ordered to pull back about 150 yards and keep on line with the units on the right.
Shortly after this artillery was called for to catch the three tanks. But a wrong
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adjustment was made, and the barrage, instead of hitting the tanks, landed on
Company E, the platoon of Company F, and Company K, 302nd, causing very
heavy casualties. Then the order came down to dig in and prepare for another
night without hot food. The night passed without much artillery coming in, and
Captain Vvhitman, Commander of Company F, managed to get some C rations
up to the men which if not hot, at least were warm, and much appreciated. But
few men who passed that night there on top of the hill will forget the biting cold
that numbed them to the marrow as they :;at hour after hour in the chill confines
of their foxholes, scarcely able to move for fear of exposing themselves to the
enemy who still watched from close by. The men ha~ · spent many such nights
before in colder weather, and under much severer artillery, but probably never
when they were nearer to complete exhaustion from the events of the
preceding days.
But the long awaited rest was at hand at last. At 0900 the next morning the
301st Infantry passed through to continue the attack, and the grimy and spent
remainder of what just a few days before been a full strength battalion, stumbled
back through Nennig to Besch where sleep and hot meals were waiting.
In Company E alone 107 men had been lost in the last five days, including every
rifle platoon leader.
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Untersie Busch
On January 25th the First and Third Battalions left the reserve area in Monneran
to return to the line. The much-needed rest had been fortifying, but insufficient.
Losses in the previous engagement had been fairly heavy, and reinforcements had
not arrived soon enough to go up on line with the Regiment. The combat efficiency of the two battalions was under par. Many rifle companies had to enlist the
services of cooks and headquarters personnel as riflemen. Nor had all combatlost equipment been replaced. However the soldiers of the Regiment were better
prepared to face the onslaughts of General Winter. To protect against trench foot
and frozen feet each man wore the new shoe-pacs and arctic stockings. Fingers
were fortified against the cold with double mittens. Ears were covered with hoods
originally designed for defense against gas and still smelling of Impregnite.
The First Battalion went on line immediately and, shortly before midnight, completed the relief of the First Battalion, 302nd Infantry, in positions west of Tettingen-Butzdorf. The Third Battalion assembled in Wochern.
On taking over from the 302nd the First Battalion was disposed with Company B
on the right and Company C on the left, "A" being in Battalion reserve. The mission,
to begin with, was purely defensive. The positions of Company B were along the
north road running between Besch and Tettingen. "C" was in the large anti-tank
ditch just to the left of "B. " Company A, since it was in reserve, moved into the
two lone buildings which stood in the large open field just to the northe{lst of
'
Besch. The night was extremly cold-so cold that it was unwise to attempt to sleep:
All during the night snow fell.
In these positions the First Battalion was to remain pending further orders,
and, except for a few reconnaissance patrols, the morning of the 26th passed
quietly.
Up to this time all attacks in the division area had been of no more than battalion strength. The operation for January 26th was to utilize the more usual formation of two regiments on line, the 376th on the right, the 302nd on the left. However, strictly speaking, there would be no regiment in reserve. The 301st was completely occupied with a defensive mission in another sector of the Corps Zone.
Due to the confusion of the previous action around Nennig, the 376th and 302nd
had temporarily exchanged Second Battalions.
The purpose of the divisional attack was to clear a bridgehead through the Switch
Line fortifications so that the armor could pour through and clear out the SaarMoselle Triangle. Combat Command "A" of the 8th Armored Division was assem-
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bled to the 94th's rear, ready to exploit any penetration made by the infantry.
The enemy to be faced was the cras;k 11th Panzer Division. Previously the
defenses had been manned only by static Fortress Battalions and by elements of
the 416th Infantry Division. When the German command realized that the 94th
threatened to breach the line, they called in the well-equipped 11th Panzer, whose
aproned Tiger Royals were almost impervious to bazooka and 57mm fire. In retaking Nennig the Second Battalion, 376th had already inflicted serious damage on
the Panzer troops. But the strong 15th Panzer Regiment, prior to January 25th was
still largely undamaged.
The 376th field order called for the attached Second Battalion, 302nd, on the
right, Third Battalion, 376th, on left, with the First Battalion, as Regimental reserve,
in its defensive positions between Tettingen and Besch. The objective was the high
ground up to and just beyond the Sinz-Nennig Road, and, ultimately, Sinz itself.
The attacker had before him first a deep tank ditch, then a steep ravine, and
finally a woods, all plainly visible on the reconnaissance. Just beyond the woods
ran the Sinz-Nennig Road.
The attack jumped off promptly at 0700, after a heavy artillery preparation. In the
right sector, the Second Battalion, 302nd, encountered light resistance almost
immediately. Enemy outposts in the woods fired on the attacking forces, and called
in artillery and mortar fire. Resistance increased as the assault progressed and
ultimately became so strong that the forward movement of the Battalion was halted.
By the end of the day the Battalion was only partially through the woods.
The Third Battalion was to move out in column of companies, L, K, I. Company L arrived on the LD (the anti-tank ditch, which was to be crossed by means
of engineer ladders) at 0650, and ten minutes later was advancing in a column of
platoons. But it was not long before it ran into trouble. As "L" crossed the brow
of the hill to the north, along with elements of the Regimental Mine Platoon, the
whole Company ran into a Schu-mine field. As the first men were hit, detectors moved
up to sweep the area but had little success in locating the wooden mines. Almost
at once a machine gun fired at the men in the field, and in the rush to move to
cover, forward or sideward, many others were mangled by the mines.
0

0

0

Innocent looking contraptions those Schu-mines. Just an old wooden box with a hinged top.
Might be an empty ammo box. Or you might not even see it hidden in the snow . But, like its
German inventors, whe the r harmless looking or h idden, it's alway s dangerous. Just step lightly on
the top, and off it goes. No shrapnel. Only an explosive charge. Enough to blow off a foot.
Ever see a man who's just lost a foot on a Schu-mine? Looks as though some giant had grabbed

103

the leg and foot in either hand and snapped the bone above the ankle. The stump is a jagged mess.
The rest of the body is covered with black powder in diminishing intensity from legs to head,
as if some one from below had thrown up a shovel full of coal dust onto the victim.
There were lots of men in Love Company who looked like that on January 26th. None of them
yelled or made any fuss when it happened. They just lay there. Some crawled out of the mine field
so that the medics wouldn't have to come in after them. Lt. Joe Klutsch kept on barking commands to
his platoon just as if he always worked flat on his back. The Company aid men, Pfc. John Eisenman and T/5 Bill Ittner tried to get to all the wounded. But -there were too many. Chaplain Steinmeier did a lot of bandaging himself. Litter teams worked as fast as they could, but the haul was
long and slow. Everybody who wasn't busy with another job pitched in to carry the crippled;
litters were improvised from blankets and hurriedly-cut saplings.
No one knew quite what to say to the footless ones, most of whom remained conscious. Sympathy was out of place. Finally one of the Iitter cases spoke up himself:
"Hell," he said. "I got it made. I'm going home."
0

0

0

In the meantime Captain Brightman called for artillery on the machine guns and
started his support platoon around the supposed limits of the field, but it too encountered Schu-mines. Then enemy artillery opened on the two platoons. While
both platoons found themselves in this fix, Staff Sergeant Salvatore J. Vastola
picked a group of men, crawled and wriggled his way through the field and
attacked and silenced the machine gun. Both platoons then moved through the
artillery to a series of communication trenches to the right of the Battalion zone
where they had some cover and could reorganize. The Company now attempted to
continue on, but found another mine field on the crest of the hill to its front and still
another to its right flank. In these straits the men took cover in the communication
trenches and requested tanks to break a way through the Schu-mines.
At this time Colonel Thurston sent back for primacord to blast a path through the
fields and directed Company K to pass through and to the left of Company L where
it too encountered another dense Schu-mine field to its left and front. Since "K" had
"L" on its right, it too took cover in the communication trenches and prolonged
''L's" line to the left. By that time communication between the two forward companies and the tank trap was cut by impassable mortar, rocket and artillery fire
which fell impartially on the communication trenches and on the draw to the south
of the two trapped companies.
Smoke was tried on the high ground to the northeast where the observers were
plotting every move in the Battalion sector and a few people were able to move
forward and some back. The primacord unfortunately proved almost valueless, for
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it would not detonate every mine in its path. By the time this was learned the
Battalion had received instructions that the First would relieve it and that it was
to reassemble in the woods about 800 yards to the southeast.
At noon on January 26th when Colonel Miner received orders to by-pass the
Third Battalion and continue the attack north towards Untersie Busch woods and
the town of Sinz, his Battalion was still disposed in its defensive positions about
300 yards behind the attacking echelons. Company A, still in Battalion reserve,
was about 800 yards to the rear.
The orders called for an attack in column of companies, "C" leading, followed by
"B" with Company A moving forward to protect the left flank. Company C, commanded by Captain Duckworth was the first company to run into trouble. It came
in the form of artillery and mortars and the confusion incident to the withdrawal
of Company L which, earlier, had advanced in the same sector. As a result of
these obstacles, Company B was ordered to swing out and continue the advance to
the right, taking over the job of lead company. "C" followed, and the two companies
continued to advance without much trouble.
By nightfall the Battalion had advanced well into the woods south of the SinzNennig road. Physical contact was established with the Second Battalion of the
302nd, which was on the right, and a line was established, manned by "C" on the left
and "B" on the right. Company A was brought forward to protect the left flank which
otherwise would have been virtually unprotected, as there was a wide gap between
Colonel Miner's Battalion and the elements that were attacking further west to the
north of Wies. That night was a dark one and a cold one. Everything had been
pretty quiet so far, but the air was filled with a tense expectancy, and the darkness seemed to be filled with lurking enemy.
0

0

0

The squad from Able Company was plenty P.O'd about the patrol. They were dog-tired and
a little shut-eye would go well. But S-2 had to know what was in those communication trenches
to the west, so the squad was sent out to give a look.
The scouts crawled close to the trench and lay on their bellies, listening.
"Hey Mac, I hear somebody in there . . . By God, those are G.I.'sl They're speaking English."
"Careful, it's probably some Heinie trick. Just keep mum awhile . . . . .

Hell, they do sound

like G.I.'s" Raising his voice just a bit he gave the password. No answer

.. and then a very

faint voice.
"Hell, we don't know no damn password. We been out here a week. Who are you?"
"Who the hell are you? That's the question."
"302- Love Company. We been surrounded out here since God knows when."
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"We're 376. Come on out. You ain't surrounded now."
So out they came, feebly and hesitantly. They looked more like bearded, bedraggled ghosts
than soldiers. For more than a week they had been isolated in that frozen trench, standing off
incessant attacks. There had been 27, now four were as cold as the ground on which they lay.
And the others were so weak they had to be half-carried back through the lines. But they had held.
0

0

0

That night plans for the resumption of the attack the next day were made in an
abandoned German dug-out which, while highly uncomfortable and hardly the best
of cover, did allow the use of a flashlight. The Battalion Commander and the two
Company Commanders, Captain Bowden and Duckworth, had done considerable
exploring in the woods to their front, and had a pretty good idea what they were
going to do the next day. But a confirmation of the location of vital terrain features
was most important. So Lieutenant William Bendure was sent for. Of him Colonel Miner
says: "We will never forget him. He was one of the finest officers in both character and ability I have ever known. When he was told of his mission, which involved
a penetration deep into enemy territory, his eyes just shone. He knew how dangerous, but also how important the mission was. He was eager for the assignment
solely because he knew that if he returned with the desired information it would
greatly contribute to the success of the Battalion's operation the next day."
It seemed ages before Lieutenant Bendure returned from his mission, but when
he did, at last, he had successfully accomplished what he -had set out to do. He was
as enthusiastic as if he had discovered a gold mine. The next day, while leading
his men with the same surging spirit, he was killed during a furious charge against
German tanks and infantry.
The Battalion objective for the next day was an extensive though not very dense,
forest lying north of the Sinz-Bubingen Road. It was high ground to the extent that
the possessor would be at least on "even observation" terms with an enemy in
Bannholz woods, further to the north, and could look down on Sinz. He would,
however, be frowned down upon by the enemy on the much higher Munzingen
Ridge off to the east. Moreover capture of Untersie Busch would completely secure
the Sinz-Nennig Road, provided the battalions on the left took their objectives.
Capture of the Sinz-Nennig road was important because once it was cleared of
enemy, Combat Command A of the 8th Armored Division could use it to come in
from Nennig and drive on Sinz and the high ground further to the east. It was
indeed a valuable objective, and very much worth fighting for.
The attacking Companies B and C with "B" on the right, were on the Line
of Departure when the artillery preparation opened. However, because the battalions

.
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on each flank seemed to have been delayed in reaching the Line of Departure, both
flanks were considerably exposed. Since the right flank offered the enemy a
covered route of approach, Company A was immediately disposed there as
protection. This necessity was unfortunate in the light of later events because,
had Company A been more readily available as a mobile reserve, the enemy
might have been driven more quickly from the objective by using "A" in a surprise
flanking movement.
The Battalion advanced steadily under cover of a fifteen minute artillery preparation to within assaulting distance of the objective. The forward slope of the hill
was covered with waist-high brush which offered a certain amount of concealment,
but no cover. When the preparation lifted, the ensuing assault carried the Battalion
over the crest of the hill, across the Sinz-Nennig road, and into Untersie Busch.
At this point, however, the battalion was viciously counterattacked by German
tanks, accompanied by infantry, advancing up the reserve slope of the hill and
through the relatively open woods .. This sudden and devastating onslaught forced
the attackers to withdraw back over the crest of the hill into defilade. The hill sloped
uniformly for approximately 75 yards, where it became slightly steeper, at this point
a temporary defense position was taken up.
Upon reaching the Sinz-Bubi_ngen Road, the enemy tanks halted and continuously
raked the waist-high brush with murderous machine gun fire. The only answer to
the tanks was to get the bazookas into action. But it was a bad place for bazookas.
There were hits, but firing from the prone position it has almost impossible to aim,
and many rounds were deflected by the heavy brush. Firing from the standing or
even kneeling position would have meant immediate and almost certain death, for
the machine guns were centering their fire instantly on anyone who exposed
himself. The battalion's anti-tanks guns were not available because the extremely
rugged and wooded country passed through during the last 24 hours had been too
difficult for them.
It was indeed a critical situation. Why the tanks did not continue their advance
is still a mystery. It is perhaps a commentary on the inflexibility of the German
mind, so often incapable of adapting to unforseen circumstances, that they made
no attempt to press their advantage.
The period that followed will be long remembered by those who lived through
it. The courage displayed by the men of the Battalion in withstanding what they
withstood that day as they crouched in the meager brush almost under the muzzles
of the enemy tankers' guns was but another example of the spirit of America's
fighting men.
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In addition to subjecting our troops to the grazing fire of the tanks' machine
guns, the Germans harried the Battalion line with incessant mortar and artillery
fire, and time after time the spine-chilling sound of Nebelwerfers was heard, followed by the earth-shaking blasts of their rockets. In accordance with previous
plans, the armor from Combat Command A of the 8th Armored Division was expected momentarily, but somehow its arrival had been delayed. In the interim, attesting
to its confidence in its own artillery, the Battalion called for and received unobserved concentrations on points within 75 yards of its own positions. Surveys of
the battlefield later revealed that two of the German heavy tanks were destroyed
by these concentrations.
And so the duel raged, each side relentlessly and savagely punishing the other,
but with the Germans as usual in their defensive positions, having the advantage
in terrain and observation.
At long last word was received that the 8th Armored was definitely on the way.
Lieutenant Chester Dadisman was ordered to move Company A from its position protecting the right flank to a point from which it could attack with the tanks
from the left. At the same time Companies C and B received instructions to
resume the attack on order. Their attack was to jump off simultaneously with the
flanking maneuver. A short time later the tanks appeared, and without delay the
operation got under way as planned. By sheer shock action the Germans were
knocked off their perch, finally being overrun in true motion picture fashion.
Company A moved in with the lead tanks until masked by the fired of "C".
Companies C and B, pressure to their front considerably lessened, swept forward once again across the Sinz-BubingenRoad and on to the objective.
The victory was both sweet and bitter. The Switch Line had been completely
breached in the Battalion Zone, and for the first time in its combat history the
Battalion was not looking up at the enemy. But the victory had been costly. Mute
evidence of the battle's brutality was plainly visible in eleven knocked out tanks
and the casualties, both dead and wounded, that the Battalion had suffered. Two of
the best combat officers in the Battalion had been killed: Lieutenant Bendure, and
Lieutenant Theodor E. Weissich of Company B. But there were still more casualties
and much bitter fighting to come.
Company B was ordered to take up a defensive position on the right of Untersie Busch. Company A was to replace battered Company Con the left. "C'' now falling back into reserve, was now commanded by Lieutenant Cornelius who had replaced Captain Duckworth when he was wounded. Untersie Busch was now a living
hell. The "buttoned-up" tanks of CCA had clustered to t!le immediate right rear of
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the woods, and were pouring great volumes of fire down into Sinz. In retaliation,
the Germans, with their perfect observation from Munzingen Ridge just beyond,
were returning equally great concentrations of mortar, artillery and rocket fire
which did not differentiate between tank and doughboy.
At this time-the time was 1430-Colonel Miner received a message ordering
the Battalion to attack Sinz at 1500 in coordination with the 2nd Battalion, 302nd on
the right. This seemed incredible, and was indeed a difficult pill to swallow. The
battalion had been going through a seemingly endless nightmare. However, there
was no alternative but to carry out the order.
The eastern edge of Untersie Busch was quickly selected as the Line of Departure, and Company A was ordered from its defensive position to a new location
near the Line of Departure. The right flank of "B" was already near the point from
which the attack would jump off. Together·, Colonel Miner, Captain Bowden and
Lieutenant Dadisman made an attempt to look over the terrain. It was only an
attempt because due to the amount of artillery still coming in more time had to be
spent scrambling for cover than studying the ground.
To the left of the road into Sinz was a deep, flat-bottomed draw which ran directly into the town. The st~ep sides of this draw would offer a certain amount of concealment in the form of brushwood and a few trees which were scattered along
them. To the left of the draw was a flat, open expanse of ground leading to Bannholz woods. Using this, the attackers would be subjected to flanking fire as well as
fire from the enemy in Bannholz woods.
c;>rders were issued to attack with Company A on the right and Company B
on the left, one company to each of the steep sides of the draw, both of them avoiding the flat bottom. Colonel Miner then ran over to the tanks, and, after considerable shouting and pounding, was able to "unbutton" one of them. After severa]
minutes, during which the tank commander attempted to contact his battalion by
radio, it became obvious that any planned coordination with the tanks would be
impossible in the time available before H-hour, it now being H minus ten.
Upon returning to Untersie Busch, Colonel Miner received another message, stating that the objective had been changed and that, with the aid of the tanks, the
battalion would attack to the north and sieze Bannholz woods. By this time the
men had nearly completed the job of forming for the attack on Sinz over to the
east. Its left flank was facing the new direction of attack.
Again a tank was unbuttoned and a tank commander consulted. The tanks, which
were operating under Division control, had not yet received word of the change,
and would therefore continue to fire on Sinz. For the time being it appeared that
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the Battalion was going to have to attack Bannholz without armor support.
At this point a new train of events was set in motion. Lieutenant Cornelius, from
his reserve po.sition in the western portion of Untersie Busch, called Colonel Miner
on the radio and reported that "either friendly or enemy tanks" were approaching
his position from the northwest. The lack of positive identification was quite understandable. The situation was quite confused, and the route of approach was
cluttered with heavy brush and trees.
Colonel Miner, disbelieving, ran towards the northern edge of Untersie Busch, to
verify but had only gotten part way through the woods when he was greeted by the
fire of an attacking wave of German infantrymen, firing from a range of approximately 30 yards. "How he escaped," as one of the Battalion officers told it afterwards, "is a miracle only God can explain."
Needless to say, upon his return it did not take the Battalion long to return the
fire. Fortunately most of the men had some sort of cover as a result of the heavy
shelling which was still in progress. Attempts to divert the 8th CCA from its mission of firing on Sinz were quite futile. Orders were orders, and it had received
no new instructions. Several of the tanks, however, were persuaded to assist with
machine gun fire.
At last the German advance was stopped by heavy frontal fire at close quarters,
but because of the rolling character of the ground the Germans could not be driven
out by fire alone. Company C in its reserve position just west of Untersie Busch,
was ideally disposed to launch a counterattack on the enemy's right flank. It was
this company, aggressively moving in on the attackers with blasts of marching
fire, that finally swept the woods clear of enemy. Company C was inadvertently
supported during this attack by the enemy artillery on Munzingen ridge, the fire of
which was landing on the attackers as much as on the defenders.
While this last phase was in progress, the very welcome word was received that
the Third Battalion would soon relieve the First. Finally, at 1800, just as the leading
elements of the Third were arriving, Untersie Busch was officially announced as
clear of all enemy.
Slowly and silently the men of the depleted First Battalion filed back in the darkness to their foxholes in the reserve position. They had completed their most bitter
day of combat; a day that for sheer grimness surpassed even the worst days at
Tettingen and Butzdorf.
By 2045 the Third Battalion had completed the relief of the First. Before the Third
could dig in the new positions, the whole line was raked with a murderous concentration of artillery that caught most of the men above ground, inflicting a num-
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ber of casualties. Under continuous fire the men continued to dig, despite the fact
that the holes filled rapidly with icy water. For the following few days these
water-filled holes were home while the Battalion withstood numerous tank and
infantry attacks.
The 7th Armored Infantry Battalion was attached to the Regiment to assist in
the attack on Sinz. However, reconnaissance indicated that enemy concentrations of
troops and armor in Sinz were too heavy to make an attack feasible with the forces
available at that time. So the Armored Infantry was released from the attachment;
the Second Battalion relieved the Second Battalion, 302nd, and, along with the
Third Battalion, improved its defensive positions in front of Sinz.
The enemy launched a number of fierce tank and infantry counterattacks in a
determined effort to force our troops back to Wochern. But each attack was beaten
off with heavy losses to the Germans. The rifle companies were all far understrength, having lost many men not only through wounds but from Trench Foot as
well. Those men who remained were weakened from loss of sleep and long hours
in cramped, water-filled fox holes. But through well timed fires and the careful
employment of artillery, they kept the enemy from getting too close.
On January 29th the Regiment was relieved by the 301st Infantry. Moving to the
rear by the way of Nennig, the men had a chance to see the devastation wrought
by two battles in the little town. Every building was damaged; most were completely
wrecked. Everywhere there was the deadly smell of cordite. Burnt-out Panzers
stood in the market square. There were corpses, in all conditions. One Panzergrenadier had been run over by a tank. He was only a red smear in the snow.
Upon being relieved, the 376th went to Veckring, France; to be in Division
reserve. So ended the first coordinated attack by the regiments of the 94th Division. It had not been completely successful in breaching the Switch Line. But it
had gained several thousand yards, captured key positions and commanding terrain, and more important, battered the proud 11th Panzer Division into an almost
ineffectual remnant. One more blow should split the Switch.
In Veckring at last there was time for rest-comparative rest at least. The
days were full of training schedules, · formations . and cleaning combat-grimed
equipment. So much so that a number of GI's, their sleep interrupted by such
things, grumbled that it was more restful up on the line. The gripe is as old as the
war and can be heard at any rest camp. It is an indirect way of expressing the
deep and underlying affection a soldier has for familiar things-even such familiar
things as formations and training schedules-when he has just come back from
being under fire and seeing his friends killed around him.
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UNIT REPORT
No.5
From:
To :

Maps:

1.

Hq 376 lnf
31 Jan 45
Veckring, WQ/183,
France

082400 Jan 45
312400 Jan 45

Germany, 1:25,000, Kirf Sheet

ENEMY
a. Units in Contact:
(1) 416 V G Div.
712th, 713th, 714th Inf Regts.
(2)

11th Pz Div.
!10th, and !11th Pz Gren Regts, 15 Pz Regt,

b.

11th Rcn Bn.
Enemy reserves that can affect our situation:

c.

Description of enemy activity during period:

(1)

Remnants of the 416th Inf Div and 11th Pz Div estimated at a total of 4000.

At the beginning of the period the 416th V G Inf Div held that portion of the Siegfried
Line between the Nied and Moselle Rivers. Extensive use of mines both AP and AT was
made. From the 8th Jan 45 to 14 Jan 45 enemy activity was confined to sporadic artillery
and mortar fire, active patrolling and improving his defensive positions. When our attack
began on his positions on 14 Jan 45 between Tettingen and Nennig he resisted fiercely
from his fortified positions with artillery mortar and small arms. Soon after our initial
objectives (Tettingen and Butzdorf) were taken he counterattacked from Campholz woods
with approximately 40 men but was beaten back. At 150400 Jan 45 he attacked our positions in Tettingen and Butzdorf with four Co's supported by artillery and mortars. He
succeeded in surrounding the two towns but by 1100 was beaten off with heavy losses.
During the period 16th and 17th Jan he harassed our positions with artillery and mortar fire
while massing his forces in the woods between Tettingen and Nennig for a counterattack
which was made on the 18th at 0730. The attack was made by the 714th Inf Regt, 416th
V G Div and the 110 Pz Gren Regt, 11th Pz Div supported by one Bn of tanks from 15th
Pz Regt, 11th Pz Div and heavy artillery and mortar fire with the mission of retaking
Tettingen. This he failed to do after suffering heavy casualties in men and material, but
_did succeed in occupying Butzdorf after the town was abandoned. On the 19th Jan he resumed his attacks on Tettingen and ]:\lennig employing remnants of the 416th V G Div
and the 110th Pz Gren Regt, 111th Pz Gren Regt and elements of the 15th Pz Regt, 11th
Pz Div. All of his counterattacks were thrown back with severe losses. During the period
25 Jan to 29 Jan he resisted our advance with artillery, rocket, mortar and small arms
fire and occasionally counterattacked with forces estimated at one Co with from 2 to 7
tanks in support. At the end of the period his activity had died down to very light
artillery fire.
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d.

Estimate of enemy strength, material means, morale and his probable knowledge of our
situation:
The enemy has lost the majority of his infantry_ regiments and probably cannot muster
more than two battalions to resist our advance unless he can furnish replacements immediately which is doubtful. He has an estimated 8 Bns of artillery and probably two Bns
of Mark 4 and 5 tanks totaling probably 60. PW's indicate that morale is very low among
the infantry regiments.

e.

Conclusions:
The enemy may with the remnants of the 11th Pz Div and 416th V G Inf Div:
(1) Counterattack from N, NE, or E
(2)

Fight a delaying action back to the Siegfried Line on the north.

(3)

Continue resistance to our attack to the N with small groups of Inf and AT
weapons to cover his obstacles and with the remnants of his force attack in the
general direction Kirf-Borg, or Weiten-Orscholz.

(4)
(5)

*

Same as (3) with the remainder withdrawing to the E bank of the Saar River.
The enemy may if reinforced:
(a)

Counterattack from N, NE, or E.

(b)

Resist and attack in the general direction Kirf-Borg or Weiten-Orscholz.

(c)

Counterattack our penetration and attack Kirf-Borg, Weiten-Orscholz.

*

*

*

*
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*

*

CHAPTER V

The Switch Falls

Ordeal in Bannbolz
0~0

l' ~

~[Ti

he foregoing excerpt from the Unit Report of January 31st sums up
the situation as it was while the Regiment rested in Veckring.
Up front the other two regiments of the Division were busy
o~o taking the town of Sinz and holding on to the positions the
376th had turned over to them when it went back. Other than taking Sinz,
the 301st and 302nd did not attempt any large scale offensives, so the
situation had not changed a great deal when the 376th returned to the fold on
February 9th, this time setting up its C P in what was left of Wochern.
On the 9th the front line roughly paralleled the road that ran from Sinz to
Schloss Bubingen, just above Wies. Things were quieter than they had been.
The Germans were undoubtedly feeling the effects of the maulings they had received during the past three weeks. But the situation was still full of interesting
and disturbing possibilities.
It was the Second Battalion's turn to be the spearhead of whatever was coming,
and back in Veckring on February 9th Colonel Martin and his staff were pouring
over their maps. General objective of the next push forward was the heavily for-
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ested area north of the Sinz-Schloss Bubingen road and south and southeast of the
town of Kreuzweiler, about two miles further north. Specifically, the first obstacle
in the path of Companies F and G, the lead-off companies for the attack that
was to take place the following morning, was a dark and forbidding clump of pine
woods just north of Sinz. It was a small patch of woods with nothing much to
distinguish it from countless similar patches all over the Saar-Moselle Triangle
except that its name happened to be Bannholz.
In the light of what was to happen in Bannholz on the following day, it might
be well to glance first at the surrounding country as it might have appeared to the
reconnaissance parties of the two attacking companies had they had more of a
chance to study it on the gray, chill evening of February 9th.
The Sinz-Bubingen road, which at that point was the front line, formed the south
boundary of a narrow but dense strip of pine woods, known on the maps as
Untersie Busch. Looking northeast from the shelter of this strip of woods, one
looked across nearly 1000 yards of open ground to where Bannholz stood out dark
green against the winter brown of surrounding fields. Further north and to the
left of Bannholz as one saw it from Untersie Busch was a hill, crested with a smaller
clump of pine, known as Geisbusch Woods. Between Geisbusch and the northwest
edge of Bannholz a deep ravine curved south and then around to the east, passing
through the open space between Bannholz and Untersie Busch. The bottom of
this draw was marshy and dotted with occasional clumps of shrubs, but otherwise,
being shallow at this point, offered no cover. From the north side of Untersie
Busch to the bottom of the draw was some 300 yards of gentle downhill slope,
cluttered with dense and tangled undergrowth which offered moderately good
concealment. The other side of the open space, from the bottom of the draw to
the south edge of Bannholz sloped gently uphill and was closely cropped pasture
land, offering no concealment whatever.
Running southwest from the elbow of the draw was a smaller gully which then
turned northwestward into another patch of forest. This one had an apple orchard
on its northern slope, but here too the ground between the main draw and the woods
was completely open. Only possible covered approach which extended most of
the way across the open was an old cowpath near the southeastern edge of the
open ground. This was shielded on the left by a fairly dense hedgerow extending
part way across the open. Finally, to enter the woods from either the southwest
or northwest it was necessary to cross one of the rutted and muddy dirt roads
that bounded it on these two sides in full view of anyone firing from the concealment of the pines.
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Bannholz itself was shaped somewhat like a mitten; the open end pointing
towards Untersie Busch across the open to the southwest, and the thumb and fingers
northeastwards. It was a good place to defend. Situated high on the slope of a hill,
its defenders could, secure in the concealment of the pines, cover any possible
routes of approach. Inside the woods was a mesh of roads which made it, unlike
many patches of dense forest, a likely place to defend with tanks.
Even from the briefest study of the area it was obvious that if the Germans
chose to make a fight for Bannholz, the attack was going to be rough. And strategically, there was every reason to believe they would choose to make a fight for it.
0 0 0
Sergeant Bower's face was white as he came into the room. "Roller here?" There was something
in the tone of his voice that made the men in the room stop what they were doing and look up.
"Roller, you're taking over. There's been an accident . . . Fikejs .. ," Sergeant Fikejs was Company F's Communications Sergeant and every one knew that he had been out that evening with
Captain Whitman and the other officers reconnoitering Bannholz Woods. They did not have to be
told what kind of an accident it had been.
Downstairs in the company CP nobody said much. Lt. Hawley, the Company Executive Officer
had had an accident too -

his leg nearly blown off by a 120mm mortar shell. Lt. Desmarais,

still with blood on his field jacket, sat with his head in his hands. There was a quaver in his
voice as he spoke.
"We couldn't see a thing," he said over and over again.

"We couldn't see a goddam thing."

There wasn't much else you could say . . .

0 0 0

It had been a disastrous reconnaissance;-communications sergeant and executive officer badly wounded and nothing gained. It had been too dark to see anything from the north edge of Untersie Busch, and with the 120's coming in the
way they were it was impossible even to stay there, let alone go forward to get
a better look. It was with a sinking feeling inside that Captain Whitman, after
sending the survivors of his reconnaissance party back to the assembly area near
Perl, went on alone to see Captain Sinclair in Sinz. Captain Sinclair was Commander of Company F, 301st Infantry which had made an unsuccesful attack on
Bannholz some days earlier, and he might be able to provide at least some information.
Not long after midnight on the morning of February 10th the trucks began to warm
up in the dark streets of Perl. An hour later the men of Colonel Martin's Battalion were clambering out of the trucks in Nennig, while squad leaders called their
squads together for the march to the Line of Departure. It was still dark as the long
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column moved westward along the Sinz-Bubingen road, and still quiet. But there
was nothing reassuring about the quiet. After what had happened the night before
nerves were still on edge, and the atmosphere was heavy with foreboding.
There was still no trace of dawn as Companies F and G gathered along the
road at the south edge of Untersie Busch. It was so dark that squad leaders checking their men had to ask a man his name, even from a few feet away, to know who
he was. There was no sound except for whispers, the scratch of pebbles rolled
under heavy feet and the rustle and click of equipment being adjusted, sometimes
to the accompaniment of stage-whisper curses.
At last it was time to start. Company G went first, striking into the open north
of Untersie Busch at 0650. Captain John D. Heath's men had the job of attacking
on the left of the Battalion area, hitting Bannholz from the northwest. He was to
cut across the thumb of the "mitten" and occupy the northern half of the woods
which corresponded to the fingers. Company F, following ten minutes later, was
to take the right half of the. area, entering the woods from the southwest, and
occupying the southern half of the woods; the part corresponding to the palm
of the "mitten".
"G's" route of advance was generally northeast, following the contours of the
draw. The Third Platoon was on the right; its Second on the left. Company F,
with its plqtoons in the same order, was to cut directly across the open, using the
hedgerow for cover as much as possible approaching the woods. On the right of
the Second Battalion zone was the 301st Infantry, occupying Sinz. To its left the
Third Battalion, 302nd, dug in along the Sinz-Bubingen Road further west. The
First Battalion was still back in Monneran in reserve, preparing to entruck and
move up to Perl.
Supporting artillery was thundering on the near edge of Bannholz as the two
companies moved out, but nothing had been heard from the Germans yet. It was
slow going over the first part of the open space. Tangled and soaking undergrowth
clung to the men's legs as they advanced, just enough to impede their progress, but
too low to serve as any kind of concealment. By now it was beginning to get
light - too light perhaps. Too light for the Germans to fail to see them moving
across the open.
It was still dark enough, however, to make keeping contact difficult, and before
long Lieutenant Gordon C. Weston's Second Platoon had swung too far to the left
in an effort · to stay in touch with the right platoon of "G" Lieutenant Stanley
Mason's Third Platoon moved up on the right along the cowpath which gave them
some measure of concealment. Both platoons had got well past the marshy bottom

'
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of the draw before there were any indications of enemy activity. Similarly the two
forward platoons of Company G were able to move all the way to the edge of
the woods before the firing started, It was "F's" Third Platoon that got the first
of it; a burst of machine gun and rifle fire that caught them still behind the
hedgerow while it was as yet more than a hundred yards from the edge of the woods.
As if this burst had been a signal, a blaze of firing immediately opened . up
on the Second Platoon as well, catching it without any available cover. There
was only one thing to do, and both platoons reached the edge of the woods at a
dead run. Company G fared better at this point, and received almost no firing
until it was actually in the woods. What it met then was only light and it replied
with a heavy volume of marching fire. Each man firing from the hip as he moved
forward. By 0800 Company G had reached its objective at the northeast edge of
the woods. So far this part of the attack was going according to plan, and had not
been too difficult.
But with Company F things were not going so well. Small arms and machine
gun fire had been only the beginning. As Lieutenant Mason's platoon entered the
woods enemy mortars· and artillery began to come in, and without warning, two
tanks which had been waiting in the thick underbrush in the southeast corner of
the woods began to add point-blank sniping with their 88's to the deadly effect
of tree-bursting shells.
Lieutenant Weston's platoon, which had veered too far to the west, was nowhere
to be found. It was up to the Third Platoon and the three bazooka teams attached
to it from the First Platoon of Anti-Tank Company to take care of the tanks.
0 0 0
Pfc. Leonard L. Neff moved fast over the open ground between the clump of undergrowth and
the squat nose of the Tiger. Flat on his stomach, he inched his bazooka along the ground beside him. The tank was firing at someone or something just a few yards away it seemed. The
blast of the gun and the blast of exploding shells followed each other almost instantaneously,
the second like an echo of the first.
Neff's ears rang with the noise as he rose a little onto his elbows and beckoned hurriedly to
Pfc. Otis A. King, his loader, who was following behind him. King came up alongside, and the
yellow tongue of the rocket's backflash seared the ground.
Smoke clouded the tank. Both men were breathing heavily as they got ready for the next
round, and King's hands trembled as he thrust the next rocket into the tube. Again and again
came the crash and hollow crack of their bazooka, and grey smoke eddied about the Tiger and
its companion a little further back in the woods.
Hit many times, but still firing, the German tanks must have finally decided they had had
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enough, for at last they clanked back into defilade and, for the moment, became less dangerous.
But the mortars were still falling-one exploding almost on top of the two bazookamen . . . King
bent over his mortally wounded comrade and saw that there was little he could do. Grimly picking
up the bazooka, he continued holding off the two tanks, refusing to leave his friend until he died.
0

0

0

The tanks were momentarily daunted, but far from out of action. The other bazooka teams had discovered the same thing. Time after time hits were scored, yet
there was no visible effect on the tanks. Like Neff, many bazookamen approached
boldly to within a few yards of one of the Tigers to discharge their rockets only
to be cut down by 88's when the rockets failed to stop them. What nobody knew
at the time was that the tanks on duty in Bannholz that day were equipped with
"bazooka skirts," an outer sheath of armor over the vital parts which was separated from the main armor by an airspace between. The rockets would explode on
contact with this outer sheath and expend their force before they had done any
real damage.
Meanwhile casualties were mounting. The bazookas proving largely ineffective,
there was nothing to hinder the tanks. Having blasted the Third Platoon until its
attack was completely stalled, and killed or seriously wounded all of the bazookamen, they moved to the southwest edge of the woods, just in time to catch Company F's support platoon moving across the open.
The support platoon was the First with First Lieutenant Wilford P. Wilson in
command. With him was the platoon of heavy machine guns from Company H,
"F's" 60 mm mortar section, most of the command group, and two stretcher bearer
teams. The tank's 88's caught them with no cover whatever except what they were
able to scrape for themselves in the rocky ground.
The First Platoon of Company G, commanded by Staff Sergeant William B. Malloy, was having difficulties too. Its mission was to enter the woods following
the others and secure the company's left flank. To do this it had to cross the
open ground west of the woods in full view of the by now alerted defenders of
Adenholz and Geisbusch Woods to the north. Half way across the First Platoon
was greeted by a deadly hail of cross-firing machine guns, followed by mortars,
artillery and 88's of the tanks that lay concealed in the edge of Geisbusch. Flanking fire is one of the deadliest threats there is to attacking infantry, and by the
time the First Platoon had reached the edge of the woods half of its men lay dead
or wounded on the field behind.
The rest of Company G, which had reached its objective initially, and Lieutenant Weston's platoon of Company F were running into strong counterattacks. By
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this time there were enemy tanks firing
from within it. Enemy artillery tore at
falling on its planned phase lines, caused
the situation had grown far too confused
was supposed to be at any given time.
0

on the woods from both sides as well as
the woods, and even friendly artillery,
some casualties among the attackers for
for anyone to be sure of being where he
0

0

NDespite the mortar barrage (as Captain Whitman tells it in his account of the attack), my
radio man, runner, and myself were able to enter the woods safely at 0745, but were immediately
subjected to another barrage. At 0815 I found Sgt. (Mariano) Scopoli's platoon, the Third Platoon,
with two squads. He had lost contact with Lieutenant Mason. I myself had been unable to contact
any of my platoon leaders since the jump-off despite repeated efforts. After a slackening of enemy
artillery and mortar fire, I ·ordered Sgt. Scopoli to sweep the woods to the southwestern corner,
then swing left and sweep the southern half of the company zone of action. In so doing he captured about 12 prisoners. In the meantime I still could gain no radio contact with either Lt. Wilson,
Lt. Mason, or Lt. Weston. Believing Lt. Weston had gone ahead on the left of my company zone

of action, I proceeded to the location (near the southwest edge of the woods) that I had chosen
for a CP, and where I had encountered Lt. (Robert C.) Pierce (Heavy Weapons Platoon Leader).
There we dropped our packs and overcoats. We watched Sgt. Scopoli take several more prisoners,
come abreast of the CP location and continue his advance. All during this time we could hear
the two tanks going around as they tried to get a better shot at us. Sgt. Scopoli moved down
on the right, and I with Lt. Pierce's runner and radio operator, moved eastwards on the left, following
in what I thought was the path of my Second Platoon. I had previously run into one bazooka
team of the Second Platoon as I entered the woods, and had dispatched them after the two tanks.
Trying to make physical contact with Lt. Weston, I continued on and luckily veered to the right,
meeting Sgt. Scopoli and his squads about 150 yards from a point midway along the eastern
edge of the woods which constituted our final objective. He had started to have his men dig in
but I told him to continue his advance, as I was convinced at that time that Lt. Weston and his
Second Platoon were to our immediate left and must be on their objective. Sgt. Scopoli and his
two squads had hardly moved 25 feet beyond the trail near the eastern edge of the woods when
they encountered the enemy dug in and firing BAR's and M1's at us. Still believing Lt. Weston
to be on our left, and still searching for the missing bazooka teams, I started out with Lt. Pierce
and ran into a flanking group of ten or more enemy. At this point an enemy tank could be heard
moving around the southeast corner of the woods to flank us on the right. Our position looked
untenable, so I instructed Sgt. Scopoli to withdraw, delaying the enemy as long as he could. I told
him I was returning to find Lt. Weston and the other bazooka teams.
NWith Lt. Pierce I returned along the general route I had taken and ran into T/Sgt (William H.)
McGuinniss at a point approximately 100 yards from the edge of the woods along our boundary
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with Company G. There at about 1030 we were subjected to another heavy mortar barrage. During this Lt. Pierce, Sgt McGuinniss, Pfc Howard R Jones, Jr., (a bazookaman whom I had found with ·
all ammunition expended) and myself were hit. I immediately administered aid to Pfc Jones, and
Sgt. McGuinniss, as Lt. Pierce seemed able to take care of himself. I found Lt. Weston in the Company G CP (near the southwestern corner of the woods) and discovered his platoon with one
remaining LMG (the others having been demolished and the crews wounded by one of the tanks)
had hit their defenses up on Company "G's" right, but inside the specified defensive right flank
of Company "G." I immediately oriented him as to the gravity of Sgt. Scopoli's situation and ordered
him to advance through his assigned part of the woods and assist Sgt. Scopoli. I would follow
along with him. An intense mortar barrage prevented his immediate execution of these instructions, and we had barely reached the boundary between companies, 300 yards from the western
edge of the woods, when we ran into Sgt. Scopoli returning with the remains of his platoon. He
had run into an enemy tank on the way back. I then ordered Lt. Weston to organize a line running through my CP location, but to look out for those tanks in the corner of the woods near Sinz
as they had already inflicted heavy casualties on the Third Platoon , .. "
0

0

0

In the Company G area the situation was going from bad to worse. Counterattacks had forced the two attacking platoons to dig in along the northeastern
edge of the woods where mortar and artillery fire pounded them unmercifully.
Foxholes were scant protection against artillery in a woods, and the casualties
steadily increased. There was, however, only one aid man left with the Company
by that time, Private Anthony J. Kapela. Kapela was faced with the staggering job
of not only showing the walking wounded the way back through the shell-harried
woods, but of carrying the litter cases back himself. For there were no men who
could be spared to help him. Each trip back he was in imminent danger from flying fragments from mortar hits high in the pines about him, from enemy infantry
or tanks that · might appear at any moment in any part of the woods, and that had
often before demonstrated their lack of scruples about using aid men as targets.
But all that morning he made the trip over and over again, and there are many men
in Company G who would not be alive today if it had not been for his courage
and determination.
At first the tanks stayed out of range of the bazookas. But it was not long before they had discovered how immune they were with the added protection of
their skirts. By the middle of the morning all of "G's" bazooka ammunition had
been spent with little effect, and the Tigers pushed their way to the very edge of
the woods. Exasperatingly and with impunity they would lumber up and down the
road that bordered the woods at that point, searching out the Second and Third
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Platoon positions. Finding an occupied foxhole they would move up to within a
few yards and fire an 88 shell directly into it. Private Bernard F. Moan became so
enraged as he watched this massacre of his comrades that he seized a machine
gun and, selecting a tank that was just approaching the woods to do some more
sniping, blazed at it so furiously that it was forced to button up and withdraw
before it could cause any damage.
Both companies by noon were in the very direst of straits. All hope of accomplishing the attacking mission was gone. The fight had become a fight for very
existence; a fight to cling to the ever diminishing possibility that any who had
entered the woods that morning would ever get out again. With radios lost and
destroyed, and many radiomen killed and wounded, communications between the two
company commanders and their platoons were almost at a standstill. Nobody knew
much about what was going on in the woods except in his own immediate vicinity.
To the individual soldier it was a morning of terror and confusion, where the
enemy was just as apt to appear behind you as in front of you; of infuriating
impotence in the face of the tanks that roamed the woods at will, destroying everything in the path of their guns and completely demoralizing any attempt to move
either forward or back. Attackers and defenders shiped at each other from behind
trees only a few yards apart, and small groups took shelter in German covered
dugouts that offered some protection against even direct hits from the guns of the
tanks. Prisoners were taken and then lost again as captor and captured took cover
from sudden firing and lost each other in the confusion.
To make matters worse it rained that afternoon. Not just the intermittent drizzle
that had kept up during the morning, but a steady, soaking rain that collected in
yellow pools at the bottom of every foxhole and made a nightmare of quicksand
of the churned-up ground where tanks had passed.
All during the afternoon, in spite of the artillery fire which Captain Larry A. Blakely of the 919th continued to direct with devastating accuracy from the woods,
the tanks kept coming back every 15 to 30 minutes, and the casualty figures were
becoming increasingly alarming. The Second Platoon of Company F was reduced
to 20 men. Of the two squads of the Third under Sergeant Scopoli, seven men remained, and three officers had been lost. Lieutenants Wilson and Desmarais had
been missing since early in the action, both believed to have been killed by the
88's. Lieutenant Mason had been seriously wounded attempting to stop one of the
tanks with a bazooka after the bazookamen had been killed. By noon Company G
was reduced to half its strength, and its casualties kept mounting during the afternoon.
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Holding a brief conference with Captain Heath in the latter's Command Post,
Captain Whitman finally decided to call for smoke. The smoke was refused, but
he was informed that Company E was being sent up. This was at 1430. At 1530
there was still no sign of any reinforcements, and no new supplies of bazooka
ammunition were forthcoming.
By this time the number of tanks that were pounding the woods had increased
to about ten, and trucks had been seen to the north of the woods unloading more
German infantry. It looked as if a major counterattack was imminent.
Once again Captain Whitman, whose wound by now had gone without any
medical attention other than his own for many hours, contacted Battalion about
the reinforcements and explained the seriousness of the situation. Once again he
was informed that help was coming. At 1615, by then hardly able to walk, he
attached the survivors of his Company to Captain Heath, and told him that he was
going to meet Captain Darrah's men on the way up. ''I'm afraid I won't be back,"
he added as he left.
Just as he left Captain Heath's Command Post he met Sergeant Manuel M. Delgado bringing up wire from the First Plato on. All during the day he had had no
contact with them, and now for the first time learned how they had been trapped
in the open and had been unable to reinforce the other two platoons in the woods.
Company E was on its way up, but the men who had survived their ordeal in the
woods since the early hours of the morning had reached the ultimate limits of
their endurance. For hours each man had fed his last flicker of hope with the
thought that orders to withdraw would soon be coming. How and from whom they
first came is still a question today. It is sufficient that they had to come, and that
each man who entered the woods that day stayed at his post unhesitatingly until
they did.
Stunned, mud-covered, and nearly spent, the men of both companies got themselves back across the open, still under a hail of fire from a new enemy counterattack. It was a pitifully small group to be called two companies, and many no
longer even had their weapons or all of their equipment. There were few machine
guns or bazookas left, and Private First Class Robert Roller Jr. crossed the open
under fire carrying the only surviving radio in all of Company F.
By 1745 the Second Battalion line had once again been established north of the
Sinz-Bubingen road, and the project of taking Bannholz was, for the time, abandoned.
The attack had been a failure and a costly one. It had been one of those days that
can be found in the combat history of any organization that has fought long enough
against a stubborn and skillful enemy; a day when the most carefully laid plans
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seem to be of no avail, and all the chessboard logic of waging war collapses
suddenly in the face of the unforeseen.
S-2 and G-2 had made their estimates of Bannholz, and their estimates had not
been far wrong. But even the intelligence personnel of a regiment or a division are
not completely omniscient. There is no way, for example, on the basis of the information it was possible to obtain, that anyone could have known the tanks in Bannholz would be wearing skirts that would render the ordinarily deadly bazooka
almost completely impotent. Yet it was this factor, more than anything else, that
accounted for the failure in the woods that day.
What it amounts to is that days like that 10th of February are a measure of the
true grimness of modern war, and are inevitable as the fact that in every battle
there are some who will be killed. The men of the Second Battalion could not hold
Bannholz that day because the odds against them turned out to be insurmountable.
What is important is how supremely they tried.
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The Switch Falls
Had the Second Battalion been successful in taking Bannholz, the other two battalions and the rest of the Division were to have launched further limited objective
attacks in an attempt to inch through the Switch Line. Considering the extreme
cost of these battalion attacks, it is perhaps fortunate that this project was
abandoned after Bannholz. Instead of continuing the attack, the First and Third
Battalions relieved the Second and Third Battalions, 301st Infantry on February 11th.
The First Battalion took over Sinz and the Third set up defensive positions north of
the Sinz-Bubingen Road. The battered Second Battalion went into Regimental reserve.
For the next week with the exception of February 15th, the 376th engaged in a
watching, waiting war that made the older men think of the days at St. Nazaire.
There were no attacks, only continuous patrols to probe the defenses in the series
of woods which faced our front. The patrols reported dense mine fields and many
booby traps. The Germans were determined to make the taking of the Switch as
difficult as possible. To pave the way for future attacks, the Division utilized several long rage softening-up processes.
The chief of these was artillery and mortar fire. During this period the German
defenders in Adenholz, Bannholz and Geisbusch Woods and in Thorn and Kreuzweiler received such concentrations of artillery as they had never known. Prisoners captured by Regiment kept asking to see the American "automatic artillery."
The Third Battalion harassed the enemy with the Phantom Platoon, which had
been developed during the St. Nazaire operation. This was a group of headquarters personnel specially trained in the firing of the .50 calibre machine gun. Utilizing
the guns normally assigned to the protection of kitchen trucks and jeeps, the
Phantom Platoon gave the Battalion extra long range firepower. Firing usually in
battery under the direction of the Compay M fire control center, the Platoon would
set up directly ·behind the lines, firing over the heads of the riflemen in the foxholes. After several hundred rounds they would quickly change position to avoid
enemy artillery.
To complete the softening-up process, the Regiment received its first real air
support. Fighter Squadrons of the XIX Tactical Air Command sent their P-51 'sand
P-47's to strafe and bomb. Getting their first close-up view of the USAAF at work,
the doughboys of the 376th looked up and cheered as the planes swooped low
overhead, then ducked as the empty cartridge cases from the planes' guns dropped
about them.
The planes and artillery also showered the enemy with surrender leaflets and
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safe conduct passes. These proved more and more effective as the days went by.
Increasing numbers of deserters walked into the American lines. They were tired
of defending the Saar-Moselle Triangle, which they considered a hopeless task.
They were tired of fighting the rugged soldiers of the 94th Division, whom Axis
Sally had dubbed "Roosevelt's Butchers." They said that many more of their comrades would desert if they could escape their officers. One of the deserters was a
Catholic priest who had been forced to man a machine gun. He volunteered to broadcast to the Germans to give up the vain struggle. This broadcast reached the ears
of Germans all along the line and was successful in bringing in many prisoners.
Living conditions in the foxholes were somewhat better than they had been during January. The cold was not quite so intense, and the snow had all melted. But
it rained frequently, and soon every soldier had his own private bathtub with cold
running water. However with the additional time and knowledge gained of experience, most every one was able to construct a liveable shelter of some sort.
Several company command posts were housed in huts assembled by the engineers
and A and P Platoons.
On February 15th the Second Battalion, 302th Infantry, attacked some pillboxes in
Campholz Woods. As a diversionary action in conjunction with this attack, the
376th sent out several combat patrols and placed intense mortar fire on Bannholz
and other fortified areas. The Third Battalion patrol contacted the enemy in Adenholz Woods and engaged in a brief fire fight. To support the patrol the Third Battalion sent one 57mm Anti-Tank Gun, one section of 81mm mortars, and part of its
Phantom Platoon across the Moselle River to Remich. From this position they could
deliver excellent enfilade fire on the German defenses.
After the terrific artillery and mortar barrages that accompanied the action on the
15th, the next few days seemed exceptionally quiet. But quiet as it was, something
was in the air. There had been rumors that a coordinated division attack was in
the offing. Even the GI's in the forward foxholes, who were not up on the latest
word coming into Regiment and the battalion headquarters, knew that something
big was afoot. The presence of the Tenth Armored Division was evidence of that.
Bannholz Woods, Munzingen Ridge and the woods just south of Kreuzweiler were
still full of Germans and would have to be cleaned before the Tenth could begin its
drive to the north.
During the week Colonel McClune revealed the general plan of the coming
attack to the battalion commanders in order to give them a chance to study the
terrain and German dispositions in the area over which they would attack.
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The 376th, as it had been all during the attack on the Switch, would be to the left
of the other Regiments, with the 94th Reconnaissance troop on its left. In the Regimental zone the Third Battalion would have the left sector, and its attack would
take it northward to Adenholz and Geisbusch Woods, just to the left of Bannholz.
The Second Battalion would form the Regimental reserve until the other two battalions had jumped off and secured their objectives. It would then be prepared to
move forward and take Kreuzweiler and Thorn with the help of the 94th Reconnaissance troop and the Division Defense Platoon. The First Battalion, which was
on the right of the Regimental zone in Sinz, learned that its mission would be to
tackle the dreaded Bannholz Woods, where the Second Battalion had come to grief
the week before.
0

0

0

Needless to say (as Colonel Miner tells it), intensive patrolling, both combat and reconnaissance
was initiated to determine the strength and disposition of enemy forces within the woods, particularly
the location of dug-in tanks and shu-mines. The information gained by these patrols, plus that
obtained from prisoners, was extremely valuable in connection with plans for the projected attack.
Maps, particularly photo-maps, were studied until all concerned were familiar with every terrain
feature and every known enemy disposition. This was particularly important because it was known
that the attack would be launched during the hours of darkness.

Plans for coordination with

attached tanks and tank destroyers were worked out in great detail.

Continuous probing and

penetration of enemy dispositions fairly well indicated that their main defensive strength· was
on the southern and eastern edges of the woods, with little defense in depth. Further, the enemy
seemed to have no readily available counterattacking force .
It was therefore decided to risk an all-out attack with

the

whole Battalion, with special

emphasis on speed, superiority of strength and rapid establishment of defensive positions once
the objective had been gained.

Plans called for Company "A" to attack west, rolling up the

southern edge of the woods, Company "B" to attack north, striking at the eastern edge. Company
"C" would follow "A" and, once having gained entrance to the woods, would turn to the right
and sweep the interior to the northern edge. Two platoons of tanks and one platoon of selfpropelled tank destroyers would closely follow "B" and "C", taking up previously designated
defensive positions on the northern edge of the woods.

The attack was rather unorthodox, but

Bannholz was by no means an orthodox woods.
0

0

0

On the 17th and 18th of February artillery continued to thunder furiously into
Bannholz, Cannon Company and all available heavy mortars constributing their
weight to the barrage. On several occasions five minute concentrations were fired
by the artillery in an effort to deceive the enemy into thinking that an attack was
about to be launched. This paid dividends, as by the time the attack actually did
jump off many prisoners were captured still cowering in the bottoms of their fox
holes.
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It was 0400 on the morning of the 19th when the attack got under way and
Companies A and C moved out of Sinz towards the objective. Ahead of them the
darkness was constantly shattered by the lightning flashes of the artillery preparation. The flashes came not only from Bannholz, but all along the Division Line to
the right and left where a total of 16 to 18 battalions of artillery were paving the
way for other simultaneous attacks as well.
Captains Dadisman and Bowden agreed that their best plan was to advance on
a narrow front, staying close to the :r:oad that ran northwest from Sinz into the
woods. There were shu-mine fields on either side which they would undoubtedly
run into in the dark if they spread out. Staying close together made it easier to
keep contact too. The overcast sky, out of which a light drizzle of rain was falling, made it so dark between artillery flashes that it was impossible for the
attackers to see more than a yard or two in front of them.
It was a strange feeling, moving forward into such stygian darkness with the
ghosts of shell-blasted trees outlined only where they were silhouetted against a
faintly lighter colored sky, their bases, among which everyone knew the enemy
crouched in waiting, completely enveloped in darkness. It is hard to remember at
such times that the enemy can see no better in the dark.
As the two lead-off companies e!ftered the woods, the bright spears of their
tracers leaping into the darkness ahead, there was surprisingly little response from
the defenders, and the main problem was keeping contact with the men beside you
and not mistaking them for lurking enemies.
As "A" and "B" proceeded on the~r mission within the woods, and Company C
followed up behind them it began to get faintly lighter in the woods and groups
of German soldiers began to appear out of nowhere, their hands raised in surrender. Apparently they too had been awed by the utter darkness, and had chosen
not to give away their positions by firing on the unseen attackers as they advanced. Now, by-passed, they realized they were doomed and gave up cheerfully.
Behind the infantrymen the supporting tanks had crashed their way into the
woods. Their guns were ready, but there was no need for them. For the Germans
the mere sight of the tanks was the last straw, and by 0815 the long-contested
woods were at last in American hands. There had actually been very slight opposition other than mortar fire and some 20 and 40mm shells which had burst in the
tops of the trees. Even the shu-mines along the edges of the woods had caused surprisingly few casualties.
During the morning the three companies worked to set up their defensive positions
in the woods which were still being harried by the mortars and some artillery.
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They were determined that, now the woods had at last been taken, no counterattack,
however strong, would dislodge them from any portion of the ground that twice
before had been assaulted at the cost of so many lives.
At 1200 Colonel Miner called the commanders of "A" and "B" together and, in the
lee of a knocked-out tank, oriented them on their next task. This was to be another
attack, this time to the east, which would jump off at 1300 that same day. Objective
for the battalion this time was the porthern portion of Munsingen Ridge, separated
from Bannholz by more than a mile of completely open ground. For this second
attack Company A, on the right, would take Der Langen Woods on top of the
ridge. Company B, on the left, would have for its objective "Hill 399" which was the
northernmost hump of the ridge. Company C would remain in Bannholz and act as
Battalion reserve. Once again the two platoons from Company A of the 704th Tank
Battalion which had followed them into Bannholz, would be attached.
This second phase of the attack would tie in with the attack the 301st, on the
Regiment's right, was making on the southern half of the ridge, taking Das Lee
Woods.
The attack jumped off on time with the smoke, provided by Cannon Company to
screen them as they moved across the open, proving fairly effective at first. The
attackers, who had looked with some misgivings on the coverless ground over
which they were to advance, proceeded with little difficulty, receiving far less fire
than they had expected. The attack was not once halted until they reached the point
where Cannon Company had to lift their smoke barrage. As the last of the smoke
thinned and drifted away, the leading elements of "B's" Second Platoon were finally
pinned by machine gun fire; but not for long.
Tech Sergeant James Lee, seizing a BAR, managed to crawl to a vantage point on
the flank of the machine gun positions. With a few well-placed bursts he knocked
out two of the guns, killing six of their crews. After this the attackers continued
on up the slopes towards their objectives. From there on it was not easy going for
the infantry, but still was not as formidable a task as the men had expected. It was
the tanks that were hardest hit. They had got under way slowly, never, during the
entire attack, catching up to the foot troops. Climbing the hill they had swung too
far to the left, and had advanced on top of instead of in the lee of the slight rise in
the ground which was to serve as a means of screening their left flank. As a result
they soon came under fire from a high velocity gun somewhere to the left. Before
the attack had reached the top of the hill three of them had been knocked out.
When the two forward companies reached the crest of the hill they met with
unexpectedly light resistance. Company A moved into Der Langen woods with little
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difficulty, taking twenty prisoners and three tracked vehicles. Meanwhile "B" had
mopped up the northern nose of the ridge, capturing the gun that had wrought such
havoc on the supporting tanks, as well as a number of machine gun positions.
0

0

0

It was a very great thrill for the whole Battalion to be on that hill (aside from the artillery

and mortar fire we were still receiving).

The northern half of Munsingen Ridge which had caused

us so much trouble during the last few weeks was finally ours.

Looking north from the crest as far

as you could see we were looking down on enemy held ground. For a while we felt as though we
had won the war right then and there.
0

0

0

But this was no limited battalion attack such as had exhausted the Regiment for
more than a month previous. Elements of the entire Division were moving in a
coordinated drive. On the Regimental front, as the First took its first objective,
the Third Battalion was advancing against Adenholz and Geisbusch Woods.
The Third's attack was made by Companies L and K with the weapons of Company M and the tanks of the First Platoon, Company A, 178 Tank Battalion in support. Company I remained in reserve to protect the Battalion's LD.
Patrols during the preceding week had discovered extensive mine fields and
booby traps in the woods that were to be attacked. Engineers accompanied the advance scouts, clearing a path through the mines and marking the route with tape,
Not knowing exactly what they would meet in the way of resistance, the attackers pressed forward aggressively but cautiously. Adenholz had been heavily defended, but there were indications that the Germans had begun to withdraw from
their positions. Slowly but surely, as the Third Battalion advanced through the
various phase lines, it became apparent that these indications were correct. The
mine fields continued to be heavy and were usually covered by at least one machine gun position, but the defenders were few in number. The phase lines were
named for coin denominations. The movement from penny to nickle to dime was
slow. After that the tempo increased and by 1124 the Battalion struck the "gold"
of the final objective. Adenholz and Geisbusch were completely cleared.
During the afternoon of the 19th, the First and Third Battalions prepared defensive positions in the newly-won territory. For a short period, Company E was
moved into the line to fill the gap between the two battalions. When the First and
Third extended their lines, Company E withdrew and rejoined the Second Battalion which was moving to Wies in preparation for an attack the next day.
At 1800 on February 19th, Combat Team 376 was detached from the 94th Division
and attached to the 10th Armored Division. This was an 'o fficial indication that
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the Switch had cracked. An opening had been made for the armor. Soon the 376th
would be following the tanks through the Triangle, cleaning out what pockets
remained.
One more strong point remained to be overcome in the Regimental zone. This
was the roadnet around Thorn and Kreuzweiler. The job was given to the Second
Battalion and the 94th Reconnaisance Troop. Thorn put up only a token show of
resistance and was captured by the cavalrymen in less than an hour. Kreuzweiler
proved a more difficult proposition. A first-hand account of the attack is given by
Captain Frederick Standish, then commander of Company F.
0

0

0

The LD was the edge of a deep draw to the south of the town, just east of the Thorn-Sinz road.
With Co 's F and G leading, the attack left the LD at 0600, and led across an open field toward
the woods immediately south of the town. Following an artillery barrage on the edge of the woods.
which lit up the field with a cold white light in flashes, the foot troops advanced at a slow run,
protected on both flanks of the narrow attacking column by heavy machine guns of Co H.

Just

inside the edge of the woods, the men who were new to combat, some 120 in all in the
two advance companies, momentarily froze.

The plan of attack called for a marching fire operation

to carve a swath through the woods, and probably the intense bedlam of noise caused the men fear.
However, this was but a momentary reaction, and again the columns swept forward, literally tearing
the trees and undergrowth to shreds by a continual hail of fire .

It was impossible during

the

advance to give orders, or signal, or do anything but shoot and run forward. Almost before anyone
knew it, the far edge of the woods was reached, and then it became apparent that it would be
quite a task to actually find the town of Kreuzweiler.

Fog and smoke had obliterate d any trace of

civilization. But Capt. Dodson and Capt. Standish agreed that the column had swung too far to the
west to be directly opposite the town, and both F and G had to move to their right in order to get
a straight shot at the village. As soon as the fog and smoke cleared, the companies entered the
town, and cleared it, but even before the last houses had been searched, a task force of the 10th
Armored Division rolled through town. Tanks, half tracks, two-and-a-half's and even jeeps. Strangely
enough, while snipers were still shooting down the streets, there appeared th.e Armored Division
Commander, in his jeep, followed by the Corps Commander in his, followed by another general
in his. Surely now the Siegfried Switch had been cracked, and the whole XX Corps would pour
through.
0

0

0

With the fall of Kreuzweiler, there was nothing left of the Switch Line. After
weeks of cruel struggle, the stubborn line had bent and then cracked. By the evening of the 20th tanks of the 10th Armored were already far into the Triangle.
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Over the Saar

CHAPTER VI

Preparations
0~0

~[!]~

.

thad all happened very suddenly. One day it was a war of waiting; of heartbreaking and inching progress through resilient defenses
that gave grudgingly, sometimes only a few hundred yards at a time,
o~o only to loom as formidable as ever at the next objective. It had been
a process of painfully hewing chips from the stubborn block of the defenders' might,
all in weather that in itself was a fearsome antagonist. The next day it was a war
of movement so precipitous that courier jeep drivers coming up from Division Rear
were often completely at a loss. They would arrive in a town where the Regimental
CP had been a few hours before, only to find the town deserted except for a few
GI's who could only explain vaguely with a wave of the hand that Regiment was
now "up that way somewhere."
This sudden change from almost static warfare to pell-mell advance, the speed
of which was greater than even Third Army Headquarters had expected, was due
mainly to two things. First of all it was the result of the enemy's protracted stand
west of the Sa.ar. The Germans, rather than fall back across the Saar with the forces
that remained to them after the battering they received at Tettingen, Butzdorf, Nen-
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nig and Sinz, chose to hold their triangle positions to the bitter end. By the time
Kreuzweiler had fallen on the morning of February 19th, the bitter end had practically come, and their forces were so depleted that further effective resistance west
of the Saar was impossible. The other factor was the lOth Armored Division, to
which the 376th Infantry had been attached on February 16th. Once Kreuzweiler
was taken, the tanks had an opening, and they poured through it to the north.
An armored division does not operate like the Infantry. The purpose of the footsoldier divisions is to strike a whole objective and pulverize it so that, in their
wake, nothing of the enemy is left. It is the job of the Infantry to finish whatever
target they strike. What the tankers have that the Infantry does not is speed and
maneuverability. Using these assets, their task is to split rather than annihilate.
Their attacks are sword thrusts, deep into the heart of the enemy, that divide him,
but leave him, like two wriggling halves of a severed worm, still functioning on
either side. The Infantry must follow in the wake of these thrusts and finish off the
pieces.
This is the basic theory of Armor-Infantry teamwork, a combination that was
continually to prove its effectiveness in the days following the establishment of
the bridgehead when the 376th moved north toward Trier, mopping up what remained of the enemy after the tanks had cut him off.
On the west side of the Saar, in the Triangle, the lOth Armored ran northeastward from Kreuzweiler to Mannebach, blasting the lifelines of the Germans still
clinging to Wincheringen and Bilzingen. As a result these towns were occupied
by the 376th with comparative ease. After this with ever-increasing momentum, the
Regiment swung eastwards towards Mannebach, last town in its path before
reaching Ayl, near the banks of the Saar.
The Second Battalion had taken Kreuzweiler, and together with the Third Battalion, they had moved from there north ward and eastward in the wake of the
lOth Armored, meeting with no opposition as formidable as that they had encountered during the early stages of the attack on the Switch. The taking of Wincheringen, Bilzingen, and other small towns in the armor's path was accomplished so
quickly it could be classed as little more than a series of mopping up operations.
But the phrase "mopping up" is often misleading. It suggests as painless and
routine an operation as advancing a flag on a battle map. In reality it is seldom
quite so simple. When an armored division moves through a town it seldom has
time to do more than shoot up the main street, knock out any enemy armor or
vehicles that impede its progress, and hurl a few point-blank rounds at windows,
cellars and other places where weapons covering their route are likely to be loca-
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ted. Any room, any side street, cellar or wall can conceal men and weapons that
did not choose to show themselves, or were not chosen as targets by the passing
tanks. These are left behind intact and must be "mopped up" by the following
Infantry. It is often no less hazardous for a foot-soldier to move into a town that
has not been finally cleared than it is to assault a town as yet untouched by armor.
Two days after the attack on Kreuzweiler had succeeded in ending resistance
there, the Second and Third Battalions arrived in Mannebach from the west, and the
First Battalion by truck from Nennig. During this time from the 19th to the 21st of
February, a total distance of 23 miles had been covered, 16 towns had been cleared,
311 prisoners taken and about 25 Germans killed. Losses of the 376th were 176 battle
and 34 non-battle casualties.
It was a curious situation that day, with Combat Team Headquarters actually
for a time operating in front of the three battalions. The first of the Regimental
Command group had arrived in Mannebach at 1141, while advance elements of
the Second and Third Battalions, that had reached their objectives in Wincheringen and Bilzingen at 1215, did not arrive until the middle of the afternoon. The
First Battalion, which had remained in its original position since the push to the
Saar had opened up two days before, had entrucked at Nennig and did not catch
up with the Regiment until 1730. Cannon Company, forever on the move during the
last two days, arrived with the 919th Artillery sometime after midnight.
In the midst of all this confusion, Colonel McClune had received his initial
order to cross the Saar River and establish a bridgehead on the eastern bank.
His first action from his new Command Post in Mannebach was to send for the
battalion commanders, who at that time, were spread all over the map. But they
were all located eventually, and gathered together to hear the order that night.
The Command Post was in a small, low-ceilinged ground floor room of one of
the houses on the main street. There was, of course, no electricity, and the room
was lighted only by a pair of gasoline lanterns. It was crowded and heavy with
smoke that hung like a fog in the dim yellow light of the lanterns. Present were
Colonel McClune with his staff and liaison officers; communications men who
already had their radio set up; the three battalion commanders with their operations officers; and representatives of supporting artillery. There were also representatives of the engineers, cavalry,. medics, and others.
The mission was simple: the 376th Combat Team would cross the Saar River in
the vicinity of Ayl and establish a bridgehead across the river at Ockfen. Time of
the crossing would be 0400 the following morning.
The order completed, there was the usual buzz of questions, and the representa-
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tives of the different battalions and units broke into smaller groups discussing
their own particular phases of the necessary coordination. Finally the meeting
broke up, and everyone groped his way through the blackness outside to his
waiting jeep.
That evening the Third Battalion, that arrived in Mannebach earlier in the afternoon after marching all the way from Adenholz Woods, virtually without opposition, was lined up for chow. According to usual custom when messing in German
towns, there were few messkits-everyone had found himself a plate of some description. Just as the line had started to move through, the word came down that
the battalion was moving out. The area was full of smashed plates as the men
from the company mess-lines moved in to pick up their packs and get ready.
Not long after, the Regiment was moving out to clear the woods southeast of
Mannebach. There was no opposition in the woods, and finally the order came to
dig in and wait there-that the Regiment would be crossing the river at 0400 in the
morning. This was the first the men had heard of the crossing.
0

0

0

It was obvious that for the crossing itself, the Regimental CP would have to be in Ayl. lt

was getting on towards midnight now, and the crossing was to start at 0400. Something would
have to be done about reconnoitering the place right away, and Col. McClune decided he might
as well do it as anyone else. Besides it would be a good chance to study the lay of the land
around the crossing site.
Only his driver came with him in the jeep as he moved eastward in the darkness over the
winding road. It was not long before the two were descending the final curve down the last steep
part of the hill just at the edge of Ayl.
The town was quiet in the moonlight. No noise or movement came from the deep shadowmasses of the streets. Only sign that there was any life at all in the town was a small group of
silhouetted figures just ahead of the jeep where the road passed the first houses.
"Probably some of the engineers," the Colonel thought, and told his driver to slow down. As
they approached he leaned out, expecting the familiar hushed command to "Halt!"

But it didn't

come. The men, it turned out, were not the engineers. The silhouette of their helmets showed
quite distinctly they were Germans-somewhat surprised ones, who, not expecting any American
troops along that way just then, did not happen to have their weapons in their hands.
The Colonel and his driver executed a discreet withdrawal and got back without mishap. But
it was evident that Ayl was not quite ready to be reconnoitered for a Command Post.
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By midnight the Third Battalion was on its way again, moving northeast towards
Ayl, which by this time had been cleared by some armored infantry from the 10th
Armored Division. At almost the same time the First Battalion was moving from
Mannebach straight across to the river at Ayl. Both arrived in the early hours of
the morning to find the armored infantry still in possession, their outlook on life
somewhat improved as a result of the well-stocked condition of some of the town's
wine cellars.
But it was getting on towards 0400 and nobody seemed to be doing much about
preparing for the crossing. To the men who had just arrived, the reason soon
became apparent. There were no boats. The engineers had been supposed to have
them at the crossing site in time for the operation, but something had apparently
gone wrong. First Lieutenant Jess L. Long, Regimental Liaison Officer, was sent off
to find out what the trouble was, and there was nothing for the men to do but turn
in and await developments.
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The Crossing
The dawn of February 22nd revealed a thick and heavy fog. The upper branches
of the pines on the west bank swayed a little in the cool wind. It was deceptively
quiet. The days of war's climaxes often are. The Saar that morning looked more
like a piece of Connecticut landscape than an approach to the Siegfried Line.
There was actually no front line. The First and Third Battalions in Ayl were
catching up on their sleep and awaiting further orders. The Second Battalion was
still in Mannebach. Service Company was operating from Nieder, further to the
southwest, and Cannon Company was digging in its new positions near Ayl.
In the town of Ayl it was surprisingly quiet. All during the morning there was no
artillery at all, and even on the open flats between Ayl and the river where groups
of engineers moved back and forth hauling boats and making other preparations
for the crossing, there wa~ only spasmodic firing. By midmorning, after the fog had
lifted, the enemy had perfect observation on both the river bank and the town
itself from the higher east bank and, in spite of the smoke generators, could have
been fairly sure of doing some damage with any kind of an artillery concentration.
But the east bank was apparently lightly occupied.
The town was a bustle of confusion, crowded with soldiers and vehicles of all
descriptions. Tanks rattled up the streets and were spotted all through the town.
Trucks carrying boats rumbled through the streets and squads of mud-covered
engineers passed continually on their way to and from the river bank.
At 1300 half a dozen jeeps and a radio truck pulled into town from the west,
bearing the Regimental Command Post party. Hardly were they unloaded when the
message center crew had hung out its shingle and begun functioning in a nearby
cellar. Radio and wire crews rushed about setting up switchboards and radio stations. It was Colonel McClune's policy to keep his Command Post as far forward as
possible. Ayl, which he had attempted to reconnoiter literally under the noses of
the enemy the night before, had been chosen because it was situated right on what
was to be the point of departure for the crossing.
The 376th, being still a task force under the 10th Armored Division, would
receive its new orders for the crossing from the 10th's Commanding General, whose
headquarters were next door to Colonel McClune's in Ayl. The 10th Armored in
turn was waiting to receive orders from General Patton.
At 1625 on the afternoon of the 22nd the order finally came through. Short and
to the point, since the details were already known, the gist of the message was
merely "attack at once."
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Cannon Company howitzer near Mannebach on February 21st. Many missions were fired from this position during the crossing of the Saar River.

In more detail the plan of the attack as it had been outlined the night before was
that the initial crossing was to be made by the First and Third Battalions. The Third
was to cross directly east of Ayl with their initial objective the steep bluffs rising
above the river just to- the north of the town of Ockfen. The First was to cross the
river several hundred yards upstream taking the high ground south of Ockfen. This
high ground was a gradually sloping, flat-topped hill liberally sprinkled with pillboxes. The top of this hill would be the Battalion's initial objective. qnce these two
objectives were secured, the town of Ockfen would be flanked on both sides. At this
point the Second Battalion was to cross the river in the footsteps of the Third and
swing around the southern edge of the bluffs, capturing the town itself. As soon as
it had done this, and had tied in with the , battalions on either side, the flank battalions, the First and Third, were to move on to their assigned sectors of the
Regimental objective which was a hill 1500 yards to the east of Ockfen. By the time
this objective was secure the Regimental bridgehead would be firmly established
with its perimeter on the commanding ground which all but encircled the valley in
which Ockfen lay. By this time the engineers were to have constructed a bridge
across the river between Ayl and Ockfen over which the lOth Armored would effect
its crossing. The tanks, once across, would fan out eastward and north towards the
towns of Schoden and Wiltingen.
Companies L and C were to point the attack for the two lead-off battalions, "L" to
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the north and "C" to the south of the road leading from Ayl across 1500 yards of
open ground to the river.
At 1630 the two companies moved out. Behind them the other companies of the
two battalions lined up and prepared to follow. But things were no longer as quiet
as they had been earlier in the day. The Germans, at last startled out of their
lethargy, were making it so hot for the chemical troops with their machine guns
that it was almost impossible for them to get to their smoke generators when they
were damaged or ran out of fuel. The result was that the protecting screen failed
and the Germans caught the oncoming companies moving across the open. Companies L and C had got half way to the river when they were stopped by machine
gun fire from pillboxes on the opposite shore.
"L", with no more cover available than the sparce trees of an orchard, was pinned
down almost immediately. Company C was at first also pinned down, but it
had cover in the form of a deep ditch to its front and finally managed to reach it in
short, frenzied dashes. By crawling up the ditch the men of "C" got to within two
hundred yards of the river. At this point, . however, the ditch no longer offered
protection.
Meanwhile Colonel McClune had proceeded to the flats below Ayl with his driver,
Corporal John R. Hills, and his radio operator, Technician Fourth Grade Richard J.
Scheibner, with the intention of personally observing and directing the river
crossing. By personally observing and directing Colonel McClune meant just that.
In a hail of machine gun fire he moved about on the coverless flats, personally
encouraging and urging on the forward elements of the attacking companies to
renewed efforts to achieve the crossing.
But it was all to no avail. Company L was pinned down in the open and its casualties were rapidly mounting. One of the casualties was Captain Brightman, the company commander, who had been killed by one of the first bursts. Company C was
pinned in its ditch, and the Company Commander, Lieutenant Cornelius, was
wounded. It was clear that until darkness at least it would be useless and far too
costly to attempt any further advance towards the river. It was, in fact, necessary to
wait until darkness even to get a number of the men back from their exposed positions on the flats. This had been the second attempt to cross the river. This time the
boats had been ready, but the men had been unable to reach them, and many of
the boats had been badly damaged by machine gun fire. There was nothing to do
but postpone the crossing again; this time until 2300 that same evening. Most of
the men took advantage of the pause for a bit of rest.
At 2300 Company C again led off for the First Battalion. This time, though the
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company moved forward over the same route, it was protected by darkness and the
going was somewhat easier. But not a great deal easier. Tracers danced around the
men like fireflies as they double-timed across the orchard on the way from AyUo
the river. Artillery flashed menacingly around them as they dragged the heavy
assault boats to the water's edge. But this time Company C got to the river.
At this time Colonel McClune, again directing the attack from the bank of the
river, was seriously wounded by shrapnel in both legs, and was evacuated by his
radio operator and driver. Scheibner, the radio operator, reported back to the command post that the Regimental Commander had been hit, and Lieutenant Colonel
Raynor E. Anderson then assumed command of the Task Force.
Getting the boats in the water was only the beginning. As they rowed across, the
inevitable machine guns opened up again, laying a veritable screen of fire around
them, fortunately not too accurate in the darkness. Several yards from the far bank
the boats began to get hung up on partially submerged barbed wire. It was useless
to try to force them the rest of the way ashore in the darkness with bullets still
splashing on every side. The only alternative was to scramble out of the boats and
wade ashore, stumbling over the tangles of wire.
For the first few minutes after landing in this fashion the first boatloads of Company C were completely disorganized. But order was soon established, and Lieutenant Chalkley, now company commander and the only officer left with the Company, reorganized the men into platoon groups. The Company was to advance to
the top of a steep hill directly to its front and secure the right half of the Battalion's
initial objective. Second Lieutenant Tom D. Huthnance, a sergeant at the time, describes the ensuing action:
Lt. Chalkley led the Third Platoon straight up the side of the hill, knocking out one pillbox
which was camouflaged to look like part of the road bank. A third of the way up they landed in a
Jerry communications trench.

The enemy was throwing hand grenades and machine pistol fire

into the trench to such an extent that they were pinned down and forced to remain there for the
rest of the night. Here Sergeant Orville Strong, our Communications Sergeant, was killed by a
potato masher, and Lt. Chalkley was struck by a fragment from a grenade, leaving the company
temporarily without an officer.
Meanwhile the Second Platoon, losing contact with the Third, had dug in in a vineyard with part
·Of the First. One squad of the First Platoon, under S jSgt Harold Price, was engaging a pillbox by
the railroad tracks which ran next to the river. This box was made up to look like a shack. It had
a mortar in the top, and the embrasures through which the mortar fired were very rusty and
screeched every time they opened up. It was well defended and Sergeant Ptice's platoon was unable
to crack it. It fell eventually to Company A.
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The other Companies in the battalion were crossing the river meanwhile, and were not having
any easier a time than we had had. Many of the boats that followed us were strafed by machine
gun fire and even destroyed by artillery. Some of the men were blown into the water and carried
downstream to a wrecked bridge.
o. 0

0

Behind "C" the first boatloads of Company B had effected their landing. But the
boat situation was getting critical. By the time two thirds of the Company had got
across all available boats at the First Battalion's crossing site had been either
destroyed by artillery or lost. The engineers who had been manning them were
nowhere to be found. Word had been received that more boats were on the way,
but in the meantime Company A and those of "B" who were still on the friendly
side of the river were being mercilessly pounded by mortars and artillery.
The promised boats did not show up, and finally it was learned that the Second
Battalion had completed its crossing of the river further downstream where the
Third Battalion had crossed earlier. There were plenty of boats there since no artillery had been falling at that point, so Colonel Miner and Captain Dadisman quickly
moved the remainder of the men up along the river to find them. There, just as the
other two battalions had, the remainder of the First was able to cross with no opposition, but it was nearly dawn before physical contact was made with the rest of the
battalion.
As soon as the whole battalion was together on the far shore, Colonel Miner
placed Captain Frank Malinski in Command of Company C and preparations were
hurriedly made for the resumption of the attack.
For the moment it was ominously quiet in the battalion zone. There was no sound
except for the occasional whine of stray machine gun bullets and the thud of shells
still landing across the river at the point where Company C ha~ originally crossed.
A heavy fog was settling in the waning darkness, shrouding the flat-topped hill
which was the battalion .objective.
At 0730 the eastward advance up the hill was resumed, this time with two companies, "B" on the left and "C" on the right. Company A remained in reserve on the
reverse slope of the hill along the river. It was a strange feeling moving forward
in the fog and not knowing how or when the enemy would be encountered. But the
top of the hill was gained at last, and the advance continued across the long flat
top. The Company had gone about 500 yards when it was halted by grazing fire
from machine guns somewhere in the fog to the front, and forced to dig in. Patrols
were immediately sent out to locate the source of the firing, but the fog soon lifted
and revealed the answer.
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The firing came from four huge, mutually supporting pillboxes about 400 yards in
front of them to the east. Situated on the flat top of the hill these boxes were so
located that their guns had grazing fire over the entire open space over which the
advancing companies would have to move. To reduce them some form of heavy,
flat trajectory fire would have to be brought to bear, and this kind of fire would not
be available until the Engineers had completed their bridge and permitted the
armor to get across.
And the engineers were having difficulties. Pillboxes along the river to the right
and rear of the attacking companies were beginning to shower the bridge site with
heavy machine gun fire. One of these guns was so close to the battalion's right rear
that the armored artillery across the river refused to fire at it for safety reasons, and
it was left for the 919th to knock it out with rounds that landed 100 yards to the
rear of the battalion OP which was just at the crest of the hill. Because of this continuous fire on the proposed bridge site, the crossing plans had to be altered to the
extent that the First Battalion, instead of continuing its battalion drive to the east
to take its original objective, was to strike south along the river towards Beurig.
Meanwhile, since fire was being received at the bridge site from the north as well,
a company from the Armored Infantry was sent across the river with the purpose
of striking at Schoden.
The new attack was initiated on the morning of the 24th by Company A while
Companies B and C protected the left flank, still facing towards their original
objective. Company A found themselves faced with a task of staggering proportions. There were pillboxes all along the railroad track down which they advanced,
and many more on the higher ground to the east, the guns of which fired continually
in the general direction of the attackers, whether they saw anybody or not. But the
men of the Company had not forgotten what they had learned at La Gacilly in Brittany about assaulting pillboxes and by dark of that day their aggressive assaults,
backed by flame-thrower teams, had silenced eight pillboxes and captured 100
supermen who seemed to have lost some of their assurance and fanaticism.
But eight pillboxes were a mere drop in an ominously large bucket. As fast as
they had cleared one box there seemed to be two more in front of them and still
they were constantly harassed by others to their flanks. Their casualties were not
heavy at any one time, but over a long period of time under such fire as they were
steadily receiving, they mounted up. It was obvious that for all its aggressiveness
and determination, ''A's" attack would soon be stalled without assistance. So Colonel
Miner relieved Company B from its mission of protecting the eastward flank, leaving
that job to "C" which had been badly shot up in the initial crossing. Thereupon Com-
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panyBpulled out and swung south on the heels of "A", thenstruck out to the southeast to locate the pillboxes on the flat open ground northeast of Beurig that were
giving so much trouble on the left flank of Company A. This action took place on
the night of the 25th.
In spite of the darkness, which made locating the source of the firing that was
coming in on them almost impossible, the platoons of Company B commanded by
First Lieutenant Carl A. Crouse, First Lieutenant William G. Land, and Tech
Sergeant Gerald T. Hayes, managed to locate a number of pillboxes and adjust 155
and 90mm artillery on several of them, capturing one after a bitter struggle. Even
with two companies working side by side it was a heartbreaking and seemingly
impossible task that lay before them. The battalion had established its bridgehead,
but after three days of furious close-in fighting to wrest the enemy from his concrete
strongholds, it still held only a narrow strip along the river and not more than
half of its original objective. And still there was no bridge and no armor.
At 2300 on February 22nd, just as the First Battalion was hurrying towards the
boats at its crossing site, the Third Battalion set out for one several hundred yards
downstream. Company I, commanded by First Lieutenant William R. Jacques, had
taken the lead position in place of "L" which had been so severely mauled during the
crossing attempt that afternoon. The attack led over the same ground as the earlier
attempt, but this time the attackers ran into no machine gun fire and, as far as anybody could tell, no artillery. Friendly artillery, laying down. a preparation on the
opposite bank of the river, and the muzzle blasts of the TD guns on the hill behind
firing overhead, made so much noise it was impossible at times to tell which way
the shells were going.
Company I reached the river safely and began to load ·on the boats which this time
were waiting and undamaged by artillery. The boats were typical engineer assault
boats, plywood, flat-bottomed dories about 20 feet long, which held a maximum of
about 12 men. The average load for the Saar crossing was ten infantrymen and two
engineers. Each man was supplied with a paddle, very like a canoe paddle. The
boats were steered by one of the engineers from the stern.
Still under heavy smoke- there was too much moonlight to have crossed even
in the darkness without i t - Company I got across the river, still with no casualties and no opposition. Three-quarters of the Company went over in the first wave,
and the remainder were picked up and taken over on the next trip.
The far shore of the river formed a steep bank that rose to a height of nearly 400
feet. Atop this bluff was the dense undergrowth of Irminer W ald, a finger of which
ran down the bank at the point of crossing, almost to the water's edge. Still with no
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opposition, Company I began to move single file up the steep slopes of the hill.
Half way up the first German sentries were encountered, but they were taken by
surprise and still no shots were fired. These sentries were the first prisoners taken
by the 376th on the east bank of the Saar.
At the top of the bluff were artiUery emplacements. Private First Class Leo F.
Carignan, who, w~th a four man patrol was the lead-off man of the company, was
the first to come upon them-a battery of 75mm mountain guns, manned by 12 men.
Carignan motioned the column to halt and had his men cover him as he advanced.
The surprise was complete, and it was not long before he had 12 very astonished
prisoners. A messenger was also captured, bearing an order for the guns to lay a concentration on the Regiment's rear area. Thanks to Carignan the guns were in no
condition to carry out any such order, and as a result many lives were undoubtedly
saved.
Meanwhile First Lieutenant Cecil G. Dansby's First Platoon, which was bringing
up the rear of Company I, ran into some spasmodic firing from by-passed pillboxes
on the slopes of the hill. Companies K and L, following "I" across the river and up the
hill, met with some resistance from the same pillboxes, but reached their objectives
easily nonetheless. In the early hours of the morning all three companies, with their
attached heavy weapons from Company M, were digging in on top of the hill.
For the Third Battalion its initial objective had been almost a dry run. Shots had
been fired, but there had been few casualties and no resistance of a sort that held
it up more than momentarily. The way seemed clear to move on to the Regimental
objective. Accordingly, during the afternoon of the 23rd, the battalion set out along
the knife-like crest of the ridge that ran back from the bluffs it was occupying almost
to the hill designated as the Regimental objective. The crest was wooded and the men
moved in single file most of the way, as there was hardly room on top of the ridge
for a wider formation. The column was a long finger pointing into enemy territory
with no way of knowing what it would run into from one moment to the next.
The enemy dispositions on its left flank at least were a totally unknown quantity.
However, other than one lightly occupied pillbox, which was taken single handed
by Private First Class Ralph W. Porche of Company I, the battalion encountered
little opposition and reached its objective virtually unopposed. But its position on
arrival was not very promising.
If the other two battalions had :met with as little resistance as the Third and had
been able to continue their advance to the Regimental objective, the Third's position would have been secure. But it had not worked out that way. The First had
been able to advance only southward and the Second had been held up in the vici-
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nity of Ockfen. This left the Third in sole possession of the final objective. It also
left it virtually surrounded. The advance to the objective had been unopposed, not
because there were no enemy in the vicinity, but because the enemy had not seen
it and did not know it was there. Hence the Third's advance had amounted to an
infiltration which had cut no swath through the enemy positions. The enemy,
alerted behind the Battalion as it passed, closed in behind and effectively cut it off.
The result was that though it had succeeded in taking both its battalion objective,
and its sector of the final objective, doing so had placed it in a position where, for
the moment, it was of little use to the rest of the Regiment.
Fortunately the Germans did not have the manpower to attack the Third while
it was in such a vulnerable position. What they did succeed in doing, however, was
infiltrating between Company K and I, setting up a machine gun which, until Captain Ralph T. Brown, commander of Company K, personally silenced it by knocking
out the crew with his Ml, had cut them off from the rest of the Regiment.
Aside from such incidents as this, and the light but constant artillery fire that
harassed the men dug in on top of the hill, their position was not critical except
from the standpoint of supply. Since it was extremely difficult to bring up food by
land, it would be more advantageous to send it by air. For this job the Regiment
borrowed 20 piper cubs from the artillery. The cubs flew low over the battalion's
positions, dropping over a thousand pounds of rations, batteries and much needed
clean socks. In spite of the two ME 109's that went after them, the cubs' "bombing"
was extremely accurate, and more than 7-5 per cent of what they dropped fell where
it could be found and used. No one in the Third Battalion likes to think of what
the next three days of isolation would have been like if it had not been for the
planes.
The Second Battalion, striking directly at Ockfen, crossed with little incident, except for prearranged enemy artillery which fell on "E" before they reached the
river. After the inevitable reorganization, Company F led off in column in an effort
to find the town in spite of the darkness, fog and smoke. Companies F and E were
scheduled to do the actual taking of the town, while Company G took the reserve
position on the side of the steep hill to the north of Ockfen which had been the
Third Battalion's initial objective. The route to Ockfen led up the railroad track,
through an under pass, then east across open ground towards the town which was
situated on the flats between the Third Battalion's hill just to the north, and the hill
to the south which was the objective of the First Battalion.
Outside of Ockfen Company F halted for some two hours in the early morning,
and was joined by Company E and the two heavy machine gun platoons of Com-
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pany H. Other than the capture of a few surprised Germans, nothing happened until
dawn except for the two machine gun platoons taking the wrong road at the underpass. As one of the gunners put it later:
We weren't sure whether someone was shooting at us or if we were doing the shooting.

It

was so dark you couldn't see more than fifteen feet in front of your face, and you had to part the
smoke with your hands to walk through it. All of a sudden the man in front of me stopped and
everybody bumped into the guy in front of him. Before I could ask what was up it sounded like
somebody was firing a half a dozen burp guns in my ear, and I fell on my face.

Then a pillbox

on our right opened up, but it was firing over our heads. Then silence . . . for an eternity it seemed.
Nerves on edge because no one knew what was happening.

Finally Lt. Stephen O'Connor told

us to move back to the underpass, where we found out that Captain Smith, the Company Commander, had finally had a chance to use his tommy gun. The Captain was leading the column and it
seems there were some Germans on the road that were foolish enough to challenge with the
only German words the captain knew. He talked back with a whole clip of thirty. It did the work.
"Das war alles."
0

.0

0

Just at daybreak the leading elements entered the town itself after a cautious
approach over 400 yards of flat marshland flanked on both sides by the steep hills
that loomed menacingly in the smoky darkness. The men knew that Captain Dodson
had taken Company G up on the hill to the left front of the Third Battalion. They
felt that flank was secure. They had heard however that the First Battalion was hard
hit crossing the river and had not succeeded in completely taking the hill that was
its objective. This left the right flank of the Second somewhat unprotected, but as it
turned out trouble did not come from either flank .
By the time the leading platoon of Company E and the first two platoons of Company F were in possession of the first five buildings in Ockfen, enemy tanks and
infantry were counterattacking from the east. The smoke was so heavy and there
was so much noise it was hard to say how many tanks there were, but there must
have been at least four. The bazookamen couldn't see and the tanks were firing
point blank at the few houses into which Companies E and F were crowded, so
there was nothing to do but withdraw.
The story is taken up from here by Captain Robert Q. Smith, Jr., Commander of
Company H, who, as usual, was with Colonel Martin that day.
0

0

0

We were expecting the engineers to start building a bridge at any time to bring the armor
across, and apparently the chemical boys were too.

All night and all day they kept laying in

heavy smoke screens. And every time the smoke would roll across the Saar and up the valley
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around Ockfen. It kept us blinded all day and we cursed it plenty. But one time we were glad it
was there. It saved us many casualties. I was up on that high bluff to the left of Ockfen overlooking
the river when "E" and "F" Companies pulled back out of the town. I had just placed a heavy machine
gun section above the dense cloud of smoke so they could fire on any movement in the far end of
town. Imagine my surprise when I started down to see the whole battalion swarming up the side of
this steep-and I do mean steep-hill. Later, in his report over the radio, Colonel Martin really hit
the nail on the head when asked if his battalion was in any danger. "Nothing," he said, "but mountain goats or scared infantrymen could ever climb this hill, and my whole damned battalion is up
here."
The Germans very obligingly had built some excellent trenches on this hill, and we reorganized
the battalion right there without the loss of a man under cover of the same dense smoke. For a
couple of hours the Colonel and I took turns adjusting artillery and Cannon fire on targets that
were very clearly visible from our roost on top of the world. Finally, about 1300, Colonel Martin
said "Well, Smith, I guess they'll want us to take that town, so I guess we'd better do it." Then he
gave me a quick outline of his plan and sent me to contact Captain Standish while he went to
orient Lieutenant Maness, commanding Company E.
The time of the attack was to be 1415. Well, at 1350 I was still frantically trying to find Standish.
Every one I asked said "he just went that way" and always pointed uphill. But still no Standish.
Finally I went back to tell Colonel Martin he'd have to delay the attack until I could find him.
Imagine my chagrin when I found that the Colonel himself had seen both company commanders and
.had even arranged for a heavy artillery preparation while I was lost in the smoke.

Well, at least

my HMG's were in position and were doing a good job. But that TOT fire the colonel had called
for!
Never in my life have I seen anything so exciting or as pretty as that! Imagine if you can the
first rounds of eight artillery battalions plus our Cannon Company all exploding at exactly the
same second on an objective the size of a very small town.

It looke.d as if the town just blew

up. And it was wonderful the way E and F companies crawled in under the barrage and were
right there at the first houses when it lifted. They stormed into town, running, shouting and shooting,
taking one house after another, just as if it had been rehearsed. Inside of an hour they had cleared
the town, put up a defense with HMG's all around it, and Lt. Murphy had his Mine Platoon with
about ten German prisoner "volunteers" putting in a minefield to prevent another tank counterattack.
0

0

0

By 1630 on the 23rd, Ockfen was completely in American hands. This time for
keeps. But the troubles of the Second Battalion were far from over. In fact that very
night a direct hit on the CP put three staff officers, including Major John R. Dossenbach, Battalion Executive Officer, into the evacuation mill.
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During the afternoon of the next day, February 24th, Company F received orders
to move north from Ockfen which was now secure. "F" was to move straight up the
steep hill and continue on a line that would isolate the bend in the river to the north
where the little town of Schoden was situated.
Company F set up a position in the woods overlooking the town, unable to move
forward across the open ground because of the observation the Germans had from
several pillboxes on the slopes of the hill to its front. About 2100 that evening
Captain Standish received orders that because there were pillboxes near the riverbank which were holding up the bridging operations for the main force of the armor,
he would send a force up the riverside railroad track that night and eliminate
these boxes.
By midnight, after on-the-spot training of the new men in the use of satchel
charges and beehives, Captain Standish and about half of his company moved out
towards the track. They tried several times to get close to the boxes but failed
because of heavy cross-fire from at least two other boxes. Fire was requested then
from the artillery and soon came over; both white phosphorus and time fire . It was
even suggested that eight inch howitzers be used, but the safety factor for our own
troops was not sufficient. Tank destroyers were tried as well from the other side of
the river, firing direct fire through the gaps in the artificial smoke. These at last
softened up the boxes sufficiently so that by early afternoon on the 25th they were
captured and outposted.
Early that evening an Armored Infantry Company attacked Schoden and the
weary men around the pillboxes set u_p reliefs for outpost duty. Half of them slept
in the largest of the boxes (the only one that the engineers did not blow up) while
the other half stationed themselves in the surrounding communication trenches.
About 2130 the water and ration detail arrived.
No sooner had this detail arrived when the Germans sent in a large counterattack,
driving the outpost into the box. Captain Standish immediately tried to get as many
men out of the box, as possible, but found that nothing could be done as the box
was surrounded. He then set out to organize a counterattacking force from among
the men who were outside, but they were so spread out that this plan too met with
little success. Finally word was got back to the First and Second Platoons and the
Weapons Platoon which, not having been called on for the riverside operation,
were still back in the original positions further east. They came at once to the rescue,
but it was the same story. They got as far as a communication trench within sight
of the surrounded pillbox, but sniper and machine gun fire prohibited any further
advance. Finally they were forced to sit there, almost within shouting distance of
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their trapped comrades and watch, powerless to aid them, as the Germans worked
to blast their way into the box. They waited desperately in the hope that some
support would come to the rescue in time. But none came. Word had been sent back
of the plight of the men in the box, but no support was available.
0

0

0

The Krauts (as Staff Sergeant Glenn Luckridge of Company F tells it) were resorting to endless
means to get in the box. Every time we would yell to our trapped comrades (who apparently did
not know we were there) we would get a prolonged burst from the machine guns. We were so
near and yet so far from them.

We had no way to get at them, as showing our heads above the

trench would have been certain death.
At about midnight the Krauts fired a bazooka round at the box in an ,e ffort to get our men out.
After which they taunted them.

We had no grenades as we had not been able to replenish our

supply. And not knowing the true conditions before us, we were afraid to try anything desperate
for fear of hurting our own men. Time crept by slowly, a minute seemed an hour, and our nerves
were nearly cracked from being in such a helpless position ... We just sat and prayed.
Finally at two in the morning there was a terrific explosion in front of the box. It didn't take
much deduction to figure they had blown a hole in the box, and now our men had little choice.
After about ten minutes we went through the most agonizing sensation in the world -

hearing

our buddies surrender. They had no choice. When we heard them go our hearts all sank. We
had done our best but failed at our objective.
0

0

0

The night of the 25th was the darkest moment in the history of the bridgehead.
Firing from the east bank both above and below Ockfen still kept the engineers
from building their bridge, and hence no armor had as yet been able to cross to the
376th Bridgehead. Unsupported, the First Battalion was battling its way inch by
inch towards Beurig. The Second was still in Ockfen and some of the pillboxes just
to the north, which were being heavily counterattacked all during the night. There
was gloom in Second Battalion Headquarters because of the tragedy of "F's" lost
platoon. The Third Battalion, still surrounded to the east, was in no position to help
the other two. The Germans were crumbling, but they had not yet lost their sting.
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The Bridgehead
FROM CO 376 COMBAT TEAM 252125A
TO CG 94 INF DIV
GR

NC

BT

CONFIDENTIAL
REPORT FOLLOWS ON DISPOSITION AND CONDITION OF CT 376.
OUR LINES ARE SO EXTENDED THAT WE CANNOT PREVENT ENEMY INFILTRATION.
ENEMY OCCUPIED PILLBOXES STILL EXIST INSIDE OUR BRIDGEHEAD. ALL TROOPS
HAVE BEEN COMMITTED SINCE FIRST DAY OF OPERATION. I HAVE NO RESERVE. ONE
COMPANY OF ARMORED INFANTRY HAS BEEN ATTACHED TEMPORARILY.
EXCEPT FOR TWO PLATOONS OF TANK DESTROYERS ON FRIENDLY SIDE OF RIVER
WE HAVE NO SUPPORT OF DIRECT FIRE OF HEAVY WEAPONS. IT IS EXPECTED THAT
THESE TWO PLATOONS WILL BE WITHDRAWN TOMORROW.
UNTIL 1900 THIS DATE ALL EVACUATION AND SUPPLY HAS BEEN HAND-CARRIED. ONE
"WEASEL'' AND SEVEN uJEEPS" MAY BE ABLE TO CROSS TONIGHT. AT PRESENT ALL
FERRY SERVICE IS OUT OF ORDER. I EXPECT THAT ALL HEAVY TRUCKS, PRIME-MOVERS,
CANNON AND ARTILLERY WEAPONS WILL HAVE TO CROSS SAAR AT YOUR
BRIDGEHEAD. IF SO THIS WILL BE CRITICAL PERIOD FOR INFANTRY BATTALIONS,
AND THEY MUST BE REINFORCED AND SUPPLIED BY ANOTHER UNIT.
IF WE CROSS ALL VEHICLES HERE, IT WILL TAKE TWO OR THREE DAYS AND PLACE
VEHICLES IN AREA GETTING OBSERVED ARTILLERY FIRE.
IN OUR BEACHHEAD WE HAVE CAPTURED ABOUT 60 PERCENT OF THE PILLBOXES, ONE
88MM GUN, ONE BATTERY OF MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY, AND 452 PRISONERS. ESTIMATED
KILLED 300.
SINCE 21 FEBRUARY I HAVE LOST 14 OFFICERS AND 161 EM. I AM UNDERSTRENGTH
47 OFFICERS AND 506 EM.
I RECOMMEND THAT THIS CT BE PASSED THRU IF 94TH DIVISION IS TO CONTINUE
TO ATTACK TO NORTH.
IF 94TH DIVISION IS TO PROTECT SAARBURG, I RECOMMEND THAT THIS CT BE
REINFORCED TO HOLD ITS PRESENT POSITION. SUCH REINFORCEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE
TANK DESTROYERS AND INFANTRY.
ANDERSON

co
Thus, by teletype to Division Headquarters, Colonel Anderson summed up the
situation as it stood on the night of the 25th. The lack of a bridge at the 376th
crossing site, and the resulting lack of heavy support was beginning to be severely
felt. Supply continued to be extremely hazardous, and the bottleneck of getting
rations and ammunition across the river had not yet been overcome. A forward aid
station, which had been set up on the east bank of the river, and which had been
operating under fire ever since, did much to solve the evacuation problem. But with
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the number of casualties to be evacuated the medical situation was still critical. For
the carrying of supplies the tireless crews of Service Company were aided by cooks
and other headquarters personnel from the line companies. Many of these, like
Technician Fifth Grade Gordon Allen of Company E, constantly braved heavy
artillery fire to get them across the river. To these men, many of whom, like Allen,
were seriously wounded carrying out this volunteer mission, goes no small share
of the credit that the Bridgehead successfully weathered its crucial period.
On the night of February 25th the only ray of optimism was the fact word had
been received that some of the armor was getting across the river via the bridge in
the 301st's bridgehead at Saarburg, further to the south. Soon they would be ready
to strike north and cut off the enemy positions along the river that were giving the
376th so much trouble.
On the morning of the 26th the first three tanks to arrive in the 376th's bridgehead
appeared in the Second Battalion area. After the tragedy of the night before the
remainder of Company F-some 48 men-still battled for the pillboxes they had
taken south of Schoden and were still virtually cut off. That morning the Third
Platoon of Company E, which had been outposting Ockfen along with the rest of "E"
and Company G, was sent north to establish contact with them, and cover their
withdrawal. The three tanks were to accompany them. Directing the attack from a
forward trench, Lieutenant Colonel Martin, the battalion commander, was wounded
and evacuated.
Two of the tanks were unable to reach the Line of Departure in time, so the
17 men-all that was left of "E's" Third Platoon-moved out with only one tank in
support. Their first objective was three mutually supporting pillboxes. The first of
these fell easily. The second surrendered only after pouring a heavy volume of
small arms and mortar fire on the already depleted platoon. In this second one they
found many American helmets, Ml's and other equipment-also one wounded
soldier from Company F. The rest had been killed or captured.
After this they attacked the third pillbox. But enemy fire increased, and the one
tank became the target of every enemy weapon in the vicinity. When the tank
commander was wounded and crawled from the hatch, the tank stopped firing. At
the same time Second Lieutenant Ernest N. Dyrlund, the platoon leader, was
mortally wounded, and there were many other casualties.
At this point Technician Fifth Grade Paul E. Ramsay, with enemy fire plowing
the ground all around him, dashed to the tank, administered first aid to the tank
commander and sent him back along a communications trench. After this he
mounted the tank and literally took charge of the battle, directing the fire of the
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tank's guns, and using the tank's radio to give the battalion command post a clear
and concise picture of the situation.
Finally what was left of Company F and the 3rd Platoon of Company •E managed
to pull back to the vicinity of Ockfen where they continued their outposting duties
and awaited the support that would be necessary before they could move north.
While this was happening the First Battalion was moving towards Beurig. Companies A and B, both of which had met stubborn resistance the night before, jumped
off on the morning of the 26th with orders to get as far south towards Beurig as
possible. During the hours of darkness Sergeant Robert J. Pailliotet and Privates
Michael Jacobs and Harold W. Ebert of Company A had scouted the pillboxes to
their front and knew just what to expect when they moved out in the morning.
The pillboxes were well-defended and it looked like a rough morning ahead.
But the defenders of Beurig had apparently seen "the handwriting on the wall."
The 301st was advancing towards the town from the south and, thus besieged from
two directions, the defenders must have finally decided their position was untenable.
The First Battalion attack met far less resistance than it had had any reason to
expect on the basis of what it had been receiving, and the Germans surrendered in
droves. By noon the town had fallen and shortly thereafter contact with the 301st
was made. The right flank of the bridgehead was at last secure.
But to the north there were still active pillboxes around Schoden which the
Second Battalion was too depleted to handle alone. In Schoden itself, Company B
of the 61st Armored Infantry Battalion was cut off. Hence, immediately Beurig had
fallen, orders came to the First Battalion to prepare to pass through the Second and
attack north on the following day. Accordingly on the afternoon of the 26th, Colonel
Miner's men retraced their steps to Ockfen and began their preparations.
The plan of attack was that Company A was to assault and clean out the pillboxes to the south and southeast of Schoden. "B" on its left, was to attack towards
the town itself along the river. Company C, still critically short of officers and key
noncoms as a result of the hammering it had received the first morning in the
bridgehead, would again remain in reserve.
On the morning of February 27th the attack jumped off, and the advance at first
proceeded rapidly with Cannon Company and the tank destroyers as well as the
919th supporting. Resistance increased with the advance, however, and Company A
soon ran into difficulties. The pillboxes in its zone were so well camouflaged that two
patrols had failed to locate any of them. It was Sergeant Leon D. Crutchfield of the
Second Platoon who finally came up with the solution. Changing the direction of his
advance, he struck towards the perimeter buildings of the town itself, the approaches
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to which would undoubtedly be covered by fire from the unseen pillboxes. His
assumption was correct, and the ensuing mortar and machine gun fire soon revealed
their locations. Fire from the supporting tank destroyers across the river was then
adjusted into the embrasures. The pillboxes after this began to fall in rapid succession under the aggressive assaults of both companies. By evening about 250 Germans had been captured and 38 killed or wounded. The cut-off armored infantry
company had been relieved.
On the morning of the 28th Company C took the lead and advanced north along
the ridge east of Schoden. Meeting stubborn resistance at first, it finally captured a
wooded hill which looked down on the town of Wiltingen on the east bank of the
river further north. In these positions Company B relieved them at 1500 and began
to dig in on the forward slope of the hill about 1100 yards from the south edge of
Wiltingen. Prior to this "B" had made contact with the armored infantry and completed the mopping up of Schoden and numerous pillboxes to the east. The left flank
of the bridgehead was now secure, and the enemy was no longer in a position
where he could fire on the west bank of the river at the crossing site.
The last operation carried out by the First Battalion in the bridgehead area was
the taking of four pillboxes which still stood between Company B's positions and
Wiltingen. The Second Battalion had received orders to pass through for an attack
on Wiltingen the next day. The order came down to Company B on the evening of
the 28th, and the pillboxes would have to be taken by the next morning. It looked
like a big order.
0

0

0

The chances for assaulting the pillboxes by daylight were fading rapidly, and finally disappeared
altogether, for it soon became as dark as the inside of a hat. The TD's which were in position on
the west bank of the Saar, waiting to support the assault had already radioed that it was too dark
to see their targets and were signing off.

It looked like rifles and grenades against concrete and

MG 42's.
Knowing that the chances of taking the pillboxes .by assault in time for the Second Battalion
jump-off were slim indeed, Captain Brehio, the Battalion S-2, suggested that a PW who had just
been brought in by a patrol be made to lead a small patrol to the key pillbox and attempt to take

it by a trick. S/Sgt Vogel, of PW Team 98 spoke German fluently and had done some splendid
work along this line only a few days before· in Beurig, accounting for over 60 prisoners. Major
Zimmerman, the Battalion Executive Officer, agreed, and Captain Bowden said that he'd try any-
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thing once. Sgt Vogel persuaded the prisoner to take an active part in the plot, much against his
wishes, and finally everything was ready.
T/Sgt Fred Peters reported with half a dozen men and the patrol was under way.

The PW led

off, followed by a .45 in the hand of Sgt Vogel. Behind them were Major Zimmerman, Captains
Brehio and Bowden, Pfcs Davidson and Bennet of Dog Company as well as Sergeant Peters and his
six riflemen. Just when everyone was hoping it would remain dark, the moon decided to appear;
only a sliver was showing, but it wouldn't be long now before it would be full.
As rapidly as possible Vogel prodded the Kraut along and the others followed close on their
heels. Down the trench they went, across the road, into an open field, across another trench and
then a sudden halt. The patrol spread out into a skirmish line automatically. The PW called
"Fritz!"

No answer.

"Fritz, hier ist Hans."

"Ja, was ist los?"
"Nichts.

I am coming over."

At this point the last man in the patrol started down the hill from

the rear, silhouetted against the moon which by now had reached its full brightness. One of the.
Kraut sentries, sensing that something was wrong, started for the pillbox, Sgt Vogel hot on his
heels. Sgt Peters and a couple of riflemen who had been crawling forward grabbed the other two
sentries in the ·trench. Vogel walked into the pillbox and shouted in German "Hands up, it's all
over." Captain Brehio, who was inside at the door,

checked the 19 prisoners for arms as they

moved out single file.
One PW was kept inside for questioning and said that the other pillboxes were unoccupied
since all the crews had assembled for orders. A quick check confirmed this, and the other pillboxes were immediately occupied.... Vogel searched for a code for the telephone but could not
find one, so it was decided to try one long and three short rings. However, the Kraut that
answered could not be convinced that it would be a good idea to come over with all his friends and
give up.
One PW, an NCO, was standing at rigid attention in front of Vogel and giving forth with what
appeared to be pretty "hot" language. Vogel seemed to be getting a big kick out of it. When asked
about it he said that the NCO had been in C"harge of the four pillboxes, and was very indignant,
claiming that the patrol had played a dirty trick on him.
0

0

0

With the fall of these pillboxes the stage was set for the attack on Wiltingen
the next day. Meanwhile the Third Battalion had been relieved from its isolated
position by the Third Battalion of the 301st which had followed Colonel Miner's
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men northward, and had struck north itself on the First Battalion's right, gaining
some 3000 yards against very light resistance, and finally reaching a point to the
east of, and almost on level with Wiltingen. The battered Second Battalion remained
in Ockfen which, with the fresh smell of cordite still clinging to its streets, had
suddenly become the Regimental Reserve area.
At the same time the 10th Armored had started north, striking up to the east of
the Regiment's positions and severing the supply lines of the Germans who had
been so stubbornly resisting the crossing. Cut off from the main bulk of their forces
further to the north and east, the Jerries with dramatic suddenness found themselves
at the end of their already overtaxed resources and collapsed like a pricked balloon.
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Out ol the Bridgehead
It is March 1st and the smoke has gone from the site of the Saar crossing between
Ayl and Ockfen. The sound of firing has ceased in Schoden, on the bluffs north of
Ockfen, and on the heights below the town. Under the grey skies the river banks,
still scarred here and there where war has passed, settle back to their customary
quiet and peaceful look. Only sound is the occasional reverberating roar as another
captured pillbox is blasted to rubble, under the expert administrations of Company
A of the 160th Engineers and the First Platoon of Company C, 319th Engineers. The
bunkers that have not yet been blasted look westward over the river as forbiddingly
as ever but are silent now for all time. The first chunk of the great Westwall itself
has fallen-not easily, but decisively and with unexpected quickness.
In the Saar Basin the Siegfried Line was, at first glance, a maze of pillboxes,
dragon's teeth, anti-tank and communication trenches which seemed to have little
system. The trenches ran at seemingly haphazard angles over the countryside,
and pillboxes were grouped here and there with apparent disregard for even
distribution. A closer glance proved that there was diabolically efficient planning
behind their locations. The anti-tank ditches, for all their seeming irrelevancy of
direction, neatly severed all passable roads and traversed any open space that
could be used as an approach for tanks. In the openest ground these were supplemented by dragon's teeth, placed in front of the ditches. All commanding ground
was laced with communication trenches that furnished perfect cover for defending
skirmish lines. The pillboxes were so placed that the guns of one covered the blind
spots of the other as well as all possible approaches from the west.
The pillboxes themselves were green and brown camouflaged hulks of reinforced
concrete, often with walls as much as fifteen feet thick. The gunports were mere
slits in the concrete, so that the only comparatively vulnerable point was the door.
This was made of steel approximately half an inch thick, that opened into an outer
chamber in which a shell that had penetrated the door could explode without harming the occupants of the inner chamber. This inner chamber, closed off by an inner
steel door and wall of concrete, would be vulnerable to nothing less than a direct
hit with a 500 pound bomb.
On the first day of March the First and Third Battalions were on line just at
the point where the river turned north again above Schoden. The Second Battalion
was in reserve. Regimental Command Post, Anti-Tank Company, Company A of the
245th Engineers and Service Company were still in· Ayl where it was beginning to
be a little quieter. The Regimental Aid Station also was still there, most of their
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customers still going forth with "bean-shaves" in celebration of the successful
crossing of the Saar. Ten miles north the first elements of the 10th Armored Division,
which had finally crossed the Saar near Saarburg, had reached the great German
communications center of Trier.
After the first confusion of the bridgehead, lines were beginning to form again,
pointing the direction of future attacks. While the 301st and 302nd Regiments
struck south and west from their crossing sites further south, the 376th was
pointed north; First Battalion on the left of the zone along the river, and the
Third on the right on the high ground south of the Wiltingen-Oberemmel road.
To the right of the Regimental zone was the 90th Cavalry.
By nightfall on March 1st the First Battalion had, with the exception of Company A,
fallen back into reserve in Schoden. The Second Battalion had replaced them, and
Companies E and G had attacked the town of Wiltingen. Before the attack a
member of the Psychological Warfare Service had set up a loud speaker across the
river from the town and urged the defenders to surrender. His efforts had a telling
effect, and if most of the Germans were not persuaded to give up, they at least were
convinced there was no use putting up a fight for the town. When Company E
reached Wiltingen the Wehrmacht had departed and the town was taken without
a shot being fired. The Germans had withdrawn to the north, and the Second
Battalion was able to move 1500 yards further beyond the town before it was finally
halted by heavy machine gun fire from pillboxes and from the steep ground on the
peninsula to the northwest. During this advance it took 25 more pillboxes. The
Third Battalion, advancing simultaneously in its zone, gained a total of 2500 yards
and captured three pillboxes.
On the day after the capture of Wiltingen the Second Battalion struck north again,
this time towards Konz at the junction of the Saar and Moselle Rivers. It met only
isolated resistance. If it took several days to clear the area it was because there
were so many pillboxes that had to be searched whether they were occupied or not.
There were also a few pillboxes like Number 111 that did not give in as easily as
the others. This one was larger and more heavily armed and had already resisted
one attack by a platoon of Company F when First Lieutenant Perry Heidelberger of
the 376th Medical Detachment took some litter teams with him and went forth under
the muzzles of its machine guns to pick up some wounded.
After first firing on his party, the Germans in the pillbox apparently changed
their minds. Several of them appeared suddenly outside of the pillbox, and indicated
to the medics that they wished to speak with them. It was not long before Lieutenant
Heidelberger had persuaded them to surrender. After he had communicated hurriedly

160

with Major Dossenbach the surrender became official and 59 Germans walked out
of the pillbox, including five officers: a major, two captains and two lieutenants.
Examination of 111 showed that it had been a formidable strongpoint. Main
armament was a 50mm mortar which, automatically loaded from machine-fed clips
of six rounds, was capable of placing 24 rounds in the air at one time. The machine
guns, equipped with shoulder pieces, had grazing fire on any possible route of
approach. The pillbox was three stories high, or rather, deep, as most of it was
below ground, and had all the comforts of home including Diesel motors for heat
and light, and showers with running water.
While the Second Battalion was operating in the Konz area, the Third, which
had taken Oberemmel the day before, continued northwards and moved into Kommlingen, encountering no more resistance than the Second had in Wiltingen. The
First Battalion was suddenly called north to help the 10th Armored take Trier.
The first Colonel Miner heard of this new mission for the First Battalion was
that his battalion was detached from the rest of the Regiment and was to assist
the 10th Armored. How and when it was to assist them was not made very clear.
The engineer officer who arrived in Schoden on the night of March 1st to guide
the Battalion to its new location did not throw much additional light on the
subject. The battalion was to help take Trier and was to start out as soon as the
trucks arrived. As to this he was both clear and emphatic. As to how it was to
get to Trier and what the situation was between there and Schoden he was far
less definite.
Had he reconnoitered the route to be followed? Colonel Miner had asked him.
No, he hadn't but he was quite sure everything would work out all right.
This was hardly a promising beginning. The Battalion was to move by truck,
taking everything with them, even the kitchen train. To get to Trier it would have
to follow one of the narrow swaths that the armor had cut through ten miles of
enemy occupied territory, and the prospective guide was apparently relying on
sheer homing instinct to get the First through.
But by 0200 the column was ready to move. Having picked up Company A in
Wiltingen, it moved out from there in a motorized column of companies ; A , B, C
and D, then Headquarters. Up front w e re Colonel Miner and his staff and the
engineer guide. Bringing up the rear was Major Zimmerman, the Executive Officer,
with Chaplain Buchanan and a number of medics. With them were the kitchen,
baggage and ammunition trains. The night w as pitch da rk, a nd, to mak e matters
worse, the roads were narrow and muddy and in places almost non-existent.
Everything seemed to be progressing as well as could be expected however until
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the Battalion column halted in the vicinity of Pellingen and Colonel Miner discovered
that not only was Major Zimmerman's entourage, complete with all the supply
trains, missing from the column, but that no contact could be established with them
by radio.
It soon became evident that the rear portion of the convoy had gone astray in the
darkness and taken a parallel route towards Trier. The story of the lost portion of
the convoy is told by Chaplain Buchanan:
Here we were 10 to 12 miles from Trier.

The fighting elements of the convoy were off ahead

somewhere following the engineer lieutenant.

In our small group we had the radio section of Bat-

talion Headquarters, the anti-tank platoon with their 57mm guns, the Battalion medics, the Battalion Surgeon, Executive Officer, Adjutant and Chaplain. To be utterly frank our ·fire power was
rather negligible.

Yet somehow we had to wm through those hills and get to Trier for thev

would be needing. us.
The situation was vague, but it was obvious and important that we find the main body of the
Battalion before dawn. We very much wished to avoid the embarrassment of having the bright
light of morning catch us wandering about with the enemy in position on either side of our path.
With our meagre fire power and rather noticeable train of kitchen trucks, it might easily prove to
be somewhat of a sad scramble.
So, cautiously, but with an undercurrent cif urgent desire to get somewhere, we rolled on towards
Trier. The shell bursts on the horizon became more frequent. Now and then we came upon a
burning vehicle which barred our way and had to be by-passed. Quickly we rolled on, racing with
the breaking dawn. Here and there along the highway stood muted pillboxes.

Everybody was

alert now.
Several miles up ahead tracers from 20mm and 40mm guns partially lighted the sky-line in front
of the city. Sometimes they seemed to be travelling in our direction ·- so that we had a tendency
to watch them a bit closely and with some misgivings. But always they fell below the horizon.
Just then, as I looked to the left, I saw a group of tanks in position along a defile near the highwav.
Several of them were warming up.
For a moment the convoy moved more slowly. For that split second we all peered apprehensively
into the darkness with but one common thought- whose tanks-friendly or enemy? Fortunately for
us they turned out to be Shermans, so we rolled on. Later none of us was quite able to explain why
we had not paused here and investigated the why and wherefore of the Shermans in the defile. We
were still a bit anxious to get to Trier, so it seemed.
A few minutes later the rumble of howitzers and heavy guns became quite ominous. The flashes
became very distinct. We were very definitely on the edge of the city now. We rolled past two huge
pillboxes flanking the road, and then came to a sudden stop. To our right several civilians, seeing us,
turned about and ran into their houses.
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As several of us jumped from our vehicles, we saw a dark form running towards us, hands held
high, and once again we heard that familiar greeting "kamerad!" Our interpreter, Sergeant Hans
Vogel, questioned the Boche and concluded we were in Trier. The German was on his way to some
other soldiers, supposedly in position to our rear-our presence in his path had definitely overwhelmed him. He told us the Americans were fighting to gain entrance on the north edge of the
city. We, it seemed, were near the south edge.
It was now quite clear that the gun batteries no more than 100 yards to our right front were

German. They were firing with great rapidity across the city, giving their all to stem the tide of
the insistent Americans. We were very close, and on a hill, slightly above their position. We could
see the gun crews at work and hear them as they snapped off their orders.
We had entered the wrong end of the city, and now found ourselves sitting on a slight grade
to the rear of the enemy's artillery batteries. We had several 50 cal. machine guns and three 57's.
Sergeant Andrew Brusgard suggested to the Major that we hurriedly set them on the high ground,
send the kitchen train back, keeping just enough vehicles to make a getaway after we had given
the howitzer and "ack ack" batteries everything we had in the way of fifties and 57's.
It might have worked-however, it was quite light now and any moment they would detect this

motley crew at their rear. We weren't at all sure of their strength or their disposition. The mess
sergeants and kitchen personnel were not spoiling for such an uncertain fracas, and our fire and
manpower being what it was, the Major resisted the temptation to have a try at it and ordered the
convoy to run down towards the partial roadblock, execute a sharp left turn, and hit the road out of
the city towards Pellingen.
This was done quite rapidly and with a definite smoothness except for one kitchen driver who
got stuck in the roadblock, and could not find his reverse in the excitement. As the two and a
halves roared up the hill away from the city, the Germans apparently became aware of our presence
and started to take potshots. But we were headed away from a strange, and what might have been
a grim experience and there was no stopping us. German civilians peeked furtively from behind
curtains as we rolled by, slightly confused perhaps at this strange assault on their ancient city.
But they were not to be thus confused for long. Just two miles down the highway we met the
Shermans roaring up for their first assault on this side of the town. Their reconnaissance captain
stopped us and asked us where the devil we had been. We quickly told our story.

Everybody

laughed. Wishing him and his gang good shooting, we continued to the rear. It was a happy ending.
We could laugh .now and enjoy our luck. But it might have been rough had the Boche known they
had unwanted and slightly confused visitors at their back door-and so early in the morning too!
0

0

0

It was not until the Battalion reached Hockweiler that Colonel Miner learned
specifically what the mission in Trier was to be. A task force from Combat Command
"B" of the 10th Armored had struck northwest through Trier from Irsch to one of the
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bridges across the Mesolle, by-passing all enemy resistance on the way in hopes of
reaching the bridge before it was blown. It had reached the bridge but had become
isolated as the task forces on either side had not been able to penetrate into the
city and had left its flanks exposed.
The Battalion was to move into Trier over the same route the armor had taken as
they sped for the bridge, mopping up any enemy it ran into along the way. Company A spearheaded the advance, led by Colonel Miner in a half-track. Although
the mission was to move through and contact the armor, the battalion was not
aware of the extent of the armor's isolation, nor of the number of enemy that had
been by-passed, and it was not long before it ran into resistance at a heavily fortified
railroad bridge. The company was stopped at this point by heavy machine gun fire
and direct fire from an 88 to its left rear which inflicted several casualties and killed
Private First Class Bernard Redner, the Company aid man.
But "A's" machine guns got into action almost immediately, enabling Second
Lieutenant Aaron L. Colvin's Platoon to move laterally to the next bridge across the
cut, where the Platoon attempted to cross. However this bridge was equally well
defended, and the First Platoon was forced to move still further along the cut
before it could get across. Once the crossing had been effected and the enemy
positions thus flanked, the Third Platoon, aided by the Company machine guns,
fought its way across at the first bridge and overran the enemy in time to save the
bridge from being blown up.
This fight of Company A's was the only serious one the Battalion had in Trier.
Contact was established with the armor, and soon after the companies were mopping up assigned sectors of the city. Company C was assigned the task of securing
the all-important river-bridge which the armor had previously taken. On March 3rd
the 376th Combat Team was released from 10th Armored and reverted to its own
94th Division. The First Battalion awaited orders to return to the Regimental zone.
On March 4th the Third Battalion had reverted to Division reserve and had taken
up positions in the vicinity of Serrig. The Second had finished off the last of the
pillboxes around Konz. Since crossing the Saar a total of 290 pillboxes had been
taken and destroyed. 1056 prisoners had been taken, and 150 killed or wounded.
The Regiment had suffered 103 battle and 130 non-battle casualties.
On March 5th nobody knew just what was next on the program. The 376th had
advanced as far north from the bridgehead as it had been ordered to, and the 301st
and 302nd had established their line running north and south well to the east of the
river. The bridgehead now firmly established and consolidated, rumors as to what
the next move would be were flying thick and fast. Prominent among them was the
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story that the Division was going to be relieved, probably by the 26th Division, and
that it would go back for ten days rest in Luxembourg. Actually the rest was more
than a rumor. On the 5th everything was arranged and the Regiment was waiting
only for the order to pull back. For the Third Battalion the order actually did come
through and was carried out. But the other two battalions were not so lucky. For
them orders also came through that evening, but they were not the ones they had
been expecting.
To the east the 301st and 302nd were having trouble. They had been struck by
several counterattacks east of Pellingen, and in the vicinity of Lampaden, and in
the midst of these an unknown number of Germans had filtered through their lines
and formed a pocket on top of an open hill south of Pellingen. The pocket was formed
by 6th SS Mountain Troops, among the Wehrmacht's toughest and most determined.
Rest or no rest, the 376th, standing by w ith its mission completed, was the only
regiment in a position to liquidate such a threat as this without jeopardizing the
main line.
The First Battalion, just returned from Trier, was chosen for the job and moved to
Pellingen while, on the evening of the 5th, the Second moved west as far as Oberemmel and spent the night outposting the town. On March 6th Company B made two
attacks on the pocket, supported by tanks, but was thrown back both times. The
difficulty was that there was no covered route of approach to the hill, visibility was
poor and the pocket was far more heavily armed with panzerfausts and machine
guns than had been expected. The tanks were completely stalled and many of them
knocked out by the panzerfausts.
By this time the Second Battalion was moving from Oberemmel to the vicinity
of Pellingen, and the Third had been called back from its very brief rest in
Dudelange, Luxembourg. Plans were afoot for a coordinate~ battalion attack to be
launched on the pocket the following morning. In preparation for this, artillery
.and Cannon Company pounded the hilltop positions intermittently all during the
night of the 6th. In the morning, half an hour before the attack was to jump off,
Colonel Miner was standing on top of the hill where the pocket had been. The only
Germans in sight were dead ones, lying .amidst the shell torn debris of their equipment. During the night the artillery and Cannon Company had apparently given
more than even the SS could take, and the survivors of the Mountain Troops had
slipped back into their own lines as quietly as they had come.
The hard fighting undergone by the Regiment in establishing the bridgehead and
taking Trier had exacted its Wice. All echelons of the 376th had contributed to
meet the demands of battle. Now with reorganization, the inevitable gaps in the
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Regimental ranks were filled, and the team, getting ready to carry the fight to the
Rhine , had an altered line-up. Lieutenant Colonel Anderson, now regimental CO,
called in Lieutenant Colonel Miner to be his executive officer. Transferring from the
Third to the First Battalion, Major Eskel Miller assumed command of that battalion.
Replacing Lieutenant Colonel Martin who was wounded near Ockfen; Major John
Dossenbach commanded the Second.
This had been the last attempt on the part of the Germans to contest the bridgehead with anything more than occasional light artillery and mortar fire. The remaining days before the Regiment burst out of its hard-won bridgehead and hurtled
headlong towards the Rhine, were filled with reorganization, outposting, patrolling
and reconnaissance of the country along the Ruwer east of Franzenheim and
Pellingen. The die-hard rumor mongers still clung to the theory that Since the SS
pocket had been wiped out, the ten day rest was still in the offing. But the rumor
had few supporters this time. Quiet as it was, the air was electric with big things
impending. Somehow every one knew the curtain was about to rise on the last act.
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cHAPTER VII

Race to the Rhine

The Big Picture

~~~
0~0

ith more than its traditional lionine ferocity, the month of March
1945 stirred the Western Front into frantic action. Following General Eisenhower's plan to destroy the Wehrmacht west of the Rhine,
the full force of American, British and French arms was unleashed

to sound the overture for the Gotterdammerung of Nazi might. No single Allied
unit can claim to have played the outstanding role in the race to the Rhine. It was
a coordinated effort of all ground and air forces; even the Navy followed along
with its craft ready to navigate the Rhine. But the part played by the 376th Infantry
Regiment in this drive is in itself like the story of an entire major campaign.
To realize the importance of the Third Army drive, of which the 376th Infantry
was on several occasions the southern spearhead, we must look at the entire Western Front as it stood early in March. The First Canadian Army had begun the attack
on February 8th; the American First and Ninth Armies had followed on February
23th. With the beginning of the second week in March they stood poised on the
west bank of the Rhine for 135 miles from the Moselle north to Nijmegen and the
First Army had a well-established bridgehead at Remagen.
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But on the south

facing the American Third and Seventh and the French First Armies stood the stillpowerful German Fi,rst and Seventh Armies, manning formidable defenses, including natural mountain fortresses .
Undoubtedly more of the forces in the north could at that time have jumped
the Rhine and thrust an armored spearhead into the heart of the Reich. But such
an action was not in line with General Eisenhower's strategy. A break-through
would have been dangerous because of the strong German forces on its southern
flank. So the spotlight fell on the American Third and Seventh Armies. It was their
task to destroy the enemy within the Saar-Rhine-Moselle Triangle. To accomplish
this a coordinated two-army attack was launched early in March.
At this time the 376th was comfortably ensconced in its enlarged bridgehead
oil the east bank of the Saar River just south of Trier. The troublesome infiltration
into the bridgehead area by the 6th SS Mountain Division had been repulsed.
There was nothing to do but improve the defensive positions along the Regimental line in case of counter-attack, send out a few patrols-and await the cue
for the Regiment to take its part in the great offensive. The First and Second Battalions were along the Main Line of Resistance, with Command Posts at Franzenheim and Pellingen, respectively. The Third Battalion maintained the Regimental
Reserve Line in the vicinity of Krettnach-Obermennig. The Regimental nerve center was in Oberemmel.
Every man in the Regiment had been briefed on the "big picture" of the twoarmy drive and on as much as was then known of the part the Regiment would
play. The 94th Division would initiate the attack to the east with the 301st and
302nd Regiments on line. The left (north) flank of the division would be screened
against counter-attacks by Third Army Cavalry units. To the right (south) of the
division, the 26th and 80th Infantry Divisions would launch simultaneous attacks.
At first the 376th would be in motorized reserve, ready to exploit a breakthrough anywhere on the Division front.
All the usual preparations for a large-scale operation were made. Ammunition,
"K" rations, new equipment were all issued. The Regiment lacked nothing but
the go-ahead signal. There was nothing to do but wait. However waiting proved
not such an easy chore for the impatient fighting men of the 376th. They knew
that the Rhine would have to be reached before they could hope for any real rest,
so they were eager to start the big job and get it over as quickly as possible.
The men of the Third Battalion spoke longingly of their scant 36 hours respite in
the pleasant town of Dudelange, Luxembourg, and cursed the fates that had called
them back to the line.
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To make waiting easier, frequent movies were shown by the 376th Special Service Section and by the Third Army's 30th Special Service Company. Some men
were sent to the Division Rest Camp for a few days. The others occupied themselves with writing letters, cleaning weapons, and talking about the days to come.
In the reserve area, the Third Battalion conducted a training schedule. Quartermaster trucks arrived and were held ready to take off at any moment.
Not all the Regiment spent its time just waiting. For large-scale attacks to be
successful, S-2 has to know where the enemy is, how strong he is,_ and what he's
·doing. The best way to find out this information is by patrols, small groups of
experienced riflemen who know how to move quietly and keep their eyes open.
Such a patrol was sent out from Company A a few days before the big drive was
to begin. Its mission was to reconnoiter and, if possible, destroy any German defenses
on the opposite bank of the tiny Ruwer River which bounded the Regiment's
front lines.
0

0

0

The patrol was divided into three groups. The main party under S/Sgt Macejak was to proceed
down the draw on the other side of the river, .probing for enemy positions. Two other groups
under Sgt. Atz and Pfc Faber were to provide flank security.
After the first group had crossed and moved away from the river into the woods that separated
it from the nearby railroad track, the first scout, Shorty Holton, saw a German wagon about
200 yards away. Investigation showed signs of recent activity. Further on, a house was sighted.
Lee and Kligman moved cautiously forward to see what was inside. Suddenly a machine gun
on the side of the hill burst out. Silence. Then the crack of an M-1. Machine gun bullets sprayed
the trees and everyone dropped. Kligman appeared and reported that the MG on the hill had
killed Lee. Faber immediately contacted Macejak, and a skirmish line was formed to move up
the right side of the draw. Pvts McMahan and Ashe soon captured two German riflemen, and
Pfc Cannon overcame a machine gun nest which held three men, one of whom had been wounded
by Kligman's first shot. The thin line bravely moved forward, firing continuously. Several more
Germans were killed or captured. The small patrol, fighting against considerable odds, was wreaking
havoc on the German defenses. But not without cost. Allen, Rafferty and Lee were killed. Acker,
badly wounded, was given first aid by Hickey, but died shortly after.
Depleted in numbers and out of radio contact with the company, the patrol began to withdraw.
The prisoners were ordered to carry the wounded and dead. Despite constant sniper fire the group
recrossed the river without mishap.
To the men who went along that night, the patrol was just another job-a rough one, because
some of their buddies had been killed. But to the Regiment and higher headquarters the destruction
of the MG nests, the report on the terrain, and the information obtained from the prisoners spelled
the possible difference between success and failure in the opening minutes of the race to the Rhine.
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On March 13th the 301st and 302nd Regiments jumped off. The first obstacle to
be met was the Ruwer River, not far in front of the Line of Departure. This was
crossed during the first day, and the engineers soon had a bridge across it. The
attacking regiments moved erratically, sometimes swiftly, sometimes not at all,
and with no communications with each other, so it was difficult for the 376th to
keep informed as to the actual situation. But by the morning of March 14th it
was obvious that although the attacking echelons were receiving heavy
artillery and rocket fire, there was going to be little resistance by enemy
infantry. Although the attack had not up to that time covered much ground it was
building up a terrific momentum that soon would be unleashed. Like its traditional
symbol the rattlesnake, the 376th lay coiled ready to spring at the order to attack.
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The Race Begins
The first order came on the morning of March 15th. The first assignment for the
Regiment, to clear the town of Hinzenburg which had been bypassed by forward
elements of the division, was given to Company B. The town was taken without
any trouble by 1100, at which time Company B went on to search the high
ground around the town. The Second Battalion mounted the trucks which had been
waiting for action during the preceding days and rode to an assembly area in the
vicinity of Heddert. The Third Battalion motored to within a mile of Schillingen,
detrucked and prepared to enter the town. But the little community was already
too crowded with troops, so the Third assembled in a woods just west of the town
and prepared to spearhead the Regiment's attack. Regiment established its forward Command Post in Schillingen.
At 2000 on the evening of March 15th, Third Battalion set out on foot to take the
first objective, the town of Grimburg. It was a clear cool night. The faint starlight was supplemented by "artificial moonlight" from an Anti-Aircraft Searchlight
Battalion somewhere off to the south. Although the Battalion's organic transportation and anti-tank guns were left behind in Schillingen, a platoon of light tanks
from Company D of the 778th Tank Battalion was attached. Riding atop the tanks
was the Second Platoon of Company I led by Second Lieutenant Roland H. Vogt.
The infantry-carrying tanks spearheaded the column, followed by the rest of the
Battalion, Company I leading. With Company M came the two mules which Colonel
Thurston had acquired to carry mortar ammunition and extra radio batteries. For
increased mobility, the heavy machine gun sections of Company M left their watercooled guns behind and carried light machine guns.
Entering heavy woods a few miles before Grimburg, the column encountered a
road block which caused the tanks to turn back. Taking to foot paths through
the dense woods, the men and mules proceeded without armor support. The route
meandered over hills and across streams. In places the dense foliage completely
shut off all light, and men had to hold on to one another to maintain contact. A
few hundred yards in front of Grimburg, the lead scouts of Company I were
challenged by German outposts. Shifting the route slightly, the scouts bypassed
the sentries. Mistaking the column for friendly troops, the Germans did not attempt
to hinder their advance. Not until the last elements of Company I were passing
did the Germans realize their mistake. Then one opened fire. The Third Platoon
returned the fire: Sergeant Martin J. Sheehy wounded one of the sentries with his
BAR. Meanwhile the other companies of the Battalion had lost contact. Company I
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went on to the edge of the town. Companies K and L soon drew abreast on the
right. Scouts were sent into the town to probe its defenses. Apparently the firing
had not alerted the other sentries. They were easily surprised. The "sneak" attack
had taken the Germans completely off their guard. No alert orders had been given
to the sentries because the local commanders hadn't the faintest idea that there were
any American troops within miles. As the outposts were rounded up, their only
apparent emotion was that of complete astonishment. Patrols were then sent to
round up the rest of the town's garrison, all of whom were found in their beds,
either sleeping or being entertained by the local frauleins. Apparently more anxious
than their soldier-protectors, the citizens of Grimburg were all awake, assembled in
the most strongly-reinforced cellars.
By 0300 the town was completey cleared. A perimeter defense was set up, and
those troops not actually manning the outposts found suitable houses and settled
down for some much-needed sleep. Since the Battalion did not have its anti-tank
guns, anti-tank mines were placed on all possible approaches, and bazookas were
held in readiness at each outpost. But apparently neighboring enemy forces did
not yet know that Grimburg had fallen. Company K outposts captured a motorcycle messenger sent out just two hours previous by the Commanding General of
a German division to contact the Grimburg garrison. A truck entering the town
was also surprised and captured. At about 0700 a German column came into view
from the southeast. Eyewitness accounts vary as to the extent of the German
forces involved. Some of the more excitable men in the outposts claim to have
seen as many as ten Tiger tanks followed by infantry. It is more generally agreed
that the column consisted only of two or three self-propelled guns without support. Sighting American troops in Grimburg, the self-propelleds opened fire, hitting
one house which Company I occupied, but causing no casualties. After a few rounds
the guns withdrew. Shortly thereafter enemy troops were observed digging in the
woods to the east of Grimburg. Contact was made with the 919th Field Artillery by
radio, and fire was adjusted onto the enemy in the woods. Everyone was alerted
for the counterattack that was expected at any minute.
Colonel Thurston was at one of the Company I outposts when Private First
Class Harold Gorelick came running up to him with the information that another
tank column was hitting the town from the north. Colonel Thurston took out his
field glasses and looked in the direction that Gorelick indicated. "Just a minute,
son," he said. "They look like ours."
Even though the tanks were still a long way off, it soon became obvious that
Colonel Thurston's identification had been correct. The tanks were Shermans, the
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leading elements of Task Force Richardson of the 10th Armored "Tiger" Division.
Hastily all anti-tank mines were pulled in, and the infantrymen sat back to await
their iron-clad comrades. Soon the first tank pulled over the hill and began blazing
away with its 76mm gun at the Germans in the woods. The Third Battalion had been
pulled out of another tight position.
But there was little time for rejoicing. There were more objectives to be taken
that day. During the morning the supply jeeps and kitchen trucks began to arrive
in Grimburg. Ammunition and "K" rations were passed out, and all was made
ready to press on to Sitzerath. This time it was Company K's turn to take the
lead. Sitzerath lies in a hollow, surrounded by steep hills to the north and west.
Company K stormed the town from the hills, to clear a path for the supporting
platoon of tanks. The infantrymen were pinned down by a German 77m gun, well
camouflaged. Enemy Panzerfausts prevented the tanks from getting into positions
where they could place fire on the 77. Captain Ralph T. Brown, Company K's
Commander, crawled to a knoll 300 yards south of the Panzerfausts in an attempt to
dislodge them with his rifle grenade. Just as he reached the knoll, the 77mm fired
almost point-blank at him, shrapnel wounding him in the face. However, his presence caused the Panzerfaust men to fear that they were being outflanked, so they
quickly withdrew. This enabled the tanks to direct their fire on the 77mm, silencing it, and permitting the capture of Sitzerath.
In Sitzerath the kitchens were given time enough to set up and were about to
feed the men their first hot meal since the beginning of the attack, when the order
came to press on to Bierfeld. But the Battalion didn't stop for breath in Bierfeld.
They pressed on to the final objective for the day, Nonnweiler, which was considered the toughest item on the agenda. Here they prepared themselves for heavy
fighting and another sleepness night. But as the column reached the outskirts of the
town, the scouts reported that it was full of tanks - American tanks! The Third
Battalion had once more crossed paths with the ubiquitous Task Force Richardson.
During this advance by the Third Battalion the other units of the Regiment
kept closely behind, ready to assume the initiative on order. At 0915 on the mornning of March 16th the Second Battalion marched from its area in the vicinity of
Heddert to a forward assembly area, arriving there at 1200. After a brief halt
they continued marching to Grimburg and thence to Sitzerath, where they spent
the night and prepared to hop off in the attack on the morning of the 17th of March.
Meanwhile the First Battalion had left Franzenheim at 1415, going by truck to a
forward assembly area, from which they marched to Grimburg, arriving at 1916.
It seemed fairly certain at this time that the German forces facing the Regiment
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were in almost complete rout. Little resistance was met in any of the towns taken.
Reports indicated that the situation was similar on adjoining fronts, although
Seventh Army troops to the south were having somewhat slower going through
the difficult terrain. Now was the time to press the advantage. Everyone was tired
and needed sleep, but knew that there could be no rest until the Rhine had been
reached.
By daylight of March 17th, the Second Battalion had shoved off from Sitzerath
and was passing through the Third Battalion in. Nonnweiler. They went on to take
Otzenhausen by 0810, then made a morning of it by taking Schwerzenbach before
noon. In both towns the troops were greeted by white sheets, shirts and towels
hung from every window to indicate the villagers' unwillingness to follow their
Fuhrer's injunction to resist the invaders unto death.
One. group of about 60 German soldiers did attempt a counter-attack from the
south and east of Otzenhausen. Although somewhat surprised at this audacious and
fool-hardy tactic of the former "supermen," the Weapons Platoon of Company E had
a field day. The light machine gun section brought the Germans under fire at
approximately 400 yards and forced them to disperse and seek cover. With perfect
timing the 60mm mortars poured their shells into the small crevices in the open
field. Six of the attackers were killed, many wounded, and the remainder fled.
During the mortar barrage, Sergeant Gerald W. Jende, section leader, witnessed
one of the rare occasions of a direct hit on an enemy with a mortar shell. As he
stated later, "He had a head, and then it disintegrated. Really beautiful!"
Company Gunder the command of Captain Arthur W. Dodson had just completed
the organization of Schwerzenbach when the 300 radio crackled forth this message,
"Enemy horse drawn column withdrawing toward you; remain in present location
and be prepared to intercept same." The company was alerted, and Captain Dodson
and Lieutenant Bob V. Smith, the Forward Observer from the 919th Field Artillery,
set up an OP to spot the approaching Germans.
At 1515 the column was sighted approximately 3000 yards due east, too far for
effective infantry action but an artilleryman's dream. Lieutenant Smith made a few
mental calculations as to range, called battalion, and the shells began to land. Only
one adjustment was needed. Then came the fire for effect. Perfect effect. The column
was completely disorganized. Wagons overturned, the men that were not wounded
immediately dashed for cover, horses stampeded. Nothing was left to continue the
retreat.
Without much difficulty the Battalion went on to take Eisen and Achtelsbach
during the afternoon. Attacking had become an endurance march. Troops could
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continue to take towns as long as their feet could carry them.
At 1400 on March 17th the 376th Infantry Regiment with attachments became
Combat Team 376 with the mission of pursuing the retreating foe as rapidly as
possible, using the method of leap-frogging battalions. At 1545, hours before the
Second Battalion had even entered Achtelsbach, the First Battalion was ordered
to pass through the Second in that town. But it was not until 2130 that the leading
elements of the First passed through the Second and went on to take Brucken.
Throughout the night the First Battalion continued to advance, going into Birkenfeld where it contacted the Third Battalion, 302nd Infantry. From there it advanced
on Elchweiler, where a few Volkssturm troops put up a show of resistance by firing
on the column from positions concealed by the darkness of the night. But they were
soon rounded up and the town was taken. ,
The First Battalion then retraced its steps to Birkenfeld where, at 0430 on the
morning of the 18th, it was told to halt and await orders changing the axis of attack.
The pause ,g ave the men a chance to get a hot meal and a few hours rest. During the
morning trucks arrived in the town. At 1130 the battalion took off along the new
route, this time as a motorized attacking force.
On reaching Heimbach the Battalion was held up by tanks of an Armored Division which had run into a hornets nest of fanatical resistance. Enemy anti-aircraft
guns spotted in advantageous positions in the hills east of the town had knocked
out a few tanks and held up the rest. Major Eskel N. Miller offered to flank the
positions, but the commander of the armored unit refused the help. So the First
Battalion remained in the immobile trucks for four hours awaiting developments.
The armor had put in a call for dive bombers, and soon a formation of P-47's
arrived. For two hours they bombed and strafed the enemy positions and self propelled guns. The Germans vainly tried to keep the planes off with 20mm and 88mm
flak, but the bombs found their targets.
Finally the road was cleared, and the First Battalion proceeded into the town.
The armor deciding to by-pass the stretch between Heimbach and Mettweiler,
moved off to the south. It was growing dark, and the Battalion's orders were to
proceed on to Mettweiler.
The rifle companies dismounted and swept the woods along the road into the
town, Company A on the left of the road, Company B on the right, with "C" following
along the highway. Entering Mettweiler, the Battalion rounded up the final remnants
of an old enemy, the 465th Volks Grenadier Division.
The Third Battalion mounted its trucks for the first time in Nonnweiler at 0900
.on the 18th of March. After some delay the heterogeneous column got under way.
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Germans marching westward: Prisoners moving back through the streets
of a German town in the wake of the Regiment's Race to the Rhine River.
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There were scout cars, tanks, tank destroyers, AAA half-tracks, troop-laden 6x6's,
and a motley collection of captured W ehrmacht trucks, pressed into service to
carry supplies. The Third reached Heimbach at 1530, and moved to billets at
Berlangenbach. The Battalion prepared to pass through the First along the Regimental axis. The Second Battalion rode from Achtelsbach to Ellweiler and thence to
Hoppstaedten to spend the night.
It was on March 18th that the drive became almost completely motorized, with
troops detrucking only to rest and to eliminate the infrequent resistance. The
trucks used were QuartermasteT vehicles driven by Negro troops who had
never before been up front with the Infantry. They approached their new job
with anxiety and eagerness. They didn't know just what to expect, but they
wanted very much to do all they could to make the campaign completely successful. Before long they were seasoned combat veterans. Their bubbling wit and
humor was often a welcome lift to their weary passengers.
Came the morning of March 19th and again the motor columns were moving, now
riding fast and hard in an attempt to catch the wildly retreating foe. Capturing
a town consisted of ridi~g through it at top speed, counting the white. flags
and keeping an eye open for snipers. The list of towns and villages taken by the
Regiment that day reads like a time-table for the Palatinate Railroad. In the 16
mile advance the Regiment sped through Thallichtenberg, Korborn, Dennweiler,
Oberalbon, Ulmet, Erdesbach, Patersbach, Bedesbach, Welchweiler, Elzweiler,
Horschbach, Hinzweiler, Aschbach, Wolfstein, and was advancing on Marbach when
it was held up by orders changing the route again. Meanwhile the First Battalion,
now in Regimental reserve, shuttled to Bedesbach. The Second Battalion assembled in Olsbrucken, in readiness to pass through the Third.
The scenery throughout most of the advance was typical of the picturesque rural
areas of southern Germany. The frequent hills were covered with aromatic pine
forests so thick with trees that they were dark and cool despite the brightest sunshine. Clear bubbling streams ran down the hills into wide lovely valleys, all
intensively cultivated. The quaint little towns looked like illustrations from
Grimm's fairy tales.
But the sight-seeing infantrymen were more interested in the spectacle that
actually lined the roads on which they travelled - the handiwork of their flying
brothers-in-arms, the United States Army Air Forces. It was the wreckage of what
had been only a few hours before long columns of German troops, equipment,
and supplies, frantically trying to reach the comparative safety of the east bank
of the Rhine. The weather had been clear. With perfect visibility, the fighter ·
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planes and dive bombers had had a field day, strafing and bombing the closely
packed convoys. Due to the acute shortage of gasoline in Germany, almost all of
the Wehrmacht vehicles had been horse-drawn. Many of the horses had been
killed, and their bloated corpses blocked the road. Many trucks and wagons were
still burning. Others had overturned, spilling their contents along the roadside.
At first horses were the only living remnants of the retreat sighted. Then German soldiers began to appear from the woods. They came first by twos and threes.
Then they began to come in greater numbers until the roads were lined with
shuffling green-clad figures. No guards were assigned. The willing prisoners were
merely ordered to continue marching to the west.
The Wehrmacht sergeant leading one group of motley ex-supermen carried a
large cardboard sign given him by some G.I.'s along the route. He seemed to
consider it some sort of safe-conduct pass, for he flashed it at every American
truck that passed. It read, "I was captured by Ceramic."
So crowded were the roads with advancing columns that the Germans were never
out of sight of some American vehicle. Eventually they were picked up by special
PW teams and herded into already over-crowded enclosures.
The Regiment was now moving so fast that it was frequently out in front of
the armor, and infantry units on both flanks had been completely outdistanced.
The 94th Reconnaissance Troop had to be called upon to screen the now exposed
southern flank of the 376th. The Third Cavalry Group, a highly mobile organization,
which had originally been assigned the mission of protecting the exposed flank, was
40 miles behind the Regiment. Were it not for the many captured German v ahicles
which the Regiment had put into use, the kitchens and company supplies would
never have been able to keep up with the rapidly-advancing troops.
For the 919th Field Artillery Battalion, which was as always faithfully supporting the 376th Infantry, this was a most hectic period. Batteries would move into
a new area, set up their lOS's, and begin the arduous task of digging in. But
invariably, before the positions were completed, the targets would be out of
range and the artillerymen would get their march orders. Without having fired a
round, they would patiently reload all their equipment and move on. In all the
long drive, from the time the 376th hopped off until it prepared to assault the city
of Ludwigshafen, the 919th fired only one mission with an expenditure of
24 rounds. The Regiment's own Cannon Company, which in past operations had
served almost exclusively as an auxiliary artillery battery, was attached to the
leading motorized assault battalion, ready to give close support.
The Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon of Regimental Headquarters Com-
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Germans display the lal.e st thing in flags to 94th Doughs in Oggershelm.

pany often found itself deep in enemy territory while checking the roads in front
of the motor columns. One dark night Private First Class John P. Downey was
stationed at an intersection as a guide for troops headed that way. Sighting two
trucks approaching, · Downey stepped out into the intersection and indicated the
correct road. Not until both had passed him did he realize that the trucks were
German vehicles and that the last one was towing an 88.
The troops spent a cold, uncomfortable night on March 19th, huddled aboard
their halted trucks. Once more the crowded roads had slowed the Regimental
advance and caused a wait for orders to change direction. As dawn broke on
March 20th the sleepy-eyed drivers finally received the order to "Turn 'em over!"
and the Regiment was again on the move, speeding over hills and through villages.
This time the destination was Neukirchen where the Third Battalion detrucked
and awaited further orders.
It was on the road to Neukirchen that the 376th renewed its acquaintanceship
with an old friend, the 12th Armored Division, with which the Regiment had
maneuvered in Tennessee. The 12th had just met the 11th Armored at Merzweiler,
trapping some 4,000 Germans between the two divisions. Now it was attempting
to reach the super-highway that stretched from Kaiserslautern to the Rhine. The
first tanks to approach the Reichsautobahn were knocked out by well-concealed
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German anti-tanks guns. 15 tanks were left abandoned where they had been hit.
The German AT positions were too well hidden and protected to be probed out
by the road-bound armor, so at 1700 on March 20th the Third Battalion took off on
foot to clean up the woods on both sides of the Autobahn and to take the Regimental objective, Carlsberg.
Resistance was encountered 500 yards southeast of Enkenbach. Enemy troops
were dug in through the woods. They had AA guns of various calibres which they
were firing as anti-personnel weapons. In spite of their excellent positions these
Germans had little fight left in them. After a few rounds were fired at them,
they began to surrender en masse. For the rest of the night our troops encountered
only civilians, all of whom were astonished when they discovered a large American column moving silently through the woods. The Germans still call American
soldiers the "Katzen" because of their ability to move noiselessly.
The Third Battalion continued on over the hill south of Enkenbach and came
out onto the Autobahn. Over rolling hills the broad twin ribbons of concrete
gleamed almost endlessly in the moonlight. As the Third Battalion trudged in two
silent columns along either side of the great highway, they were passed by an
inspiring spectacle, tanks and half-tracks of the 12th Armored Division, throttles
wide open, shooting sparks into the night, speeding east along the Autobahn which
Hitler had built for his own tanks. Not long after midnight of the 19th, Second
Battalion cleared Hinzweiler, and continued its motor march by bounds until it
arrived in Neukirchen at 1600. The First Battalion moved by shuttling from
Bedesbach to Ottenberg. The Regimental Command Post moved twice during the
day and set up overnight at Neukirchen.
At dawn on the 21st of March Carlsberg was the deepest penetration of the 376th
into German territory. But it was not to be for long. Waiting only long enough to
get a good breakfast, First Battalion boarded its trucks and moved off to the east
passing through the Third at Carlsberg by 1100.
It was just beyond Carlsberg that the 376th had its first real encounter with
enemy aircraft. As the First Battalion convoy moved through a rather narrow
defile, it was attacked by several of the amazingly fast jet-propelled fighters.
accompanied by two slower twin-engine planes. The faster planes bombed and
strafed almost at will, but Battery D, 465th AAA A W Battalion managed to score
hits on the twin-engine jobs and reported one of them brought down. Although the
bombs failed to hit the convoy, the strafing killed three and wounded eight.
At Studenheim the First Battalion detrucked and continued the advance on foot
to the objective. Once again the Regiment received orders to change its bound-
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aries. So the First was halted until th€ limits of the new zone were determined.
Then it moved south to the new area where it set up a defensive line facing the
great chemical center of Ludwigshafen on the Rhine. The swift pursuit was over for
a while. The Rhine had been re~ched, but the west bank had not been completely
cleared. The German High Command had determined to defend Ludwigshafen as
long as possible. For this purpose the 9th Flak Division, which had formerly provided anti-aircraft protection for the city, was left behind. With it were fanatical
groups of SS men. Pausing only to take breath after its plunge from the Ruwer
to the Rhine, the 376th prepared to breach the city's defenses. The First Battalion sent patrols into the outskirts to probe the emplacements there.
During the day the Second Battalion moved on foot from Neukirchen to Carlsberg, where it ·entrucked and rode on to Oggersheim to prepare for its role in
the attack on i.udwigshafen. The Third Battalion remained in reserve in Carlsberg.
With the Regiment poised ready for the attack on Ludwigshafen, let us look
back over the 376th's operations for the week of March 15th to 22nd and consider
their importance. The Regiment had made a gain of approximately 100 miles, cleared
over 30 towns, and jammed PW enclosures with over 5000 prisoners. Huge stores
of enemy equipment had been captured or destroyed. But the greatest significance
of the 376th's drive was the part it played in the link-up of the Third and Seventh
Armies. By their junction these two powerful American armies completely destroyed the German Seventh Army and bottled up the German First Army. General
Eisenhower's plans had been fulfilled; all German forces west of the Rhine had
been neutralized.
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Ludwigshalen
Throughout World War II the American Press has done a more than adequate
job in reporting battlefront news. But on occasion it has made some flagrant
errors in its combat coverage. These mistakes are usually overlooked by the
average reader, but to the soldiers whom they concern, they provide considerable amusement. Thus the men of the 376th Infantry Regiment laughed ironically
at the newspapers of March 22th which said that the important German industrial
city of Ludwigshafen on the Rhine had been taken by the 12th Armored Division.
True, the 12th Armored had tanks in Ludwigshafen on the 22nd. But they
weren't active tanks engaged in flushing snipers out of a captured city. They
were blackened, driverless hulls, come to grief before the massed 88's of Ludwigshafen's fanatical defenders. The 12th had attempted to sweep onto the broad
Rhine plain and breach the city's defenses by sheer force of the momentum of
the drive from the Moselle. But the German High Command was not willing to
give up this important city as easily as they had abandoned the territory in front
of it. The 9th Flak Division, a veteran outfit which for years had made the skies
over Ludwigshafen and other industrial cities a hell for RAF and USAAF bomber
crews, had been deployed around the city as infantry troops. Their flak guns
were depressed to zero elevation for use against attacking armor and personnel.
As many as fifty were massed in a small area. Boxcars full of 88mm ammuni,
tion were on hand. Visibility from the gun positions was almost perfect. The
attackers could not make a move on the open ground before the city without
being spotted.
Taking over the initiative from the 12th Armored, the 376th Infantry set up
in Oggersheim, a surburb of Ludwigshafen, on March 21st, in preparation for an
attack on the following day. Lieutenant Colonel Raynor E. Anderson, Regimental
Commander, established his Command Post in Oggersheim's largest brewery, a
central location from which to direct the assault. The brewery, still in operation,
provided a constant flow of cool beer for the members of the staff as they
worked over plans.
Oggersheim was the first German- town with a sizable civilian population that
the 376th had occupied for any length of time. So, while the rest of the staff
planned the attack, Major Frank Bayle, S-5, was busy organizing some kind of
military government for the town. In this task, he received welcome and
unexpected assistance from a 21 year old American girl from Brooklyn, Miss
Hilda Theiss, one of the first American citizens to be liberated in Germany. She
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aided Major Bayle considerably in setting up the military government by giving
the names of people who would aid the Americans, translating orders to the
bi.irgermeister, and posting regulations for the civilians.
Soldiers of the First Battalion were the first foot troops to penetrate the Ludwigshafen industrial area. Patrols entered the suburbs of the city late on
March 21st and encountered heavy enemy resistance. The battalion set up in
Oppau and patrolling continued throughout the following day. On the evening of
March 22nd the battalion moved out against Friesenheim, one of the chief suburbs,
With Company A in the lead. As the scouts of the leading Third Platoon rounded
a large lake that fronted the town, an enemy machine gun opened up and was
soon joined by others, maintaining a continuous stream of heavy fire. After reorganizing the battalion withdrew back to Oggersheim, sending small patrols from
Companies A and C on into Friesenheim.
By the time the companies reorganized in Oggersheim and received their orders
it was dawn and time to resume the attack. With only a quick cup of hot coffee
to offset the lack of sleep the men set out once more for Friesenheim. This time
there were two companies abreast, "A" on the left, "C' on the right. They found
that the Germans had returned during the night to the open ground between
Oggersheim and the LD, and were now occupying well dug-in positions. The
defenders were closely supported by 88mm and 20mm anti-aircraft guns.
The only approach to the German positions was across open ground. There
were no covered routes. It was a situa Uon that called for marching fire. The
leading platoons of Companies A and C used this effective technique with great
success. It takes a rare brand of courage to move across an open field, shooting
as you go, knowing all the time that the enemy has protection and you have none.
But it works. As long as the bullets keep whizzing close overhead, Jerry stays
down low in his hole until the G.I. gets close enough to rout him out. Company Cs
Second Platoon under First Lieutenant Raymond L. Graham plus Staff Sergeant
Harold B. Price with one squad from the First Platoon over-ran the German
positions, capturing numerous prisoners and two 88mm guns. Sergeant Domonick R.
Di Stefano and Private John J. Key Jr. were wounded in this action after killing
more than their share of Germans.
Meanwhile, Company B which was in Battalion reserve, sent a combat patrol under
Lieutenant Carl A. Crouse to guard the right flank of the battalion. By skillful
use of the bazooka and called artillery fire, the patrol drew the enemy from their
holes and collected over 20 prisoners.
At 1330 the attack was resumed and was successful in penetrating Friesenheim.
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Here the leading platoon was brought under the direct fire of two 88's and two
20mm AA guns just 200 yards away. Advance was held up until Sergeant Leslie
R. Jewell's machine gun section from Company C's Fourth Platoon was able to
open up on the gun crews and keep them from firing.
Although they arrived in Oggersheim only shortly before midnight of the 21st,
the Second Battalion began its attack at 0130 of the 22nd. Company E and a
heavy machine gun section of Company H led off with the mission of taking
the town of Maudach. Only one enemy outpost woo encountered. At 0430 the
town was taken. Only two prisoners were found when Company F searched
the town.
Company F was then assigned the mission of taking Rheingonbeim and
continuing the attack toward the north and taking Mundenheim. They crossed
the Line of Departure at 1105 on March 22nd. The First Platoon on the east side
of the road was held up by machine gun and rifle fire. The Second Platoon on
the west side of the road used marching fire and the support of the right machine
gun section to secure positions on the southwest edge of the town, and then by
its fire enabled the First Platoon to sideslip resistance and enter the town to
resume the attack. The assault continued with two platoons on the line until
the center of town was reached, where the width of the zone required the support platoon to be committed. The Company continued the attack to the north
edge of the town where heavy artillery, machine gun and sniper fire forced a halt.
Company G crossed the Line of Departure at 1100 and initiated an attack on the
axis of the Hochfeld-Mundenheim Road against enemy known to hold well dug-in
positions running generally north and south through the western outskirts of
Hochfeld. At 1700 Company E moved to Rheingonheim and assisted in clearing the
north side of the town, taking four prisoners. A combat patrol, sent out to destroy an
anti-tank gun, met an enemy patrol, and killed and wounded several of them, taking
four prisoners. Meanwhile the First Battalion was still advancing very slowly
against stubborn opposition.
About noon of March 22nd, Brigadier General Henry Cheadle, Assistant Commanding General of the 94th Division, visited Colonel Anderson at his Command
Post in the Oggersheim brewery to check on the progress of the attack. At this
time Colonel Anderson told the General that it would be impossible to take Ludwigshafen in the required time with only one infantry regiment. Thereupon Task
Forc·e Cheadle was created, with the sole mission of clearing the west bank of the
Rhine at Ludwigshafen. It consisted of Combat Team Anderson, which contained
the Second and Third Battalions, and Combat Team Miner, which contained the
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First Battalion and the First Battalion, 30 1st Infantry. In addition, elements of the
12th Armored Division were atta<;::hed to each Combat Team.
The Third Battalion, still in Regimental Reserve, motored from Carlsberg to
Oggersheim during the morning of the 22nd. Enemy spotters hidden in Oggersheim
directed · artillery fire from Mannheim across the river onto the billets used by the
Battalion, scoring many direct hits and causing several casualties.
0

0

0

He looked just like any other German civilian. so when the old man started talking to them in
hesitant but idiomatic English, the G.I.'s ignored him. They didn't care to fraternize.

But when

he said. "I don't think the U. S. Army has really changed much since I served my hitch.'' That
was too much for the scientific curiosity of Pfc. Truman R. Temple.
"When were you in the American Army?'' he asked.
"Back in '98.' ' was the answer. "I served with Teddy Roosevelt's Rough Riders." This last with
unmistakable pride.
By this time there was a small crowd of Item Company men around. They all wanted to hear
the old fellow's story. What the hell, he might be a Jerry civilian, but he was an ex-G. I. There
couldn't be anything wrong with talking to him. So they asked him more questions, and he told
them how he went to America as a youth, wandered over most of the country for several years,
went to Cuba in the Spanish-American War, then returned to Germany early in the century when
poor health forced him to retire to his parents farm. He asked the boys what states they were
from and told them which -ones he had visited. With Red Clark, who hails from Delphos, Ohio,
he pulled the old gag about "what's high in the middle and round on both ends?"
It was a pleasant interlude for the tired Joes, who were in Oggersheim waiting to join the

assault on Ludwigshafen. They were sorry when the old Rough Rider had to leave. They talked
about him for a while. Then the shells started coming in. Everybody ducked for cellars. The
barrage was plenty accurate. Obviously the Heinies had a spotter with a radio in the town. One
of those innocent-looking civilians. Like the friendly old guy.
0

0

0

In the early hours before dawn on March 23rd the Third Battalion moved
into line on the right of the Second. The two battalions fought abreast clearing
the outposts in Mundenheim from the south. The First continued its attack on Ludwigshafen from the east. The First Battalion, 301st was swung in from the north in
a flanking movement late on the 23rd. From all sides Task Force Cheadle was
closing in on the doomed city. There was no over-all artillery preparation, and the
battalions attacked almost independently in their sectors. It was a typical infantry
job, approaching the city through slime-filled sewers, biting the dirt as the 88's
fell, flushing snipers from the many factories, and fighting street to street in Ludwigshafen itself. By nightfall all foot elements of the Regiment were within the city
proper.
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War ends for Ludwigshafen defenders as they line up for march to POW pen.

For the first time in their combat careers the doughboys of the 376th in Ludwigshaten found themselves performing for an audience. The inquisitive citizens of the
industrial city gathered in doorways and even in the streets to watch the fighting.
Apparently ignorant of the fact that artillery shells don't discriminate between
combatant and spectator, they stood about in idle groups as if they were immune
to all danger. They couldn't realize that the shells coming from the guns in Mannheim were German shells, German shells falling on a German city, killing German
civilians.
Nor were the burghers the only oblivious ones in the battle of Ludwigshafen.
On the second day of fighting, the sniper-hunting G.I.'s were surprised to see a
jeep containing what appeared to be two rear-echelon captains, wearing garrison
caps. But they weren't captains, they were lieutenants, senior grade, in the United
States Navy. They inquired as to the route to the river bank, and were amazed when
told they couldn't go up there.
"But we were informed that this city had been cleared."
"Yes sir, all but some snipers."
"Well, what are those explosions? Are you fellows blowing up mines?"
"Mines hell! That's incoming mail."
"You mean artillery? Migawd, where' s my helmet? Let's get out of here, driver!"
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No matter what part of the city they entered, all the attacking battalions met
the same fanatical resistance. The defenders of Ludwigshafen, realizing that they
had no chance of escaping across the · Rhine, were determined to fight to the
'
death rather than surrender. A group of SS men would barricade themselves in a
strategically-located building and fire at any American who ventured out into the
street. To advance without being observed the men of the 376th had to "mousehole" from one house to the next, blasting holes with TNT or with a bazooka
rocket. The First Battalion had learned this technique well in Tettingen.
With no tanks to blast the snipers out of the buildings, the infantrymen had
to flush them out with rifles, grenades and bazookas. One mortar section used
their new trigger mortar to fire almost flat-- -trajectory into windows. By such
dogged tactics the soldiers of Task Force Cheadle moved from phase line to
phase line through the city to the railroad station where the various routes of
attack co~verged. But even after Ludwigshafen had been declared officially taken,
snipers kept popping up in disconcerting places.
Fanatical SS troups continued to hold out in various buildings during March 24th,
but one by one they were eliminated. Although artillery and sniper fire still came
from Mannheim across the Rhine, Ludwigshafen was taken. Task Force Cheadle
having finished its job, was dissolved. The 376th Regiment was relieved by the
399th Infantry of the 100th Division, which was preparing to cross the Rhine.
Upon being relieved the 376th went back to Heimbach for its first real rest in
two months. For an idea of the heroic task it had performed we quote from the
commendation given the 94th Division by Major General Walton H. Walker, Commander of the XX Corps: " . . . . the 94th Infantry Division determinedly drove
from its bridgehead over the Saar River to the Rhine. As the German forces on
your front began to collapse you launched a pursuit which resulted in the capture
of many towns, many prisoners of war and large amounts of enemy material and
supplies. You and your division played an important part in driving the enemy
from the area west of the Rhine. As a fitting climax the Division, with elements
of the 12th Armored Division, took the important City of Ludwigshafen."
After a short rest, the 376th headed north, ready for a new task.
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New Missions

CHAPTER VIII

est: oil the· Rhine

rn~

fter Ludwigshafen the men of the 376th were all agreed on one
thing: they had been through a tough fight and could all use a good
rest. The battle for this great chemical center was the climax to
0~0
seemingly endless days of combat since the Regiment first saw action
in September on the Brittany Peninsula. These days of contact with the enemy,
continuous except for the short time spent traveling from the besieged Atlantic ports
to the Western Front, warranted a respite. The doughboys who had been through it
all certainly thought so, and higher headquarters evidently concurred with the man in
the forward foxhole. The 376th therefore went rearward into Third Army reserve.
It was the first rest given the entire 94th Division in its long career of uninterrupted
combat.
It was while the 376th was in this reserve that Twelfth Army Group decided
to leaven the salt-water fresh Fifteenth Army with a veteran unit. General Omar
Bradley called upon the 94th; and the 376th, along with the 301st, 302nd and supporting and attached units, found itself headed north for the Fifteenth Army.
When the actual order to move finally filtered down to the 376th Command Post
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in Heimbach, Germany on March 29th, it seemed to many that each of the higher
echelons through which the message was transmitted had drained off a portion
of the information. For the order merely said to proceed to Willich, Germany.
There was not even enough meat in that to start a good rumor. But the rumor
merchants tried their best anyway.
Once more the foot soldiers of the Regiment rode the 40 and 8's, and along a
parallel route the motor convoy headed for Willich. The first vehicle of the
motorized column crossed the Initial Point at 0730 on April 1st, Easter Sunday, and
the organic transportation was well on its way by that afternoon when the two
trains spotted for the Regiment at last puffed, chugged and jolted to a start. The
route to Willich went through the countryside that von Rundstedt had overrun in
December. The scenery here consisted of great tracts of desolate land that once
were productive. As much of the Ardennes that the men could see from the trains
and trucks was as ravaged as the country around Nennig. After three days of
bumps and shakes; eating "K" rations; drinking hot coffee; watching the French,
Luxembourgian, Belgian, Dutch and German scenery pass in review, the "horsePullmans" squeaked to a stop and the journey ended.
After detraining at Willich on April 3rd, the foot troops motored to Anrath,
where billets had been provided for the night. The next day the battalions shuttled
to their respective tactical reserve positions, the First Battalion in Depeskreuz, the
Second in Willich, and the Third in Osterath. Shortly thereafter the Regimental
Command Post also moved to Willich.
It was in these towns on the night of April 4th that the soldiers of the 376th
Infantry Regiment were oriented on their new assignment. The great Ruhr industrial
area had just been pocketed by the double enveloping movement of the First and
Ninth Armies. The western limit of this pocket was the Rhine River. The 94th
Division was to go into position along the west bank of the Rhine to prevent any
part of the huge enemy force within thepocket from escaping across the river.
Also the Division would be prepared to suppress rear area disorders and to enforce
Military Government in its zone. Being in Divisional reserve, the 376th would be
engaged chiefly in this latter portion of the mission. Further, the Division would be
prepared to establish Military Government within the Ruhr behind the advancing
armies. That phrase "behind the advancing armies" was a significant one. The 376th
had been in the front lines for a long time; now it was to get an opportunity to do
something different. There were few riflemen in the Regiment who did not breathe
a sigh of relief. The foot soldier is proud of his primary mission, but he is never
happy about it. No one who has been in combat wants to return to it. The men of
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Remains of destroyed bridge over the Rhine River near Dusseldorf, Germany.
Jeep is crossing on pontoon bridge built by the U. S. Army Engineers.

the 376th had proved their ability on the battlefield. Now they were not ashamed to
accept a less glorious task.
But no one was foolish enough to believe that the new job would be easy.
Within the Regiment's zone there were many uncaptured German soldiers, both in
and out of uniform. There were Nazi civilians, ready every minute to sabotage the
Allied drive. And there were thousands of "Displaced Persons," former slaves of
the Germans, roaming the countryside, happy but confused by their newly-acquired
freedom. They had to be collected in camps, fed, deloused and made ready for
repatriation.
To enforce security the Regiment set up 30 stationary guard posts and operated
frequent motorized patrols throughout the countryside. One rifle company reinforced was motorized and remained on continuous alert in case of riots or other
disorders. Camps were set up for the DP's. Those soldiers who were not fully
engaged in these activities participated in a regular drill schedule. After so many
months in combat it was difficult to return to close-order drill, but soon the men
were marching like garrison troops. On April 7th the First Battalion held the first
parade by American troops in Germany since the end of the occupation after
World War I. An enlarged Division band played the Division song and the Stars
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and Stripes waved overhead as the Battalion passed in review for General Malony.
The curious German civilians grouped around the parade ground could not help
but be impressed. They had thought the Americans too undisciplined to march
properly. Now they saw that American soldiers could parade inspiringly, not like
automatons, but as free men banded together for a single purpose.
On April 12th the Regimenfs zone was changed slightly, and the First Battalion
moved by foot and motor to Anrath to occupy new areas and conduct motorized
patrols in Anrath, Vennheidt, Neersen, Viersen and surrounding territories.
Most of the companies discontinued drill schedule at this time so that all
available men could participate in the searching of German houses. The object was
to find hidden stores of ammunition, rifles, pistols, cameras or any Wehrmacht
equipment that the so innocent-looking civilians might be saving for future Werewolf activity. A check was also made of food supplies to. aid the Military Government detachment in distribution, The search had many interesting sidelights. One
old farmer nervously told the searching party that he had a "gun" in his garden.
He took great pains to explain that the weapon was not his, the German Army had
left it behind. Upon investigation, the "gun" turned out to be an 88mm anti-tank
gun, with carriage and ammunition.
The Regimental Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Raynor E. Anderson, upon receipt
of orders, reported for duty with XXII Corps Headquarters on the 13th. Lieutenant
Colonel John W. Gaddis, former Executive Officer of the 302nd Infantry, assumed
command of the Regiment on the 14th. On the 15th the entire Regiment moved to
the enlarged area. The Regimental Command Post was set up in Kempen. The
Second and Third Battalions were in Grefrath and Nieukerk, respectively. Here the
mission remained unchanged.
But on April 17th the Battle of the Ruhr pocket was so near its final phases that
the chances of the enemy attempting a crossing of the Rhine was quite good.
Therefore the Third Battalion was relieved of responsibility of its area and was
reassembled in Nieukerk and motorized with 24 trucks, prepared to repel any
penetrations. A "dry run" alert during the hours of darkness assured the Regimental
Commander that the Third Battalion was prepared to cope with any appropriate
mission they might receive.
Soon the Ruhr pocket was completely eliminated, and on April 23rd reconnaissance elements of the Regiment went to the new area east of the Rhine.
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Wuppertal
The story of the 376th Infantry Regiment in the last few weeks before V-E Day
is inextricably bound up with the tale of a city, Wuppertal. In its short history as
a city-it was incorporated in 1929-Wuppertal has been many things to many
people. The ambitious businessmen of the Handelskammer (Chamber of Commerce)
considered it one of the chief centers of the German textile industry. The cultural
elements of the population liked to think of their city as the Athens of the Bergischland, the musical center of the "singing, resounding hills." In the chaotic last days of
the Weimar Republic, Wuppertal had been the scene of much Communistic activity.
But after the succession of the Nazis to power, the city slipped readily into the
pattern of all German cities of that time, the meek kowtowing to the arrogant party
leaders, the suppression of all that was liberal. To the bomber crews of the Allied
air forces the city was only one of a long list of secondary targets. To the soldiers
of the 8th Infantry Division, the first American soldiers to enter Wuppertal, it was
just another German city, like all the others sullen and dazed by its sudden capture.
But when the 376th arrived on the scene few days later, Wuppertal was prepared
to present yet another face. Resigned to the fact of defeat, the citizens, like true
German opportunists, tried to show the American soldiers that they welcomed them
as liberators from the vile Nazis. Although the G.I.'s could not help being pleased at
the warm welcome, they were not taken in by the Germans' quick-about-face.
Geographically Wuppertal is somewhat of a freak. To fit into its narrow valley
the city had stretched itself into snake-like proportions. From the tip of Oberbarmen
to the western end of Vohwinkel it is over 15 kilometers long, but nowhere is it very
wide. Connecting the extremities of the city is the Schwebebahn, a unique elevated
railway. Instead of riding on rails, the cars of this upside-down "El" are suspended
from a trolley, with nothing below them but the dirty waters of the Wupper River.
The graceful curves of the Schwebebahn as it follows the twists of the river have
been the subject of thousands of pictures.
Not all of the 376th was located in Wuppertal. The Third Battalion's area
included the neighboring cities of Remscheid, Lennep and Luttringhausen. Remscheid's chief claim to fame is its many small machine shops which have
turned out most of Germany's finest precision tools. Both Remscheid and Wuppertal
are in a broad economic sense a part of the Ruhr industrial area. But the inhabitants
of both cities prefer to think of themselves as Rhinelanders.
This then was the area which the 376th Infantry Regiment entered on April 25th.
The days that followed were comparatively pleasant as days go in the Infantry,
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Cars running under the track characterize the Schwebebahn, Wuppertal's
unique railway which sretches ten miles connecting both ends of the city.

but they were not easy. The work was similar to what the Regiment had been
doing on the other side of the Rhine but on a far greater scale. The problem of the
Displaced Persons was a staggering one. A hasty reconnaissance of the zone revealed 198 camps or single barracks for foreign workers, in which were housed
some 30,000 Russians, Poles, Italians, Yugoslavians, French, Czechs, Belgians and
Dutch. The living conditions in these camps were unbelievably bad. Families were
crowded together with dozens of single individuals in small, filthy, unventilated,
unlighted rooms, creeping with lice. It was the job of the Regiment not only to
feed and cloth~ these people and improve their quarters, but also to organize them
for eventual repatriation. Considering the fact that infantrymen are not trained in
the techniques of relief work, the dispatch with which the task was accomplished
is a credit to the energy and cheerful helpfulness of every man in the Regiment.
The many small groups of Displaced Persons were consolidated into larger camps,
with a single language group in each camp. This greatly facilitated administration.
Freed from their long hours of drudgery in the German factories , the foreign workers
had time to clean their own quarters. The Regiment provided soap and whatever
other cleansing materials were available. The medics kept a close check on sanitation
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and health. The sick were sent to Army hospitals or to supervised German hospitals.
Since the Regiment had no rations for these people, the city was required to
provide their food.
In each camp two or three soldiers were stationed permanently to assist in any
troubles that the Displaced Persons might have. These troubles proved to be frequent
and varied. The G.I. camp directors had to become proficient in everything from
equitable food distribution to delivering babies. But, despite all these difficulties plus
the language barrier, the soldiers and their charges soon became close friends.
Nor was the "boy meets girl" angle overlooked in the relationships between the
men of the 376th and the DP's. Since the pretty and promiscuous German frauleins
were strictly "off limits," the G.l.'s confined their public attentions to the DP girls,
who, despite a long absence from beauty parlors, were often quite attractive.
Dances were held at the various camps with music provided either by the DP's own
orchestras or by units of the 94th Division Band. The Americans soon learned to
dance in the European manner, and a few of the girls became fairly adept at jitterbugging. When it came time for some of the DP's to be repatriated, there were
many reluctant farewells.
However, dealings with the DP's were not always so amicable. The Russians and
French and all the other former prisoners of the Germans were bitter about their
years of slavery. They felt that they deserved not only liberation but also revenge.
So, taking law into their own hands, they proceeded to terrorize the German
civilians, looting and murdering as they pleased. Although the American soldiers
sympathized with their oppressed allies, they could not condone such conduct. So it
was often necessary to arrest some of the more violent DP's.
A number of Germans had to be arrested also, but usually for such minor infractions
as curfew violation or failure to carry an identity card. There was little of the
"Werewolf" sabotage which Hitler claimed would be carried out by his fanatical
followers unto death. The chief illegal activity was the Black Market, which was
almost impossible to control despite frequent arrests. In collaboration with the
Counter-Intelligence Corps the Regiment participated in several raids on suspicious
houses and uncovered many Party leaders and other persons subject to automatic
arrest.
Another big job was the checking of all factories for stores on hand and potential
capabilities. Most of these plants .were not operating, but one small machine shop
in the Remscheid area was found still blithely turing out parts for German 88mm
shells. No one had told them to stop work.
Despite all that had to be done, there was time for recreation. In the sports line
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Regiment was able to do much that it had not done since leaving Camp McCain.
Softball, swimming and track teams were organized, with regular competition
between companies and platoons. The Regiment also joined in the Division track
and turf meets held at Truman Park in Dusseldorf. For those who preferred more
sedentary diversion there were frequent movies and an occasional USO show.
Clubs for officers, non-commissioned officers and privates were set up in most
battalion areas. The beer in these places was always adequate in quantity if not in
quality.
Under the direction of Special Services Officer, First Lieutenant George Buck
and Private First Class George A. 0. Hagerty, the troupe of the local Stadthalle
presented a variety show, "Wuppertal Follies," which was received enthusiastically by audiences from the Regiment.
Although V-E Day came to the 376th as somewhat of an anti-climax, the men of
the Regiment took time to celebrate the news that meant that no more of their
comrades would die on European battlefields. There were no wild outbreaks such
as were seen in the larger cities of the United States. The soldiers celebrated
quietly, knowing that only part of the job was completed. Further cause for cheer
came on May 16th when Colonel Harold H. McClune resumed his duties as Regimental Commander. The entire Regiment had sorely missed the inspiring personality of their leader since the day he had been severely wounded during the
crossing of the Saar River.
Amidst the joy of war's end the men of the Regiment paused on Memorial Day
to remember with prayer their unfortunate fellows who had fallen on the battlefields. Special ceremonies were attended by each company.
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Czechoslovakia
With June came the news that the Regiment was leaving Wuppertal. Everyone
had expected this; the area was part of the British zone of occupation. The big
question was, "Where to, now?" Some rumors said Southern Germany. Most people
thought the Division was headed for the Pacific. The hopefuls claimed that it would
be by way of the States; the pessimists held out for the direct route. All were surprised to learn that next stop for the 376th would be Czechoslovakia.
Advance detachments from the British 53rd Royal Welsh Fusiliers Division and
the 71st Highland Light Infantry Brigade arrived in Wuppertal on June 8th to prepare
for the arrival of the remainder of their troops. Meanwhile the 376th continued to
maintain its security guards and went on with the important work of repatriating
the Displaced Persons. Over 3400 Russians and Czechs were started on the journey
home between the 1st and 12th of June. At noon on June 12th the Regiment was
officially relieved by the Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
Although the British had already assumed responsibility for the area, First
Lieutenant John F. Narewski took it upon himself early on the morning of the 13th
to investigate a disturbance . in a nearby DP camp. He was shot and killed by an
unidentified displaced person. He will be long remembered for his outstanding
accomplishments while a member of the Regiment.
Movement began at 0655 on June 13th as the motor elements began to cross the
selected starting points. The trip was to be accomplished in three days. An advance
billeting party had preceded the main motor column by fOl.tr hours to locate and
establish overnight bivouac areas in the vicinity of Guisen, Germany the first night,
and Jena, Germany the second night. During the afternoon of the 14th the foot
troops arrived at the Wuppertal-Unterbarmen railroad station by streetcar, bus and
every other possible substitute for the missing Quartermaster trucks. Here the men
boarded the 40 and 8's for their third long trip across Europe.
The Regimental Command Post opened in Strakonice, Czechoslovakia at 1300 on
the 14th. All commanders were prepared to receive the motor elements as they arrived at 1830 on the 16th, and the foot troops when they detrained at Passau, Austria
on the 18th and 19th. All available Division transportation was pooled to transport
troops from the detraining point to the vicinity of Strakonice. By 1200 on the 19th
the Regiment had completed relieving all road blocks, guard posts and patrols
formerly operated by the 187 Field Artillery Group.
Most of these guard posts were along the border that separated the American
from the Russian zone in Czechoslovakia. The chief purpose of these road blocks
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was to prevent anyone but Czech citizens from crossing the border. Being soldiers
rather than politicians, the men of the 376th didn't pretend to understand the
reasons for the restraint of intercourse with their Russian allies, but carried out
their mission effectively as always. No American or Russian soldier could cross the
line without special permission. Despite this hindrance there was a good bit of
social and commercial intercourse between the neighboring armies.
Wearied by the sight of war-torn cities, the men of the 376th found the beautiful,
undisturbed landscapes of Czechoslovakia a pleasant change. The companies were
billeted in quaint little villages of clean, thick-walled white houses and cobble-stone
streets. The Americans found the Czech people quiet, and industrious. Life was
peaceful and monotonous.
The operational requirements of the Regiment in the new area were limited, so
a schedule was instituted which consisted of military training, education and
organized recreation.
In accordance with the greatly expanded Information and Education program,
battalion schools were set up in which men could study anything from elementary
arithmetic to college subjects.
Unlike the end of the European war, V-J Day came with overwhelming suddenness. The men of the 376th could scarcely believe the good news. Already resigned
to the inevitability of their participation in the Pacific war, the men were stunned
to realize that they could now think about going home permanently.
There was nothing for the Regiment to do now but "sweat out" the trip back to
the United States. Meanwhile training was curtailed, and the schedule emphasized
sports and education. The Regiment made a good showing in all the division
leagues, from volleyball to baseball.
The same men who had won track honors at the Division Track Meet in Dusseldorf competed against the stars of the 101st Airborne Division in the stadium
at Berchtesgaden. Private First Class Howard W. Ladwig of Company D was the
star of the meet, winning three events. Ladwig went on to win the Third Army
400 meter champidnship. In the Regimental softball league, Company C came out
on top.
The 376th Infantry Regiment had finished its task. Soon it will probably return
to reserve status. No one who has been with the 376th throughout its history will
be likely to be disappointed about this. The Regiment has seen its share of combat.
It has no need to seek further laurels. Although it came into World War II without
any previous battle honors, it has, during its one year in Europe, proved itself
worthy to stand beside the greatest of American Infantry regiments.
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During its over six months of almost uninterrupted combat, the 376th has successfully engaged in every major type of Infantry operation except a beach-head
landing. At St. Nazaire it laid siege to numerically superior forces. Along the
Siegfried Switch Line it attacked and reduced strongly fortified positions, both
with and without the aid of armor. During January and February of 1945 the
Regiment withstood the worst that war has to offer in the way of fierce counterattacks and miserable weather. Joining the the lOth Armored Division, the 376th
forced a break in the Switch Line for the tanks to slip through, then followed
the armor, mopping up in the Saar-Moselle Triangle. Coming to the fore again,
the Regiment seized a bridgehead across the Saar River. From the Saar to the
Rhine the 376th showed the Germans what a real blitzkrieg is. Combat ended
with the fierce street fighting in Ludwigshafen. Then the Regiment topped off its
versatile performance with a period of Military Government. No matter what the
mission, it was done well. Every man who has served with this noble organization can be proud to have been a member of the 376th Infantry Regiment.
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Major General Harry J. Malony, Commanding General, 94th Infantry Division, presents the Bronze Star Medal to a soldier of the 376th Infantry
Regiment at Willich, Germany, where he reviewed units of the Division.
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Silve.- Stw· Medal
This me-dal su pcrsedes the miniature silver star formerly worn
on the service ribbon of a ntedal.
and is given to aJI services for
gallantry iu action. Established
in 1935.

Distinguished Service C1·oss
.Army award for extraordinary
heroism in military operations
against an armed enemy. It is
second only to the Medal of
Honor, and was created in 1918.

Soldier's 111edal
A warded to Army personnel and
to members of the Navy,Marine
Corps and foreign military personnel serving with the Army
who have distinguished themselves by heroism not involving
actual conflict. Instituted in 1926.

Hmnze Star Atedal
Awarded to all U. S. services for
heroic or nteritorious achievelnent or service in nlilitary or
naval operations not involving
aeria] flight, but against the
enemy. Established in 1944.

Pu1'Ple Heart
Established by Washington in
1782, this award lapsed until its
revival in 1932. Originally given
for ""military merit," it is now
given only to those who have
been killed or wounded iu action
against the enemy.

Distinguished Service Cross
CAPTAIN

SECOND LIEUTENANT

SERGEANT

RALPH T. BROWN

DALE E. BOWYER

PAUL E. RAMSEY

Silver Star Medal
COLONEL
HAROLD H. McCLUNE
LIUETENANT COLONELS
RUSSELL M. MINER
BENJAMIN E. THURSTON
CAPTAINS
CARL J. SHETLER
FREDRICK D. STANDISH II
WILLIAM R. STEINMEIER
JULIAN M. WAY
FIRST LIEUTENANTS
THOMAS A. DALY
PERRY HEIDELBERGER JR.
BERNARD F. SIMURO
SECOND UEUTENANT
STANLEY C. MASON
TECHNICAL SERGEANTS
LEON D. CRUTCHFIELD
HERBERT E. FOGLEMAN
NATHANIEL ISAACMAN
ROBERT H. JOHNSON
VINCENT J . MAISTO
JOHN L. MciNTYRE
MARION SCOPOLI
STAFF SERGEANTS
JOSEPH L. BUGLER
CHARLES V. DEEMS
FRED GROSSI
WILLMER HALCOMB
FRED HARDING

RAY KETNER
EDWARD J. MACEJAK
LEROY McPHERSON
ADRIAN A. SIMPKINS
JAMES L. SPARLING
ESTLE E. TEMPLETON
EARL H. TRIPLETT
THOMAS C. WILSON
SERGEANTS
MICHEAL P. BAJZIK
DEWEY F. MICK
JOHN C. MITCHELL
ANTHONY S. ROA
WALTER L. SEIGENTHALER
TECHNICIANS 4TH GRADE
ERNEST J. HILL
HAROLD H. TANNER
CORPORAL
BERNIE H. HECK
TECHNICIANS 5TH GRADE
WILLIAM L. CLEARY
WILLIAM R. ITTNER
FURMAN B. McCOY
ROBERT A . MONROE
LEE J. SANBORN
EARL N. VULGAMORE
PRIVATES FIRST CLASS
JOHN B. ALBERTSON
BURNETT BENNETT

HAROLD K. BYRNE
JAMES I. BELLISTON JR.
THEO A . ELBERT
JOHN L. EISENMANN
CHARLES N. FRANKLIN
GEORGE R. GIBSON
WILLIAM L. GILFILLAN
VIRGIL E. HAMIL TON
CLAIR HUNEYCUTT
RICHARD J. KAMINS
.WERNER G. KRONCKE
EDSON A. LAKIN
WALTER P. MARKUS
EARLE T. MOUSAW
LEONARD L. NEFF
JOSEPH M. NICHOLAS
JOHN F. PIETRZAK
RALPH W. PORCHE
RUSSELL C. SANODEN
PAUL G . SCARBOUGH
JACK B. WEAKLEY
PRIVATES
ANTHONY J. KAPELLA
GERARD J. MALSTEDT
JAMES T. MANOS
DONN R. MAUCK
HAROLD E. McDANIEL
STANTON H. NULL
RICHARD G. TRUMBLA Y
JACK ZEBIN

Soldiers Medal
STAFF SERGEANT

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

JOSEPH R. MENDRICK

CHARLES P. SEAMAN

LIST OF AWARDS COMPLETE AS OF JUNE 1945

Bronze Star Medal
COLONEL
HAROLD H. McCLUNE
LIEUTENANT COLONELS
RAYNOR E. ANDERSON
JOHN R. DOSSENBACH
JOHN W. GADDIS
OLIVIUS C. MARTIN JR.
RUSSELL N. MINER
BENJAMIN E. THURSTON
MAJORS
SAMUEL W. CALDWELL
ALKIE C. KAUFMAN
FRANK MALINSKY JR.
ESKEL N. MILLER JR.
IRA C. REDFERN
LAWRENCE B. SANDOZ
LAWRENCE S. SIMCOX
ROBERT K. ZIMMERMAN
CAPTAINS
CLAUDE W. BAKER
WILLIAM H. BEHRENS JR.
HENRY C. BOWDEN
EDWIN W. BREHIO
WILLIAM A. BRIGHTMAN
JOSEPH W. BROWN
RALPH T. BROWN
ALBERT B. BUCHANAN
WILLIAM H. BUEHRLE
FREDERICK W. BUCKY JR.
CHESTER E. DADISMAN
ARTHUR J. DeLOACH JR.
ANTHONY J. DiLORENZO
ARTHUR W. DODSON
EDWIN E. DUCKWORTH
RICHARD E. EMEIS
WILLARD H. FISHER
WILLIAM R. JACQUES
CECIL J. KING
ROBERT W. KING
JOSEPH T. KOSHOFFER
HAROLD M. MANESS
THOMAS J. MciNTYRE
FRANK L. MITTLE
ROBERT T . PARSONS
GEORGE S. REA
JOHN J. RYAN
PAUL E. SAYWELL
ROBERT Q . SMITH JR.
WILLIAM P. SPRINGER
ROBERT C. STANLEY
WILLIAM R. STEINMEIER
WARD F . TIBBITTS
HARRY G. WALLING
RALPH E. WATKINS JR.
GEORGE P. WHITMAN
FIRST LIEUTENANTS
THOMAS F. BATELL
HARRY C. BLACKBURN
HARRYM.BRUBAKER
WALDO C. BURNS
ANTHONY J. CATALLO
ARTHUR P . CEBULL
BEN R. CHALKLEY
JAMES W. CORNELIUS
THOMAS A. DALY
CECIL G. DANSBY
ELMER E. DECKER
RALPH P. EITNER
ROY C. ERWIN
CARL D. FORD
ROBERT E. FOSTER

RAMON G. FOX
WILLIAM M. GOLDENZWEIG
HAROLD W. GRIFFIN
PERRY M. HEIDELBERGER .JR.
JESSE W. HODGES
TOM HODGES
JOSEPH L. JESMER
ELMER A. KAUFMAN
JAMES F. KELLY
SAMUEL R. KESSELMAN
RAYMOND J. KING
JOSEPH L. KNOUS
WILLIAM G. LAND
JESS L. LONG
CHARLES P. MACKE
EUGENE MacMANUS
INMAN E. MALLARD
WILLIAM B. MALLOY
JAMES C. McCULLOUGH JR.
ROBERT D. McFARLAND
DWIGHT M. MORSE
JOHN F. MURPHY
JOHN F. NAREWSKI
H.JALMER W. NEILSEN
THOMAS J. ROSS
THOMAS L. SCHMIDT
DAVID F. STAFFORD
WILLIAM F. STEMBEL
NILS F. UGLAND
JOSEPH K. WILLIAMS JR.
SECOND LIEUTENANTS
PHILIP A. ALLA
DALE E. BOWYER
BERNARD B. COHEN
DAVID J. GILLESPIE
DANIEL C. HERBINE
MARVIN J. HERTWECK
JAMES B. HOWARD
CHARLES E. HEUBERT
WARREN L. HUNLEY
TOM D. HUTHNANCE
FRANK F. KRAHL JR.
STANLEY C. MASON
JOSEPH R. MENDRICK
JACK A. MISSILDINE
STEPHEN A. o·coNNOR
CARL J. RICH
CHARLES E. TOWLE
EARLS. TUCK
AMBROSE H. VANDENBERG
ROLAND H. VOGT
GORDON J. WESTON
CAMPBELL WILLINGHAM
WILFORD P. WILSON JR.
W 0 J G
FRANCIS C. BATES
MORRIS SEDLETZKY
RAYMOND H. SHACKELFORD
MASTER SERGEANTS
HECTOR E. BARRIERE
ANDREW E. BRUSGARD
ROBERT C. CURRY
CLAUDE H. DAIL
FIRST SERGEANTS
WILLIAM M. ANDERSON
JACK P. BLACK
RICHARD E. BORCHERS
FRITZ H. GIBSON
WILLIAM S. HAGUE
HORACE R. HAMBY
LOUIS F. MORSE

PATRICK NAPLES
.JOHN J. PELLE
MEL YIN A. SILBER
JOSEPH C. ZIEGLER
TECHNICAL SERGEANTS
PAUL W. ADAMS
ANDREW ROTHENBACH
JOHN A. BACCELLO
.JAMES A. BEATTIE
ARNOLD B. CONWAY
CHARLES H. COWAN JR.
SCIPIONE L. D.ELIA
JOSEPH C. DIETLMEIER
MALCOM L. DUNN
PERCY A. DUNN
FRANCIS M. FIELDS JR .
HOWARD M. HENDERSON
MARVIN J. HERTWECK
GERALD W . JENDE
FORREST M. KEE
ROBERT J. KINCAID
HERMAN F . KLEMZ
FREDERICK C. KLINE
CHARLES W. KRATOCHVIL
PAUL F. KREITZBERG
GARNET R. LEE
CHARLES W. MADDOCK JR.
BUN E. McKEE
WALTER F. MIKOLIN
STANLEY S . MONTOWSKI
CHARLES F. MYERS
JOHN F. NAGY
LOUIS S. NEMETH
FRANKLIN H. NEUMANN
FRANK W. NOLL JR.
ARTHUR E. OLSON
HAROLD B. PRICE
ANTHONY S. RAO
ANDREW ROTHENBACH
WENDALIN F. SCHOMMER
MARIANO SCOPOLI
WALTER F. SKOWRONSKI
ANDREW F. VOJTECKY
JACK C. WALLACE
CHARLES E. WINTER JR .
STAFF SERGEANTS
ROBERT K. ADAIR
MERRILL J. ADERMAN
JOHN T. ANDERSON
WILLIAM H. ANDERSON
ALTON E. ANTHONY
WILEY G. BANKS
JOSEPH S . BARBUS
HAROLD A. BAUERS
GEORGE C. BAXTER
DOUGLAS E. BISHOP
BERT W. BLAIR
JACK L. BOWLER
MICHAEL S. BRODI
ARCHIE CERNAGNAN
JAMES H . CLARK
THOMAS M. CLAUS!
HARRY F. DEEGAN
RUSSE LL F. DOLL JR .
FRANK M. DOUGAN
MICHAEL DRIPCHAK
BIAGIO R. ESPOSITO
MARTIN W. EVANS
WALDO FERRARONE
HERMAN H. FINKE
G LADWIN J . FLORY

CHARLES FOXGROVER JR.
JASPER FUSON
EDWARD C. GALLAGHER
AUGUSTUS W. GRAHAM Jil
CHARLES R. GROVES
JOSEPH W. GUDECZAUSKAS
HENRY C. HALL
DONALD V. HANSON
ELMER H. HAUGEN
ALLEN HAYS JR.
ALBERT F. HEATH
WALTER F. HOHMANN
VERN G. HULL
MICHAEL JACOBS
JAMES P. JENNINGS
KARL H. KING
GEORGE L. KIRSCH
RUSSELL R. KNIGHT
HERMAN A. LaCHAPELLE
XENOPHON P. LASKARIS
WARREN B. LISTER
JAMES LUCAS
WESLEY C. LUEBKE
RICHARD R. MAGNAN
COY E. MALLONEE
ALVIN H. MARTEN
MAX E. McCONNEL
JAMES D. McLEES
HOWARD T. McWILLIAMS
.JOSEPH MERRITT
JOHN R. MILROY
LEO E. MILOSZEWSKI
ALBERT MORALDI
ROBERT J. MORRISON
ROY W. MURPHY
JOE N. NESBITT
CHARLES H. NICHOLS
ROBERT J. PAILLTOTET
JUNIOR T. PAYNE
SAMUEL REITER
ALBERT T. REYNOLDS JR.
WILLIAM E. RING
JOHN A. ROGERS
CHESTER W. RONDAEU
ROBERT L. ROSENBERG
DOMENIC P. RUGGIERI
S1EPHEN J. RYCHALSKY
LAWRENCE W. SCEALF
MARLIN P. SCHIMELPFENIG
WILLIAM C. SEIDEL
RAYMOND SETTINERI
HAROLD M. SHAFTO
SAMUEL M. SILVER
RAYMOND P. SINGER
JAMES A. SMALLEY
ELMER 0. SMITH
' HAROLD SMITH
J.D. SOCKEY
NORMAN A. SOKA
KENNETH STAAB
EVERRET B. STAUFFER
BERTRAM STERN
JAMES I. STEVENS
MICHAEL A. SZALAJ
EDWARD F. SZPRECH
CLARENCE W. TALLEY
LEONEL J. THEBERGE
GEORGE TOMASZEWSKI
SYLVESTER S. TRAWINSKI
ROBERT B. TREFZGER
PASQUALE URSITTI JR.
WILLIAM D. VANDUSEN
HENRY WILLIAMS
TECHNICIANS 3RD GRADE
SYLVESTER P. FINNERTY
WALTER G. GERHARD

GEORGE C. JONES
NATHAN B. LONG
FRANK C. MAHAR
CLAIR V. SLAGG
WILLIAM J. ZACK
SERGEANTS
ALEXANDER L. ALTIER
JAMES L. ATZ
JOHN A. BACELLO
JOHN N. BACHMAN
GEORGE P. BOHACH
WALLACE A. BOUDREAUX
ROBERT M. BOYD
GERALD A. BRAUN
LEO F . CARIGNAN
LAURENCE A. COHEN
TOM CONKEN
CHARLES H. COW AN JR.
HAROLD L. CROSSLEY
HENRY CUKJATI
HOWARD J. CURLER
RALPH H. DAGUE
KENNETH J. DEITCHLEY
MANUEL M. DELGADO
ANGELO L. DIMATTIA
FRANCIS P. DOWNING
WILLIAM A. EBERLINE
ROBERT G. FELDER
ROY C. GALLAGHER
RICHARD R. GILBERT
PAUL J. GOLDEN
,RAYMOND W. HALEY
ROY E. HARP
HENRY H. HERSCH JR.
ROBERT J. HIGGINS
GEORGE HOCCHEIM
JOSEPH S. HODGE
MALVIN L. ISHMAN
JOSEPH E. JURGENS
KENNETH O.KETTLER
LAWRENCE E. LEIGEY
FREDERICK L. LINEHAM
LLOYD 0. MEGENITY
B£RNARD F. MOAN
DONALD L. MOMBLOW
MILLARD C. MOTES
SIDNEY.L. MURPHY
fMIL F. ,NIGL
WILLIAM F. OGIEGO
CLYDE A. PATTERSON
JOHN PELTZ
KENNETH F. PERIGO
CLEVELAND C. PETERSON
ADOLPH PFEIFFER
JAMES W. PIERCE
CONLY H. PLASTER
MATTHEW J. RANCILIO
WILLIAM D. REDMON
CLARENCE A. REIMERS
WILLARD E. RHODES
!~OBERT ROLLER JR.
WAYNE L. ROSS
STEFEN E. SADOWSKI
MILBURN W. SEAL
MARTIN J. SHEEHY
JOHN SODA
RAYMOND S. TULL JR.
CHARLES H. TURNER
CHARLES L. TURNER
CHARLES WEINER
WILLIAM J. WIBBENMEYER
WALLACE W . WILCZYNSKI
ARTHUR R. WILSON
HO~ER D. WILT
THEODORE A. WYLLIE

TECHNICIANS 4TH GRADE
EDWARD C. BERG
EMIL BORSCH
ARCHIE L. CHAMBERLAIN
MICHAEL FISHER
ROBERT P. FORNSHELL
DENVER HAHN
PHILIP HANDLER
WARREN G. HAWKINS
ERNEST J. HILL
HAROLD D. HODGE
HERBERT JAFFE
A JIITHONY J. KAPALA
WILLIAM F. KNETTLE
HARRY MARKENSON
GEORGE L. MARSHALL
KENNETH J. MARTIN
MERVIN L. MOORE
COURTLAND PALMER
ALIEN J. PECAR
CLARENCE C. PERDUE
GEORGE A. ROBERTSON JR.
HARRY E. ROGERS JR.
RICHARD J. SCHEIBNER
COLEMAN STALLINGS
HANS W. VOGEL
LEONARD M. WEISS
JAMES G. WITZIGRENTER
JOHN ZAVADIL
CORPORALS
FRANKIE A. ANDERSON
SAM ARNDT
JOSEPH E. BAUMER
WILLIAM J. BEAUMONT
HERBERT R. DAVIDSON
JOSEPH F. DRLIK JR.
MARTIN F. FITZGERALD
WALLY F. JONES JR.
RICHARD KOOYENGA
WILLIE A. LESTER
LINUS H. LUEBBERT
WILLIAM R. McCLAIN
RICHARD C. MILLER
CHARLES E. ROSS
TECHNICIANS 5TH GRADE
ROY S. ALEXANDER
ROBERT C. ANDERSON
WILLIAM G. BATTCHER
WATSON C. BEARDEN
FRANCIS C. BERNAS
WALDEN M. BRANT
FRANK W. BYRUM
ALVA G. CARMAN
JAMES B. CANEL
JULIAN J. COWAN
VINCENT E. DePASQUALE
LEONARD S. DePASQUE
CHARLES A. EUSTIS
HARLAN C. FARMER
HARRY L. FEINTUCH
TRAVIS S. FLEMING
EDWARD A. FUSSO
ALOYSIUS F. GEVERMUEHLE
DARROLD o·. GITTENS
JOHN GRIFFIN
DONALD L. 'HAZALL
CLARENCE J. HENKE
VICTOR E. JAEGER
JOSEPH F. JANKOWSKI
EDWIN F. KUSEK
EDWARD R. LESHER
JOSEPH F. McCUE
ARTHUR J. MODZELESKY
EARL L. MORGAN
CHARLES W. O'BRIEN
PATRICK J. PEPE

EDWARD A. POLLARD
<:HESTER B. RUDNICK
LEE J. SANBORN
HENRY J. SCHMITZ
JAMES R. STORMONT
JAMES J. SUTTON
JOHN B. SWEENEY
JAMES C. TALLEY
LLOYD G. THOMAS
GEORGE R. TRUAX
EWEL E. VAUGHAN
CLIFFORD F. WELLMAN
PRIVATES FIRST CLASS
MICHAEL C. ALBA
RALPH ALLEN
WILFRED C. ALLMAN
DONALD E. ARCHAMBEAU
JOHN F. ARCHER
RUSSELL J. ARMSTRONG
BERLIN ASHE
WILBUR E. BALDWIN
JAMES R. BAUCUM
RALPH S. BAYER
ALBERT J. BEARDSLEY
LADISLAUS J. BIELECKI
MALANGTON W. BILLS
ROLAND H. BLEAU
MAX BOGUALA WSKI
PETER J. BOMMARITO
IVAN C. BRENNEN
HOMER W. BRITT
STANLEY BROUGHTON
EVERETT L. BROWN
FRANK BRYANT
HERBERT C. BUCHMEIER
NORMAN A. BUNIN
GEORGE A. BURDGE
CHESTER G. BURTCH
EMMETT B. CAIN
ROY H. CARDER
JAMES B. CALVERT
MOlLE W. CARPENTER
RAYMOND L. CARR
ANTHONY J. CATANZERO
GODFREY B. CHILD
AMERICAO CICCONE
EUGENE H. CLA YTER
RUSSELL G. CONNELL
WILBERT V. COOK
ROBERT A. COOPER
SIMON A. CRAWFORD
ERVIN CROGAN
PAUL CURTIS
FRANK S. DAPICE
HERBERT A. DARRAH
JAMES R. DEBORD
ALPHONSE J. DENIS
SANDERS M. DORR JR.
FRANCIS P. DOWNING
JOSEPH R. DUPRE
CLARENCE G. DUDLEY
JAMES R. EAKIN
JOHN H. EBEL
FREDERICK L. EDWARDS
JOHN L. EISENMANN
RESTER R. ELLIS
WILLIAM M. EMPFIELD
REGINALD EMPSON
CARL G. ERIKSON JR.
RICHARD J. FABER JR.
PAUL M. FARRIS
MELVIN J. FISCHER
RAYMOND G. FOSTBERG
STEPHEN A. FRACARO
JOHN F. FUSSELL
EDWARD R. GEISZLER

HERMAN B. GIBSON
JESSE A. GLASS
JULIAN D. GOLDSTEIN
PHILIP C. GOLDSTEIN
DAVID GOLDSTINE
HUBERT E. GRAHAM
MORRIS A. GRANT
KARL R. GUSTAVSSON
SETH P. HALL
WALTER E. HAMBLIN
KENNETH K. HAMILTON
CHARLES P. HEARN
KEITH B. HARRIS
RODGER J. HARRIS
JAMES W. HARRISON
CLARENCE HATFIELD
WARREN R. HEEN
WILLIAM E. HELMS
WALTER G. HERRING
WILLIAM D. HICHEY
RICHARD E. HOFFMAN
THOMAS H. HOGGINS
WILLIAM R. HOLTON
ALAN T. HOWENSTINE
ROBERT L. INGLIS
EMMETT E. INLOW JR.
THEODORE E. JANAS
ROBERT E. JENNINGS
RUFUS JOHNSON
JAMES F. JOHNSTON
JAMES T. JONES
BENNIE W. JOOS
WALTER S. JUERGENSEN
RICHARD J. KAMINS
THOMAS L. KAPES JR.
FRANK H. KELLER
GLADSTONE 0. KILGORE
OTIS A. KING
EUGENE E. KLEEHAMMER
ROBERT KLIGMAN
JOHN F. KRZYWDA
VINCENT P. LAGO
EDSON A. LAKIN
FLOYD J. LANQRY JR.
EDWARD S. LEAKWAY
RALPH M. LEE
IRWIN J. LEVEN
J. B. LILLJEDAHL
PAUL D. LINDER
GEORGE D. LINDSAY
ZELBERT UNDSA Y
lGNATIOUS J. LO MONACO
ZACHARY M. LOWY
HAROLD L. LUDLOW
GERARD J. MAHLSTEDT
WALTER P. MARKUS
HARRY S. MASHTARE
JOHN J. MATHEWS
SAMUEL K. MAUPIN
JOHN MAURO JR.
DONALD McCAMPBELL
HAROLD E. McDANIEL
ESKER McNEIL JR.
KINSLEY McWHORTER JR.
JOHN T. McKAY
DONALD W. MEALS
EDWARD MELSBAK
WILLIAM G. MERLINE
RUSSELL MERRITT
ROY M. MILLER
WILFRED E. MILLER
JUAN M. MORENO
THOMAS J. MORT
PAUL V. MULROY
PAUL L. O"DANIEL
LEE O'DELL
CLINTON A. O"DONOHUE
WILLIAM H. OSBORN

FREDERICK PANZER
DON K. PARIS
NED PATTERSON
VIRGILE L. PAXSON
WILLIAM PECK JR.
ALFRED V. PFARR
WESLEY E. PHILIPS
W. T. PILLOW
FLORUS A. PINKSTON
RAYMOND L. POLLARD
RALPH W. PORCHE
SAM PRESLEY JR.
SYDNEY E. PRIBBLE JR.
NICHOLAS F. RADEL
JOSEPH T. RAFFERTY
DAVID RAY
CLAUDE E. REEL
ROBERT E. RYERSON JR.
MAX RIEMER
DONALD F. REISDORF
MARK A. ROMOHR
ALFRED SCHEPS
LEANORD S. SCHLECHTER
GEORGE F. SCHMITZ
WILLIAM STEL TZER
DEWEY SIZEMORE
MAY H. SHAFFER
EDWARD S. SHAPIRO
FRANK N. SHOTTA
RAUL 0. SHUCK
JOSEPH C. SICINA
JACK E. SILVER
ROBERT L. SIMINGTON
RUDOLPH SKALA
ANDREW C. STARR
JOHN T. STEMPIEN
FRED W. STUBBS
JAMES D. SWARTS
J . C. SWEATT
JOSEPH A.TALOTTA
TOLBERT G. TAYLOR
ANTHONY TEDESCO
ELDON D. TEEL
CHARLES R. TERRY
GORDON J. THORNTON
ROYCE A. TOMSON
BALTASAR TOVAR
CHARLES H. TURNER
THOMAS P. TYLER SR.
FRED T. UNFERDORFER
WILMER B. VAN BLARGAN
DAVID W. VAN ROSSUM
JOHN T. VERLANDER
BELFORD E. VOEGLIN
GEORGE W. WADDY JR.
DANIEL B. WATTS
JOHN J. WEAVER JR.
MILTON E. WELSCH
WALTER J. WERONKO
DANIEL S. WHITE
ROLAND B. WHITE
JOHN M. WITHEHEAD
SHELBY WILLAMS
ELMER WILSON
BARNEY T. WITKOSKI
FLOYD L. V. WOMACK
JENKINS WONG
DONALD D. WOOD
RAYMOND C. WOOD HILL
FRANK G. YANDS
MATTUS ZALEWSKI
PRIVATES
RALPH E. ACKER
JAMES E. SMITH
JESSE L SWEAZEY
ROBERT J. WATSON
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MAJOR
SAMUEL W . CALDWELL
CAPTAINS
JOSEPH W . BROWN JR.
ROBERT W . KING
JOHN J . RYAN
AARON SPECTOR
ROBERT C. G . STANLEY
FIRST LIEUTENANTS
PERRY HEIDELBERGER JR.
ELMER A. KAUFMANN
SECOND LIEUTENANT
NEAL L. ROSENSTEIN
TECHNICAL SERGEANT
ROBERT L. HUGHES
STAFF SERGEANTS
THOMAS E. HILL
MAX E. McCONNELL
EDWARD F. SZPIECH
GEORGE F. TOMASZEWSKI
TECHNICIANS 3RD GRADE
VINCENT A. BONAFEDE
SYLVESTER P. FINNERTY
WALTER G. GERHARD
GEORGE C. JONES
NATHAN B. LANG
FRANK C. MAHAR
DAVID SCHNEIDER
ClAIR V . SLAGG
EDWARD L. WHYTE
WILLIAM J. ZACK
SERGEANTS
RAYMOND F. CARLSON
ARTHUR R. WILSON
TECHNICIANS 4TH GRADE
EDWARD C. BERG
ROBERT P. FORNSHELL
ERNEST J . HILL
HERBERT JAFFE
ANTHONY J. KAPALA
WILLIAM F. KNETTLE
GEORGE L. MARSHALL
KENNETH K. MARTIN
COLEMAN STALLINGS
CORPORALS
FRANKIE A . ANDERSON
ALFRED M. CHILDERS
ALBERT E. FELDMAN
AMADEO LORENZO
MARTIN P. MALLOY
DONALD J . WOOLEY

TECHNICIANS 5TH GRADE
FRANCIS R. ABRAMS
ROBERT C. ANDERSON
WILLIAM A. ANTUNA
GEORGE W. BOYLES
ANTHONY J . CATANZARO
JULIAN J . COWAN
KENNETH L. DANIELS
VINCENT E. DePASQUALE
CALVIN E. DUFORD
HARLIN C. FARMER
TRAVIS S. FLEMING
CHARLES A. GAROSSA JR.
JOHN F. GNIT
JOHN GRIFFIN
CLARENCE J. HENKE
WILLIAM R. ITTNER
EDWARD F. LESHER
HAROLD D. McCOMBS
RUSSELL MERRITT
HERMAN ROSEN
LYNN A . ROSENBERGER
DONALD J. SAILORS
ROBERT J. SOUTHWELL
MANFRED E. STARNBERG
JAMES J. SUTTON
JOHN E. SWEENEY
LEONARD VIGARS
PRIVATES FIRST CLASS
ROBERT L. BAXTER
WILLIAM S. BLANTON
ROLAND H. BLEAU
HOMER W. BRITT
ADAM CAMPBELL
WILLIAM B. CANTER
JOSEPH E. CAPIK
ARNOLD E. CASTO
EUGENE H. CLAYTER
WILLIAM COHEN
WILBERT V. COOK
BRUCE D. CORRIE
PAUL F. COX
LESTER CRA YENS
DAVID D. CRAWFORD
DALTON R. CUIDRY
JUAN M. DeARRIBA
JOHN R. DICKEY
CLARENCE G. DUDLEY
FRANK J. DWORNCZEK
STEPHEN A.FRACARO
ALBERT FRENETTE
WELTON K. GARRETT
JOHN E. GILL

JESSE A. GLASS
RICHARD L. HALE
KENNETH K. HAMILTON
WILLIAM H. HAMPTON JR.
ROGER J. HARRIS
WARREN R. HEEN
WALTER E. JOHANSON
JAMES T. JONES
VINCENT P. LAGO
IGNATIUS J. LoMONACO
FRED T. MARCONE
JOSEPH MARINO
FELIX A. MATULA JR .
ALFRED J . MAZUREK
KEITH V. McNAMES
J. T . MELTON
DONALD C. MINKLER
SOLOMON NASH
CLINTON O'DONOHUE
EDWARD L. PARRISH
NICHOLAS F . RADEL
DAVID T. RAY
STANLEY J. RAZMUS
ARTHUR S. ROBINSON
NOLAN A. SALITA
DEWEY SARGENT
CHARLES H. SCARBROUGH
ALFRED SCHEPS
GEORGE F. SCHMITZ
IRVING SCHNABEL
ROBERT L. SIMINGTON
KENNETH S. SPAINHOUR
RAYMOND P. SPULLER
THOMAS J. SYKES
WILLIAM R. THRASHER
OLIVER R. THURMAN
ARTHUR L. TREECE
THOMAS P. TYLER JR.
MARCO A. VALENTI
PAUL M. WATSON
ROBERT J. WATSON
MILTON A. WELSCH
SHELLEY WILLIAMS
PRIVATES
CARL W. CHRIST
EDWARD B. DZIESINSKI
SCOTT C. FORBES
ANDREW KANEL
DOMINIC LEONINO
DON K. PARIS
JESSIE I. SWEAZEY
MARTINEZ WALKER
REGINALD 0. WHITE

CO C, 319TH MEDICAL BN

[Q]

ne of the most dramatic examples of American military
efficiency in this war is the humanitarian dispatch with
which wounded soldiers were evacuated from the
battlefield. So thorough and so swift was the process
0~0
whereby the Medical Department treated and transported the wounded that the number of men who died during or after
evacuation was practically negligible.
The first step in the process was immediate treatment by the Company
Aid Men. Mention has been made in this History of some of the
achievements of these unarmed heroes of the battlefield. But the Aid Man
could not remain with his patient very long. There were always too many
others to look after. The next step, the removal of the wounded man to
the battalion aid station, was the responsibility of the litter bearers. Only
some one who has actually had the experience of carrying a fullgrown
man several miles through dense woods and up steep hills, with ice
making the footing treacherous and fierce cold numbing the hands, and
with artillery shells falling indiscriminately along the route, can really
know how terrible and how completely fatiguing this can be. During some
attacks, the litter teams had to go out again and again without rest.
At the battalion aid station the wounded were given further care, tagged,
and sent by ambulance to the clearing station. There they were further
examined, and sent on to rear area hospitals.
All the work of litter bearing, ambulance driving and management of
the clearing station was in the hands of a group of less than 100 men
and officers, the Collecting Company. For the 376th this was Company C
of the 319th Medical Battalion. Wherever the Regiment went, Company C
was always on hand, always ready for their great life-saving task. During
the Regiment's period in combat, the Clearing Station evacuated over 6000
casualties, only three of whom died enroute.
For its fine work, Company C, 319th Medical Battalion received the
Meritorious Service Plaque and the gratitude of all the infantrymen who
owe their lives to the swift, able care of the "Medics".

SERVICE COMPANY PLAQUE
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ERVICE COMPANY very seldom gets to do any fighting.
Fighting is not its job. It is one of the specialized
organizations in the Regiment that is easily forgotten
in the accounts of actions where the front line battalions
0~0
are the pins that move on the map. Service Company
is often forgotten because its work is so vitally important in so many
different ways it is almost invariably taken for granted. Supplies and
ammunition get to the front line companies; the trucks are ready to roll
when they are needed; rations arrive regularly at the company kitchens;
mail gets to the men in the forward foxholes. All these things are SOP.
Without them the pins could not move on the map. But :!lone of these
things just happen. They are the result of unfaltering teamwork on the
part of the many branches of Service Company, working in all weather
and under the most adverse conditions, to see that they do happen.
Before the end of the war, the War Department realized the need for
some official recognition of the splendid achievements of the Army's
service troops. For this purpose the above plaque was authorized. For
its constant record of meritorious and faithful endeavor, Service Company,
376th Infantry, was among the units to be awarded this distinction. In
addition each man of the company received a small cloth replica of the
plaque to be worn on the right sleeve, an emblem that he can wear
as proudly as his Combat Infantry Badge. But no decoration can fully
indicate the 'eternal gratitude of the men of the front line companies who
remember that those whose job it was to supply them never let them down.

919TH FIELD ARTILLERY BN
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hroughout this history there are accounts of soldiers of
the 376th saving themselves from overwhelming counterattacks by calling for artillery fire. From the matter-offact way in which the story speaks of the man in the
0~0 foxhole "placing" artillery fire on the enemy, it would
appear to the uninitiated that this is a kind of automatic process, caused
by pressing a button. Indeed the action is so efficient as to seem almost
automatic: The observer picks up his phone or radio, gives a few figures,
and in a few minutes the shells begin to land, accurate and deadly.
The battalions of the 94th Division Artillery have on several occasions
been called "the best Artillery in the United States Army." Not the least
of these four excellent organizations is the 919th Field Artillery Battalion.
This 105mm howitzer outfit was a regular part of Combat Team 376
throughout the war. The infantrymen of the 376th Regiment are proud
of the fine record of their "very own'' artillery battalion. But they are also
grateful for the frequent support given by other units of Division and
Corps Artillery, especially the larger calibre guns which so effectively
silenced the harassing enemy batteries.
One of the most difficult assignments for the 919th was the St. Nazaire
sector where, with the help of one attached battalion, they had to cover
an area large enough for an entire Corps and counter enemy guns that
outnumbered them five to one. With the brilliant leadership of Colonel
Caveness, the 919th organized this extended front so effectively that not a
single yard was uncovered nor a patrol unsupported.
The 376th Infantry remembers especially the work of the 919th's Forward
Observers. These brave officers and their hard-working radio operators
were in and forward of the front lines during every action from the first
patrol at St. Nazaire to the final conquest of Ludwigshafen. The FO's and
the Artillery's Liaison Officers also served as instructors, teaching the
riflemen the technique of adjusting fire.
Never has the 919th failed to give su pport which the 376th required.

CO C, 319TH ENGINEER C BN
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he combat infantryman usually thinks of himself as a
lone. warrior. The other arms and services work hard
to prepare him for his job, but when he gets into that
front line foxhole, he feels very much alone. However
0~0
he has one companion who is usually by his side, if
not out in front of him. That faithful comrade is the Combat Engineer.
When the doughboy is stopped by mines, the engineer clears a path for
him. When a pillbox halts the advance, the engineer blows it up. When
there is a river in the way, the engineer ferries the riflemen across in
assault boats and then builds a bridge.
Ever since training days at Camp Phillips, Company C of the 319th
Engineer Combat Battalion has been an integral pa~t of Combat Team 376.
In training the engineers learned how to use an M-1 as well as their more
specialized tools. They acted as demonstration crews to teach the
infantrymen the technique of assaulting fortified areas.
In the St. Nazaire sector, the men of Company C went out in front of
the lines to lay mines, booby-traps and barbed wire for the protection
of the static positions. From the middle of October almost until the
freezing weather of winter had set in, incessant rains kept the roads in
the Regimental sector in a muddy and bog-like state. Constant road work
kept the engineers busy throughout this period.
When the 376th began its assaults on the Siegfried Switch Line, the
work of the engineers became even more complicated. First the vehicles
had to be given a coat of snow-camouflage paint. Then with the attack
on Tettingen-Butzdorf came Company C's real battle proving. Engineers
with mine detectors accompanied the forward scouts into the towns.
On January 17th the company worked feverishly on two jobs, constructing a
road to supply the First Battalion in Tettingen, and assisting Company B,
376th in a~saulting two pillboxes. Both boxes were completely demolished
in less than three hours.
To supply the Third Battalion in Nennig, the engineers crossed the
Moselle River in assault boats at Besch. Captain Grover D. Rose, then

commanding Company C was wounded on the morning of January 19th
near Wochern. On the evening of the 19th the Company was relieved
and went back into France for a "rest," which consisted of several days
spent repairing the plumbing and lighting fixtures for the Division Rest
Camp. On January 25th Company C returned to the line to continue its
work breaching the many mine fields and destroying pill boxes.
After a brief period with the Company, Captain Rose returned to the
hospital on February 13th for further treatment, and command of the
Company was assumed by Captain Lawrence T. Brighton.
During the crossing of the Saar, the First Platoon of Company C went
across with the first wave of boats, equipped with pole charges for the
destruction of the many concrete emplacements. The remainder of the
Company worked at the 94th Division bridgehead ferrying vehicles and
building a bridge, under constant enemy artillery and small arms fire.
Almost 70 % of the engineers' equipment was destroyed by artillery during
this operation.
Throughout the drive to the Rhine and the attack on Ludwigshafen
the engineers did route reconnaissance and cleared road blocks.
Versatile and faithful, the soldiers of Company C, 319th Engineer Combat
Battalion played an important role in the accomplishments of the 376th.
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